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This dissertation investigated the impacts of regulatory policies on well-being of immigrant families and 
low-income families, which offers evidence for policymakers to evaluate the necessity of employing 
harsh measures. In the first paper, I used the nationally representative National Health Interview Survey 
(2000-2012) to study the health and mental health impacts of local immigration enforcement policies, 
under Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Secure 
Communities Program. I found some evidence of local immigration enforcement policies negatively 
impacting the mental health and self-rated health of Latino immigrants. In the second paper, I explored 
relationships between participation in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program and 
parental investments in children, and how stringencies in state TANF policy requirements impacted the 
relationships. I used the 2004 and 2008 panels of Survey on Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and 
found that TANF participation was associated with increased family meal times and decreased incidences 
of family outings and reading time. TANF participation was not associated with other areas of parenting 
(e.g., extracurricular activity participation, family rules on watching TV, positive parenting, parenting 
stress, and parental expectation). Also, stringent state TANF policy characteristics were not associated 
with negative parenting behaviors. In the last paper, I investigated how the stringencies of state TANF 
policy were associated with single mothers’ long-term trajectories of welfare use, labor supply, and 
earned income. I used the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of SIPP data (1996-2007), covering the decade 
following TANF implementation. Findings indicated that stringent state TANF policies were strongly 
related to single mothers’ lower likelihood to participate in TANF; however, single mothers used other 
welfare programs (e.g., SNAP and SSI) to the same extent as single mothers living in states with less 
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This dissertation investigates impacts of regulatory policies on well-being of population 
groups that are vulnerable and generally framed as “undeserving” in policy discourse. 
Specifically, I examine impacts of two regulatory policies on families in need of welfare and 
families with undocumented immigrants (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). The first set of policies 
under examination is the local immigration enforcement policies, under Section 287(g) of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Secure Communities 
Program. These immigration enforcement policies have expanded the terrain of immigration 
enforcement to county and state jurisdiction in identifying the undocumented immigrants. Latino 
immigrants are disproportionately targeted and affected in the enforcement process. Prior 
literature documented the policy effects of state and local enforcement on earnings, employment, 
and settlement patterns of undocumented immigrants. In the first paper, I specifically study the 
health and mental health impacts of local and state enforcement policies on Latino immigrant 
adults aged 18 to 60, using a nationally representative dataset, National Health Interview Survey 
(2000-2012). This paper is the first to estimate the health effects of immigration enforcement 
policies at the national level, and findings offer evidence to assess the full range of costs and 
benefits of these policies. 
The second policy that I study is the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
that imposed work requirements, time limits and sanctions on noncompliance to work 
requirements to the poor seeking cash welfare. For low-income families, stringent state policy 
requirements denote extra levels of psychological stress and stigma in addition to being in 
economic hardship. The second and the third papers of my dissertation are devoted to 
investigating impacts of stringent policies on the well-being of children and households headed 




parental investments in children and whether TANF participation in states with more stringent 
policy requirements leads to negative parental investments. This aim uses data from Child 
Wellbeing Topical Modules of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (2004-2006 and 
2009-2011) and employs individual fixed effect models. This paper extends prior literature in 
covering less examined outcomes such as family interactions and environment and examining 
impacts of TANF participation using updated data from 8-13 years post-welfare reform. 
In the third paper, I compare employment, earnings, and welfare use long-term 
trajectories of low-skilled single mothers living in states with lenient versus stringent TANF 
policy requirements from 1996 to 2007 using the SIPP data. This paper aims to explore whether 
more stringent state TANF policies are associated with single mothers being more self-sufficient 
in working more, earning more, and using welfare less in the long-run. Findings from this study 
contribute to our knowledge on long-term trajectories following lenient and stringent welfare-to-
work policy requirements. 
Implication 
Population groups that are socially constructed negatively and possess weak political 
power often face regulatory and punitive policy tools (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). These 
population groups are framed as undeserving, dishonest, or selfish and have limited wealth and 
resources to mobilize for actions to guard their interests (Schneider & Ingram, 1997). Examples 
of these vulnerable groups include welfare recipients, undocumented immigrants, and criminals. 
On the contrary, population groups that are positively constructed and have strong political 
power, such as veteran and the elderly, often face beneficiary public policies. Given that these 
“undeserving” population groups lack public support to repeal punitive and regulatory policy 




measures on well-being of the disadvantaged populations. These efforts are in line social 
workers’ commitment to social justice and the mission to advocate for the disadvantaged. 
Evidence from evaluating impacts of regulatory policies may provide powerful leverage to 
reevaluate the necessity of punitive measures. Against this backdrop, the three papers in this 
dissertation contribute to the body of work in evaluating impacts of regulatory policies on well-
being of vulnerable populations. 
References 
Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction of target populations: Implications for 
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Backgrounds: I study the effect of local immigration enforcement that has escalated fear and 
risk of deportation among the undocumented on the health and mental health outcomes of Latino 
immigrants living in the United States. In 1996, the US government passed the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Section 287(g) of IIRIRA 
grants state and local jurisdictions the choice to enter into agreements with Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement to participate in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. The number 
of localities pursuing 287(g) agreements has increased from two in 2002 to 76 in 2009 across 26 
states. Since 2008, the Secure Communities Program (SC) gradually replaced 287(g) and was 
implemented in all counties nation-wide in 2013. As a result, tens of thousands of undocumented 
immigrants were removed annually from prison or during policing operations. 
 
Data and Methods: I use the restricted-use National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data 
(2000-2012) and link county-level 287(g) and SC policy variables to study the effect of local 
immigration enforcement on the health and mental health outcomes of Latino immigrants. Health 
is measured by self-rated health, and mental health is measured by Kessler-6 Psychological 
Distress Scale. The analytic sample is restricted to adults aged 18-60 born in Latin America 
living in households with at least one noncitizen family member. Ordinary least square models 
with county and year fixed effects are used to measure the health effects.  
 
Results and Conclusion: I found some evidence of local immigration enforcement policies 
adversely impacting mental health and self-rated health of Latino immigrants. There is little 
national-level scientific research on how immigration policy environment affects immigrant 
health, in general, and how state- and local-activism on immigration enforcement has influenced 
the health and mental health of immigrant families. This research bridges this critical knowledge 








 Over the past decade, the terrain of immigration enforcement in the United States has 
expanded from national borders to local and state jurisdictions, resulting in increased arrests on 
grounds of immigration status and national origin (Lacayo, 2010). Surveys has shown that Latino 
immigrants report being subject to racial profiling during police patrolling or other police 
activities (Lacayo, 2010). Previous research documents that local and state government 
participation in immigration enforcement has affected immigrant settlement patterns, their 
employment and earnings, and patterns of farm labor use and farm profitability (Pham and Van, 
2010; Capps, Rosenblum, Rodriquez, and Chishti. 2011; Kostandini, Mykerezi, and Escalante, 
2013; Watson, 2013). How local immigration enforcement has influenced the health and mental 
health of the undocumented and their families remains an understudied area of research (Hardy 
et al., 2011).  
 Involvement of local and state governments in immigration enforcement intensifies fears 
of deportation and is likely to leave a negative impact on the physical as well as mental health of 
undocumented immigrants and their family members, many of whom may be legal residents. 
Local enforcement is also likely to make undocumented immigrants and their families more 
vulnerable to workplace exploitation. As a coping mechanism, they may adopt certain unhealthy 
behaviors (e.g. smoking, alcohol consumption), risking long term health.  
Understanding the health consequences of local immigration enforcement is important to 
inform debates on immigration reforms. Extant research has shown that local immigration 
enforcement measures escalate stress and anxiety levels of immigrants and deter them from 
seeking health services (Rhodes et al., 2015; Hacker et al., 2011). These studies are local or state 




systematic national research on health and mental health impacts of local enforcement. In this 
paper, I bridge this knowledge gap by studying the effects of local immigration enforcement on 
health and mental health outcomes of Latino immigrant adults in households with non-citizen 
members, a population that has a high propensity of being affected by enforcement policies 
(Zong & Batalova, 2016). Specifically, I study the effects of local enforcement resulting from 
Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
and the Secure Communities program. I take advantage of the geographic (county-level) and 
temporal variation in the implementation of Section 287(g) and the Secure Communities 
program to study their impacts on health. The empirical analysis is based on the National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS) (2000-2012) that provides rich information on health and mental health 
conditions. The restricted use NHIS data allow me to link the county- and state-level policy 
variables to the individual-level data to study the policy effects.  
I adopt a comparison group research design to test if time-varying factors correlated with 
country/state level enforcement policies confound the estimated effects. I run models on U.S. 
born non-Hispanic White, who are unaffected by enforcement policies. The validity of this 
research design requires that the estimated effects of enforcement policy on the comparison 
group are modest and insignificant. If not, that would imply that there are time-varying factors 
correlated with enforcement policies that affected the health outcomes of the comparison group 
and that these same factors may also be confounding the estimates of the effects of the policies 
on Latino immigrants.  
The legislative debates on immigration enforcement are carried out with the implicit 
assumption that enforcement only affects the undocumented and not their family members, who 




enforcement policies that I study are not designed with any explicit intent of influencing the 
health outcomes of immigrant families. Partly for this reason the health consequences of 
immigration enforcement have not been thoroughly studied or discussed. However, given the far 
reaching impact that immigration enforcement has on the lives of the undocumented and their 
families, their health consequences are likely to be non-negligible and critical in capturing the 
full range of costs and benefits of immigration enforcement policies.  
Local Immigration Enforcement Policies – Section 287(g) and Secure Communities 
In 1996, with the stated goal to increase public safety and remove illegal immigrants who 
committed serious offenses, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 
Section 287(g) granted state and local jurisdictions the option to participate in enforcement of 
federal immigration laws. Because participation in Section 287(g) has been voluntary, some 
localities decided to participate while others opted out. Localities opting to participate signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that required 
establishing a supervisory structure to support localities and train local officials to enforce 
immigration laws. Section 287(g) involves two types of enforcement agreements: Task Force 
Enforcement (TF) allows state and local law enforcement officers to screen for immigration 
status in the field during policing operations (street screening) and Jail Enforcement (JE) that 
allows local enforcement officials to screen for immigration status in jails. Local participation in 
Section 287 (g) was negligible in the first decade of after its passage. In 2002, Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement and in 2003 Alabama Department of Public Safety were the 
first two localities to sign 287(g) agreements with ICE. Local participation in 287(g) slowly 
picked up in 2005 and the number peaked in 2009, when the number of localities participating in 




agreements, 47 signed Jail Enforcement agreements, and 5 agreements involved both TF and JE.1 
These state- and local-level TF agreements cover 22% (690 counties) of all 3140 counties, and 
JE agreements cover 3% (106 counties) of all counties (See Figure 2). 
From 2006 to 2012, local officials deputized under 287(g) arrested 256,330 
undocumented immigrants (ICE FOIA, 2015). In 2008, the number of removals under 287(g) 
represents 9.5% of all ICE immigrant removals (Lacayo, 2010). Some of these removals were 
based on minor traffic offenses such as driving without driver’s license or driving under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs (Vaughan & Edwards, 2009). In addition, anecdotal evidence 
suggested that Latinos were subject to racial profiling and were increasingly pulled over and 
interrogated for minor offenses as an excuse to check their documentation status (Lacayo, 2010). 
In the 2008 National Survey of Latinos administered by Pew Hispanic Center, nearly 10% of 
Hispanic adults (both native-born and immigrants) reported that they had been asked by the 
police or other authorities about their immigration status in the past year, and 35% of native-born 
Hispanic citizens said that they worried “a lot or some” about deportation of relatives, or friends 
(Lopez & Minushikin, 2008; Lacayo, 2010). In short, escalation in local immigration 
enforcement activities has disproportionately affected the lives of Latino families.   
Interior immigration enforcement took another turn in 2008 with the launch of the Secure 
Communities program (SC) that required matching fingerprints of all arrested individuals with 
the ICE database to screen for immigration violations. Whereas Section 287(g) was designed to 
engage local law enforcement in immigration enforcement, Secure Communities allowed ICE a 
                                                          
1 In this study, TF is defined as whether having TF agreements in counties, and JE is defined as whether having JE 
agreements in counties. In this case, localities that have both TF and JE are coded as 1 for both policy variables. In 
Appendix Table A, I conducted sensitivity analyses using two additional sets of policy coding. One, coding having 
TF agreements as 1 and having JE yet not having TF policies as 0. Two, coding having TF agreements and not 




technological presence in local law enforcement agencies. Under SC, when a person is arrested 
or in jail for a criminal offense, the state and local authorities are required to submit fingerprints 
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which the latter shares with ICE to check against 
immigration databases to identify (removable) undocumented individuals (ICE, 2015). 
Compared to 287(g), Secure Communities expedites enforcement without imposing additional 
requirements on local law enforcement. Unlike 287(g), participation in Secure Communities was 
not voluntary. It was gradually rolled out across counties, from covering 14 counties in 2008 to 
nation-wide in 2013 (See Figure 2).  
In 2015, SC was replace by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). PEP follows the 
similar procedures as Secure Communities and differs from SC in that PEP focuses on 
individuals convicted of significant criminal offenses or those who pose a threat to public safety. 
PEP only seeks to transfer individuals who have been convicted of an offense listed under the 
Department of Homeland Security civil immigration enforcement priorities. These priorities are 
participation in an organized criminal gang to further the illegal activity of the gang, or posing a 
danger to national security (ICE, 2016). Overall, the evolution of local immigration policies from 
Section 287(g), SC, to PEP show traces of ICE’s efforts to respond to the concern about racial 
profiling and to reduce the incidence of removing individuals based on minor crimes (ICE, 2015; 
2016).  
Previous research has shown that stricter local immigration control policies have 
contributed to a decline in immigrants’ economic opportunities, lowering their employment and 
wages (Kostandini, Mykerezi, & Escalante, 2013; Pham & Van, 2010; Gentsch & Massey, 
2011). These policies also lead to a reduction in remittances (Amuedo-Dorantes & Puttitanun, 




place, which may deteriorate the work conditions faced by immigrant workers (Gleeson, 2014). 
Enforcement policies also showed to have mixed impacts on crime rates, where no effect was 
reported in Prince William County, Virginia (Koper et al., 2013) and a higher rate of police 
arrests on grounds of immigration status and national origin was found in Davidson County, 
Tennessee, a new immigrant gateway city (Donato & Rodriquez, 2014). Studies also reported 
that 287(g) did not significantly affect undocumented immigrants’ migration patterns. Task 
Force Enforcement policies increased the outflow of non-citizens with some college education, 
missing the intended policy target (Watson, 2013). Parrado (2012) also found that 287(g) did not 
affect the size of Mexican immigrant population outside of large cities such as Dallas, Los 
Angeles, Riverside, and Phoenix.  
Immigration Enforcement and Health 
 Immigration is a stressful undertaking with negative psychosocial impacts (Vega & 
Amaro, 1994; Jasso et al., 2004). It is associated with increased stress, fear, and uncertainty. For 
families with undocumented members, the negative health effects of migration are more intense 
and complicated (Sullivan & Rehm, 2005; Delva et al., 2013). Repeated exposure to prejudice, 
discrimination, and exploitation on account of immigration status, and concerns about disclosure 
and deportation, of oneself or a family member, are likely to leave a negative impact on the 
physical as well as mental health of the undocumented and their family members (Vega & 
Amaro, 1994; Cavazor-Rehg et al., 2007; Sullivan & Rehm, 2005).  
Immigration enforcement policies may further affect health status of undocumented 
immigrants and their families through several mechanisms. First, immigration enforcement 
policies increase risk of deportation and are likely to increase the stress, fear, and anxiety of 




outcomes. Second, economic consequences of immigration enforcement on the undocumented, 
such as fewer job opportunities, increased exploitation at work, decreased earning, or facing a 
bread winner being deported would also have negative health and mental health effects. Third, 
immigrants have reported to minimize their time driving on the road to reduce their chances of 
being stopped by a police. This avoidance to travel may reduce social interaction, social support, 
and health service utilization (Rhodes et al., 2015; Hardy et al., 2011). Fourth, the increase in 
immigration enforcement may escalate immigrants’ levels of mistrust toward public institutions, 
lowering their health and social service utilization rates (Watson, 2014; Padraza & Zhu, 2015; 
Rhodes et al., 2015; Cavazos-Rehg, Zayas & Spitznagel, 2007). Finally, to cope with the 
escalated psychological and economic burden associated with the increased risk and exploitation, 
immigrants may adopt certain behaviors that may be unhealthy (e.g. smoking, alcohol 
consumption), risking long term health.  
Extant research on impacts of local immigration enforcement policies on health generally 
focus on regional case studies and often utilize qualitative research methods, and their findings 
support most mechanisms described above (Rhodes et al., 2015; Hardy et al., 2011; Hacker et al., 
2011). Rhodes and colleagues (2015) utilized qualitative interviews and focus groups to study 
impacts of Section 287(g) in local counties in North Carolina on Hispanic immigrants, Hacker et 
al. (2011) used focus groups to study impacts of ICE activities on health in Everett, 
Massachusetts, and Hardy et al. (2011) conducted semi-structured interviews and focus groups to 
study impacts of the SB 1070 in Arizona, a bill that made failure to possess immigration 
documents a crime and expanded police power to detain potentially undocumented resident. 
Respondents in these studies stated that they avoid using health care and other social services 




and ineligibility for state-issued driver’s licenses (Rhodes et al., 2015; Hacker et al., 2011; Hardy 
et al., 2011). They also do not seek care when needed, delay preventive services, have 
incomplete sequence of care, reduce their utilization in both preventive care and curative care, 
and increase the use of nonstandard and unsafe contingencies for care (Rhodes et al., 2015; 
Hacker et al., 2011; Hardy et al., 2011). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that reduced mobility 
limits immigrants’ physical activity and influences food purchases and consumption behaviors 
(e.g., “people go to the nearest place to get whatever they can find to eat (pp. 1251, Hardy et al., 
2011)”), which may have long-term impacts on physical health (Hardy et al., 2011; Hacker et al., 
2011). Also, respondents reported deterioration in mental health among family members 
resulting from high levels of fear associated with immigration enforcement. These mental health 
impacts include isolation, frustration, decreased self-esteem, anxiety, and depression, and these 
adverse psychological effects compromise physical health, showing symptoms of hair loss and 
hypertension (Rhodes et al., 2015; Hardy et al., 2011; Hacker et al., 2011). Although these 
studies documented immigrants’ experiences under local immigration enforcement at a state or 
local scale, they are limited in their scope to depict health impacts of enforcement policies at the 
national level.  
This study extends prior research in that it is the first study to use nationally 
representative data to study health impacts of local immigration enforcement policies. I examine 
the extent to which the mental health and health status of Latino immigrant families has been 
affected due to the immigration enforcement initiatives across hundreds of counties across the 
U.S. The scale of the examination offers more generalizable evidence for immigration reform 
policy debates. Findings from the study can shed light to health consequences of adopting 




The primary hypothesis of the current study is as follows: local immigration enforcement 
policies (Section 287(g) and SC) that marginalize and exclude the undocumented, will intensify 
the stress, fears, and uncertainties of immigration, adversely affecting the health outcomes of not 
only the undocumented, but also of their family members, who may be U.S. citizens or legal 
permanent residents. To study the health impacts, I take advantage of the “natural experiments” 
created by variations in the local immigration enforcement policy across geographic locations 
(state and local jurisdictions) and years. A number of specification checks, described in the 
empirical strategies section, are applied to test the causality of these effects. 
Methods 
Samples and Research Designs  
The goal of this study is to examine health impacts of local immigration enforcement on 
not only the undocumented immigrants, who are directly affected by local immigration 
enforcement, but also their family members and friends living in the same household who may 
be legal immigrants or US citizens. The main analysis is conducted on two samples of adults 
aged 18 to 60 born in Latin America (Latino immigrants hereafter): those in households with at 
least one non-citizen member and those in households with only non-citizen family members 
(and no citizen family members).2    
                                                          
2 I also repeat the analysis on two additional samples: non-Latino foreign born adults (non-Latino immigrants 
hereafter), and US-born Latino adults. Results are included in the Appendices B and C. Non-Latino immigrants have 
a lower propensity to be undocumented compared Latino immigrants, and they are less likely to be targeted during 
the enforcement practice by appearance. However, the hostility towards immigrants may still adversely affect their 
well-being, and there could still be some non-Latino undocumented immigrants captured in the survey. Hence, I 
hypothesize that the health effects on non-Latino immigrants will be modest. US-born Latinos are not targeted by 
enforcement policies since they cannot be deported. Yet, they may be subject to racial profiling in daily lives in the 
immigration enforcement practices, and they may have undocumented family members or friends who are directly 
affected by intensified enforcement.  I hypothesize that their distress regarding the hostile policy environment 
towards their racial group and their fear for undocumented family members or friends being identified and deported 
may compromise their health and mental health. So, although US-born Latino immigrants are not the target group of 





Latino immigrant families are the focus of this study since 77 percent of all 
undocumented immigrants in the US come from Latin America, with Mexico being the largest 
country of origin (56% of all undocumented immigrants), followed by Guatemala (6%), El 
Salvador (4%), and Honduras (3%) (Zong & Batalova, 2016).3 These countries also represent the 
leading countries of origin of apprehended undocumented immigrants (Zong & Batalova, 2016). 
Also, it is estimated that about 47% of foreign born Latinos or 68% of non-citizen Latinos in the 
US are undocumented in 2012 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012; Zong & Batalova, 2016).4 Restricting 
samples of analysis to Latino immigrants in households with at least one non-citizen or without 
any citizen allows this study to capture adults living in households most affected by the 
enforcement policies. I hypothesize that local immigration enforcement policies adversely affect 
the health and mental health of Latino immigrants in households with at least one citizen, and 
effects will be even stronger for those living in households where all members are non-citizens, 
since they are more likely to be undocumented and hence have a higher propensity to be directly 
affected by enforcement policies.    
A primary challenge in any nation-wide study on the undocumented in the U.S. is that 
national data sources do not provide information on the legal status of foreign-born persons, so it 
is impossible to determine whether an immigrant respondent is undocumented or a legal resident. 
Although researchers have explored strategies to impute legal status from survey data (Hall, 
Greeman, & Farkas, 2010), the most suitable health data set for this study, NHIS, does not 
                                                          
3 In all analyses on Latino immigrants, this study controls for region of origin: Mexico, Central America, and South 
America. In Table 8, I further conducted sensitivity analyses using Mexican immigrants as the analytic samples. The 
results are similar to those from Latino immigrants. 
4 In 2012, the number of undocumented immigrants in the US was estimated to be 11.4 million, and 77% of them 
come from Latin America (Zong & Batalova, 2016). This suggests that approximately there were 8.8 million Latino 
undocumented in the US in 2012 (11,400,000 x 0.77 = 8,778,000). The number foreign born and non-citizen 
population who identified as Latino in 2012 was 18,579,270 and 12,977,027, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2012). This leads to estimations that 47% of foreign born Latinos (8,778,000 / 18,579,270 = 0.472) or 68% of non-




collect necessary information to replicate these imputation strategies. In this paper, I have tried to 
address this limitation by identifying groups that have a high likelihood to be undocumented. I 
acknowledge that there may be some individuals in the targeted group/s that are unaffected by 
enforcement, which would result in estimates biased towards zero.  
I begin with the following regression equation: 
𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽𝑐 + 𝛽𝑡 +  𝜒1𝑇𝐹𝑐𝑡 + 𝜒2𝐽𝐸𝑐𝑡 + 𝜒3𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑡 + 𝑃𝑐𝑡𝜑 + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡∆ + 𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑡     (1) 
i = 1, …, N (persons) 
c = 1, …, 306 (counties) 
t = 2000, …, 2012 (years) 
where 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑡 represents a health outcome of individual i (or a mental health outcome; 
described in detail in the Measures section); 𝑇𝐹𝑐𝑡 is coded as 1 if county c has a Task Force 
Enforcement agreement with ICE in year t, otherwise 0; 𝐽𝐸𝑐𝑡, equals to 1 if county c has a Jail 
Enforcement agreement with ICE in year t, otherwise 0; and 𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑡 equals to 1 if county c has a 
Secure Communities agreement in year t, otherwise 0. The equation includes a full set of county 
fixed effects (𝛽𝑐) and year fixed effects (𝛽𝑡); time-varying county characteristics (𝑃𝑐𝑡) such as 
county unemployment rate in year t, county poverty rate in year t, whether the county is located 
in a state that provides in-state tuition subsidy to the undocumented residents in year t, whether 
the county is located in a state that allows undocumented immigrants to obtain driver’s license in 
year t, whether the county is located in a state that has Omnibus Bills passed in year t,5 and 
whether the county is located in a state that passed E-Verify in year t; individual characteristics 
                                                          
5 Omnibus bills across states generally “require law enforcement to attempt to determine the immigration status of a 
person involved in a lawful stop; allow state residents to sue state and local agencies for noncompliance with 
immigration enforcement; require E-Verify; and make it a state violation for failure to carry an alien registration 
document (NCSL, 2012).” In some states, the regulations are further to the areas of driver’s license/IDs (e.g., 
driver’s licenses or IDs issued to foreign nationals shall distinguish between lawful permanent residents and 
temporary immigrants), business or public records transactions (e.g., made it a felony for an alien not lawfully 
present to enter into business transactions with government, such as applying for or renewing a motor vehicle 
license plate or a business license), harbor/transport/rental agreements (e.g., made it illegal for a person to transport 
an alien; conceal, harbor or shield an alien), or public benefits (e.g., denying the provision of public benefits to 





6 such as age, sex, marital status, education level, household size, family income, citizenship 
status, years lived in the US, cohort of arrival, and region of origin; whether the interview was 
conducted in English and 𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑡 as unobserved characteristics.  
The identifying assumption in equation (1) is that there are no time-varying factors 
correlated with enforcement policy. Conditional on the validity of this assumption, estimated 
effect of enforcement policy variables would yield the effect of enforcement policies on the 
health and mental health of Latino immigrants. Note that I include a rich set of time-varying 
county effects (𝑃𝑐𝑡).  However, there may still be other time-varying factors correlated with 
enforcement policies that may confound the estimated effects. To address this issue, I estimate 
equation (1) using a sample of US born non-Hispanic White adults, who are unlikely to be 
affected by enforcement policies. For the identifying assumption to be valid, the estimated 
effects of the policies should be negligible on this group. 
One possible confounder of the empirical specification in the above equation is other 
county-specific or state-specific time-varying factors correlated with the policy variables (𝑇𝐹𝑐𝑡, 
𝐽𝐸𝑐𝑡, and 𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑡) that may affect the health outcomes of Latino immigrant adults. I address this 
issue in two ways. One, I include a set of county-specific time-varying factors (denoted by 𝑃𝑐𝑡) 
described above – namely county unemployment rate, county poverty rates, and other local 
immigration policies (e.g., Dream Act, driver’s license, Omnibus Bills, E-Verify). These 
variables control for the time-varying economic and policy environments that may be correlated 
                                                          
6 The detailed coding of these controls are as follow: age ((omitted category 19-24), 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-
49, 50-54, 55-60), gender (male), marital status (married), education level (less than 9 years, 9-12 years (no high 
school degree), (omitted category: high school degree or GED), some colleges or more), household size dummies (1, 
2, (omitted category: 3-4), 5+), log family income, language of interview (not English), years since immigration (0-
5, 6-10, 11-15, (omitted category: 15+)), cohort of arrival ((omitted category before 1987), 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 





with the enforcement policy variables and influence the health and mental health of Latino 
immigrants. Two, I repeat the analysis on US born non-Hispanic White adults, who are unlikely 
to be affected by the policies. The estimated effect of the policies should be negligible on this 
group. If not, that would indicate that the research design adopted here is not appropriate to 
measure the effect of enforcement policies.   
Another possible threat to the above specifications could arise if the population most 
affected by local and state immigration enforcement decided to return to their countries of origin 
or relocated in another locality with a lesser threat of local enforcement. Watson (2013) found 
that while 287(g) did not result in voluntary emigration, Task Force enforcement increased the 
probability of relocating within the U.S. and the effect was greater among non-citizens with at 
least some college education. There is not much we can do address this problem. Assuming that 
those who decided to relocate were also most adversely affected by policies, the estimates of 𝜒1, 
𝜒2, and 𝜒3 would be biased towards zero.  
Another source of bias could arise if local enforcement resulted in increased positive 
health/mental selection of new immigrants – i.e. new immigrants being healthier than immigrants 
who arrived in the U.S. before enforcement policies were enacted in 2002. I conducted a 
sensitivity analysis restricting to the target samples to pre-2002 arrivals to address this bias. 
Results from this analysis were similar to those from larger sample suggesting that bias on 
account of healthy migration in counties with stringent enforcement policies is modest or non-
existent in our analysis.   
Differential non-response rates in survey among affected population constitute an 
additional source of bias. The NHIS survey asks respondents to provide their social security 




than 60% of Latino immigrants have done so (Carter-Pokras & Fischer, 2010), this request may 
increase the probability of undocumented immigrants and their family members refusing to 
participate in the survey. Furthermore, the non-response patterns may be correlated with the 
policy variables. That is, the survey response rates could be lower among immigrants after the 
implementation of local immigration enforcement policies in counties. Higher non-response 
among affected population is likely to yield estimates that are biased towards zero.  
Data 
The empirical analysis requires merging the Section 287(g) and Secure Communities 
policy variables to the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data (2000-2012). The NHIS 
data offer the advantage of having a relatively large sample size and oversampling Hispanic 
population, which is essential given that this study focuses on Latino immigrants. Also, the 
NHIS is rich in measures of health and mental health (detailed in the measures section).  
Because of confidentiality and disclosure rules, the National Center for Health Statistics 
(NCHS) does not provide state/county level identifiers in the public use NHIS. All analysis for 
this paper has been conducted on the restricted use NHIS that contains data on state/county level 
identifiers at the NY Census Data Center upon approval from the NCHS Research Data Center, 
who also enabled merging of policy variables by county and year with the micro-level NHIS 
data. 
I use three enforcement policy variables: whether a county had Task Force agreement 
with ICE in year t, whether a country had Jail Enforcement with ICE in year t, and whether a 
county has a Secure Communities initiative in year t. Other time-varying county variables that 
are merged with the NHIS are: unemployment rate and poverty rate by county and year as well 




state and year. The restricted use NHIS data also provide detailed information on the year of 
immigrant entry in the US and their country of birth, which are used to construct detailed control 
variables on the cohort of arrival, years since immigration, as well as regions/country of origin.  
The sample sizes for Latino immigrant adults in households with some non-citizens in 
NHIS (2000-2012) are 71,241 for the self-rated health measure and 24,210 for the mental health 
and physical health conditions collected in the Sample Adult module. The corresponding sample 
sizes for Latino immigrants in households with only non-citizen family members (no citizen 
members) are 18,948 and 7,680. A power analysis suggests that, in a model with 353 controls 
(including dummies for counties) that explains 10% of variability in an outcome, a sample size 
of 1280 can have 90% power with a significance level of 0.05 to detect an R-Squared of 0.01 
attributed to three of the key policy variables (Cohen, 1988). Since the sample sizes in different 
sample specifications are larger than 1280, this study has more than 90% power to detect the 
policy effects. 
Because Latino immigrants cluster in a small number of counties in the US, in order to 
avoid spurious results on account of a small number of observations in a few counties, the 
empirical analysis is based on counties with at least 20 observations of Latino immigrants. 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of counties nationally that had each type of enforcement policies 
by year, and the proportions in NHIS counties as well as NHIS counties with at least 20 Hispanic 
non-citizen observations.  
Multiple sources have been used to compile data on the histories of policies and 
contextual economic environment. Data on local enforcement policies by county and year are 
obtained from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) through a FOIA request as well 




Agreements from the ICE website, ICE screenshots from other websites, and published reports 
(ICE, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2014; Justice Strategies, 2007; American Immigration Lawyers 
Association, 2008; 2009; Dream Activist, 2008; DHS, 2010; Lacayo, 2010; Apsan Law Offices, 
LLC, 2010; Kostandini et al., 2013). The initiation dates of Secure Communities program are 
obtained through a publicly available document (ICE, 2013). The state Dream Act state policy 
data were compiled through various published papers (Wong & Shen, 2002; Kaushal, 2008; 
Dougherty & Nienhusser, 2010; Russell 2011; Dain, 2014). Information on state policies 
relevant to undocumented immigrants such as eligibility to obtain driver’s license, Omnibus 
Bills, and E-Verify was obtained from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
websites (NCSL, 2012; NCSL, 2015a, 2015b). The county-level unemployment rates and 
poverty rates are taken from the Area Resource Files (released by Health Resources and Services 
Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services).  
Measures 
I study several dimensions of health and mental health of Latino immigrants (Table 2). 
Each individual in NHIS is asked to scale his/her subjective health status as excellent, very good, 
good, fair and poor, which I use to create two measures of self-reported health. Poor health is 
equal to 1 if the respondent reported their health as poor or fair, otherwise 0. Good health is 
defined as equal 1 if the respondent reported their health as very good or excellent, otherwise 0. 
Self-rated health is a valid measure of overall health as it strongly predicts serious, chronic 
conditions, disability, health service utilization, mental illnesses as well as mortality (Goldstein, 
Siegel, & Boyer, 1984; Burström & Fredlund, 2001; Wu et al., 2013). It is also strongly 
associated with many health risk factors, such as income inequality, life and work pressure, poor 




Mansyur et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2013). Self-rated health is also a reliable measure of health as its 
test-retest reliability is as good as or better than the reliability of many objective health condition 
questions (e.g., asthma, backache, and headaches/migraine) (Lundberg & Manderbacka, 1996). 
The NHIS provides detailed data on the mental health of adult respondents in its Sample 
Adult module. From each family in the NHIS, one sample adult (aged 18 or more) is randomly 
selected as a Sample Adult to answer questions, including those on respondent’s mental health. I 
used the following seven questions as the measures for mental health: In the past 30 days, how 
often did you feel so sad so that nothing could cheer you up? In the past 30 days, how often did 
you feel nervous? In the past 30 days, how often did you feel restless and fidgety? In the past 30 
days, how often did you feel hopeless? In the past 30 days, how often did you feel that 
everything was an effort? In the past 30 days, how often did you feel worthless? In all, how often 
did these feelings (expressed in the previous six questions) interfere with your life and activities? 
Respondents are asked to provide answers to these questions on a scale of 0 to 4 (none of the 
time, a little of the time, some of the time, most of the time, and all of the time). The first six 
questions belong to the Kessler 6 (K6) scale (Pratt & Dey, 2007). I construct a measure (scale) of 
the psychological distress among adults to examine the effect of local enforcement policies on 
the psychological functioning. The possible range of the score is 0 through 24, with the higher 
score representing the worse mental health status. The internal consistency of items in the scale 
is high (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = 0.88), indicating good reliability. I also recode the mental health score in 
to a dichotomous measure, 1 indicating had experienced some mental health distress (scored 6 or 
above on the K6 scale) and 0 otherwise (Sakurai et al, 2011). Additionally, I study the effect of 




mental health in the past 30 days. Experiencing a given outcome some to all of the time is coded 
as 1, and none to a little of the time is coded as 0. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the demographic characteristics of adults aged 18 to 60 during 2000-
2001, before the implementation of enforcement policies. The primary interest is in Latino 
immigrants in households with at least one non-citizen family member. This demographic group 
has a high probability of being undocumented or having an undocumented family member. I also 
study Latino immigrant adults with no citizen family members. While this second group of 
Latino immigrants has a higher probability of being undocumented or having undocumented 
family members, the restriction reduces the sample size, which may reduce our ability to detect 
small size effects. For comparison, I also present the descriptive statistics of US-born non-
Hispanic Whites, a group that is unlikely to be affected by enforcement measures.  
Latino immigrants in households with some or all non-citizen family members have a 
more disadvantageous socioeconomic status compared to US-born Whites. Over 77 percent of 
Latino immigrant adults do not have college education compared to 36 percent for US-born 
Whites. Latino immigrants are younger, more likely to be male, have larger household sizes but 
lower average incomes than White families. Approximately two thirds of Latino samples were 
interviewed in a language other than English, whereas only 15 of US-born Latinos were not 
interviewed in English. 
Table 2 presents the mean health outcomes of the target and the comparison groups in the 
base years of 2000-2001. There are two main points to note. One, Latino immigrants are two to 
three percentage points (33 to 50%) more likely to report fair to poor health and 10 to 13 




compared with US-born Whites. Two, the overall mental health (based on the mental health 
score) of Latino immigrants is better than that of US-born Whites and they are less likely to 
report that their mental health conditions interfere with life and activities. However, on two 
specific conditions, Latino immigrants reported having worse conditions than US born whites 
(whether the respondent felt sad all or some of the times; whether the respondent felt hopeless all 
or some of the time.  
Tables 3-5 present the effects of local immigration enforcement policies on the health and 
mental health outcomes of Latino immigrants. All models control for age ((omitted category 19-
24), 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-60), gender, marital status (whether married), 
education level (less than 9 years, 9-12 years (no high school degree), (omitted category: high 
school degree or GED), some colleges or more), household size dummies (1, 2, (omitted 
category: 3-4), 5+), log family income, and county and year fixed effects. The foreign-born 
Latino samples further controls for years since immigration (0-5, 6-10, 11-15, (15+ omitted 
category)), cohort of arrival ((omitted category before 1987), 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 
2002-2012), citizenship status, and regions of origin. Additionally, model 2 controls for the 
following county/state controls: county unemployment rate, county poverty rate, whether the 
state of residence has legislations related to undocumented immigrants (Dream Act, driver’s 
license, omnibus bills and E-Verify) in year t. Standard errors clustered on county of residence 
are in parenthesis. All models are estimated with ordinary least squares.  
Table 3 presents the effects of local immigration enforcement policies on two self-rated 
health outcomes: has fair/poor and very good/excellent health. Estimates suggest that SC 
increased the likelihoods of Latino immigrants in households with non-citizens rating their 




while JE lowered Latino immigrants’ probabilities of reporting very good or excellent health by 
3.7 (p<0.05) to 7.5 (p<0.01) percentage points (6 to 12 percent). Note that the inclusion of time-
varying county variables in Model 2 does not substantially change the estimated effects of the 
enforcement measures. Wald tests reject the hypothesis that estimated effects of SC are 
statistically the same as the estimated effects of TE or JE when the outcome is fair/poor health. 
When excellent/very good health is the outcome, a Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the 
estimated effects of JE is statistically no different from the estimated effect of SC. Estimated 
coefficients from a similar analysis using the sample of US-born Whites are modest and 
statistically insignificant. 
Table 4 has estimates of the effect of local immigration enforcement policies on mental 
health scores, with higher values indicating higher levels of mental health distress. Results 
suggest that TF deteriorated the mental health of Latino immigrants in households with one or 
more non-citizen family members by 19 (p<0.05) to 21 (p<0.1) percent (=0.46/2.18 to 
0.41/2.18). When the sample group is narrowed to Latino immigrants in households with no 
citizen, a group most likely to be affected by local immigration enforcement policies, the adverse 
effect of TF is stronger. TF increased the mental health distress among this group by 31 (p<0.05) 
to 40 (p<0.01) percent (=0.71/2.26 to 0.91/2.26). Results from Wald tests suggest that in some 
models the negative impacts of TF are stronger than SC or JE. Findings from the analysis on US-
born Whites suggest that enforcement policies had no effect on their mental health.  
In Table 5, I present estimates of the effects of local immigration enforcement policies on 
a range of mental health outcomes beyond the K6 scale. The dependent variables, listed as 
bolded headings in each box, are based on questions relating to mental health status of the 




varying county characteristics (model 2), which is the preferred model. The first outcome is a 
dichotomized outcome recoded from the mental health scale, with a score above or equal to 6 
points defining as having some mental health distress (Sakurai et al, 2011). The second outcome, 
“any mental health limitation”, is also a dichotomous outcome indicating whether mental health 
conditions interfere with life or activities some to a lot of the time. For the additional six mental 
health outcomes comprised the mental health scores (K6 scale), experiencing a given outcome 
(e.g. sad, nervous, hopeless) some to all of the time is coded as 1, and none to a little of the time 
is coded as 0.  
Results in Table 5 suggest that TF has a negative effect of many measures of mental 
health of Latino adult immigrants; the effect sizes are larger (point estimates) when the samples 
are restricted to Latino immigrants in all-non-citizen families. TF increased likelihoods of Latino 
immigrants experiencing some mental health distress by 2.9 (p<0.1) to 8.1 (p<0.01) percentage 
points. TF also increased feelings of nervousness, hopelessness, worthless, restless, everything is 
an effort, and mental health conditions interfering with lives. In addition, SC is marginally 
associated with increased feelings of sadness and nervousness. Contrary to my hypothesis, JE 
lowered the experience of having some mental health distress or feeling sad, nervous, or 
hopeless. The enforcement policy effects on the non-Hispanic Whites, the comparison group, are 
generally negligible, which is expected as they are least likely to being affected by enforcement 
policies.    
Sensitivity Analysis 
 Table 6 checks the robustness of findings on the main outcomes, mental health distress 
scores and self-rated health, among Latino immigrants. All sensitivity analyses are conducted 




inclusion criteria in the main analyses is adults living in the 306 counties with at least 20 Latino 
non-citizens across survey years. I examine whether findings from this study is sensitive to the 
cutoff criteria on minimum observation in a county. The first sensitivity test examines policy 
effects on Latino immigrants living in the 189 counties with at least 50 Latino non-citizens and 
finds that the policy effects are similar, if not larger, across mental health and self-rated health 
outcomes when compared to models using 20 Latino non-citizens as the cutoff.  
Second, NHIS regularly adjusts its sampling plan according to updated information from 
the recent Census. The redesign during the study period (2000-2012) happened in 2006. Some 
counties were a part of NHIS samples prior to 2006 but not after, and some counties were 
sampled by NHIS after but not prior to 2006. Given that the empirical strategy in this study relies 
on within county comparison using county fixed effects, and the year of 2006 is at a time when 
counties are starting to adopt Section 287(g) policies, having enough observations prior to and 
after the policy change in each county is ideal for investigation. I conduct sensitivity analyses 
restricting the samples to those in counties covered by NHIS throughout every year between 
2000 and 2012 (which is about 70% of the total NHIS samples). Results from the second “all 
years” sensitivity tests reveal that the policy effects when using this sample are similar or slightly 
larger. 
Third, immigration enforcement may affect the location choice of immigrants after the 
policy implementation (Watson, 2013). It may serve the interests of undocumented immigrants 
with poorer health to not residing in counties with local immigration enforcement policies. If this 
positive health selection pattern among immigrant samples indeed exists, it will bias the policy 
effect towards zero. I check whether the negative effects of enforcement on new immigrants 




restricting the samples to those who arrived before 2002, the year when the first Section 287(g) 
agreement was signed, revealed that policy effects are similar and larger in size across three 
outcomes.  
Fourth, in this set of sensitivity analysis, I restrict the observations to a time period before 
the Great Recession to describe the policy effects ruling out the influence of Great Recession on 
health and mental health. Results suggest that the adverse mental health effects of TF and JE’s 
effects on reduced likelihood of having good health remain robust in this specification. One 
additional worth-noting finding is that, although JE reduced the likelihood to have excellent 
health, it also improved mental health functioning during the period between 2000 and 2008. 
In the fifth sensitivity analysis, I restrict the samples to adult immigrants born in Mexico, 
since immigrants from Mexico represent the largest immigrant group in the US and more than 
half of the undocumented immigrants in the US are from Mexico (Passel & Cohn, 2011; Zong & 
Batalova, 2016). In the sixth sensitivity analysis, I restrict the samples to Latino and Mexican 
non-citizens, since non-citizens represent a group likely to be directly affected by the 
immigration enforcement practice. These analyses allow this study to further understand the 
robustness of findings across different sample definitions. Results from these analyses are similar 
to findings reported for Latino immigrants in households with some non-citizens except for two 
points. First, in addition to JE, TF also significantly lowered the propensity of Mexican 
immigrants to have very good or excellent health. Second, mirroring what was shown in the 
analyses on a period between 2000 and 2008 among Latino immigrant samples, JE marginally 
improved the mental health among Mexican immigrants while significantly decrease their 




In Table 7, I repeat the main analyses on self-rated health and mental health scores in 
Tables 3 and 4 (model 2 with county/state controls) after controlling for whether counties have 
had an unsuccessful request to form any type of 287(g) agreements with ICE in year t. More than 
one hundred unsuccessful 287(g) requests were filed by county, city or state governments. These 
requests were either denied by ICE or withdrawn by local jurisdictions. The analyses so far 
defined enforcement policies based on effective dates and counties with no enforcement policy 
including those with denied/withdrawn requests for enforcement were the omitted category. 
Requests for 287(g) agreements (withdrawn or denied) are indicative of a certain discriminatory 
environment against the undocumented in these counties. Controlling for whether counties had 
requested to sign 287(g) in year t with ICE both accounts for the effects of requests when 
examining policy effects and identifying health effects of discriminatory policy climates in the 
absence of actual policy implementation.  
Findings from models controlling for 287(g) requests show that 287(g) requests reduced 
the likelihood of having excellent and very good health among Latino immigrants in households 
with some non-citizens. 287(g) requests also increased the levels of mental health distress for 
Latino immigrants in households with all non-citizens.  In addition, after controlling for 287(g) 
request (namely, separating effects of requests from policy effects), the association between TF 
and having poor/fair health went from not significant to marginally significant. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study investigates the health and mental health effects of local immigration 
enforcement policies, including Task Force Enforcement (TF) and Jail Enforcement (JE) 
agreements under Section 287(g) of the IIRAIRA and the Secure Communities (SC) program, 




risk of Latino immigrants in households with non-citizens rating their overall health as fair or 
poor by 1.5 to 2.8 percentage points (17 to 35 percent), and JE lowered their probability of 
reporting very good or excellent health by 3.7 to 7.5 percentage points (6 to 12 percent). 
Estimates indicate that TF deteriorated the mental health distress scores of Latino immigrants in 
households with non-citizens by 19 to 40 percent, or increased their likelihood to have some 
mental health distress by 2.9 to 8.1 percentage points. The same analyses were conducted on a 
group that was unaffected by the policies, US-born non-Hispanic Whites, and the policy effects 
on this group were overall modest or null, providing support for the validity of research design. I 
also administered a series of sensitivity tests and found that findings from this study are robust 
across various sample specifications.  
There is one additional finding that is worth-noting in this study. In the analyses that 
controlled for whether a county had made an unsuccessful request to form a 287(g) agreement 
with ICE in a given year, there is evidence suggesting that the request alone escalated the mental 
health distress for Latino immigrants (and, as shown in Appendix Table C, even for US-born 
Latinos, a group that would not be directly affected by the enforcement policy had the 
agreements been signed). Even though these requests did not result in signed 287(g) agreements 
with ICE, climates associated with the request (e.g., discriminatory or hostile atmosphere 
towards immigrants or Latino ethnic groups, an increased possibility that an interior enforcement 
policy will eventually pass in the future) affected their mental health well-being.  
The adverse effects of local immigration enforcement policies on self-rated health and 
mental health distress are alarming since these measures have implications for long-term health. 
Prior studies have documented strong associations between mortality and self-rated health or 




have also shown that mental health distress, poor self-rated health, and other physical health 
conditions all demand higher health care expenditures compared to populations not experiencing 
these conditions (Brown et al., 2002; Martin et al., 2008; DeSalvo et al., 2009; Pirraglia et al., 
2011; Bernard, Farr, & Fang, 2011). Heightened health care costs along with burden of poor 
health may exacerbates lives in Latino communities living in low-income neighborhoods.  
Findings from this study should be interpreted with caution due to four limitations. First, 
although this study presented the health and mental health impacts of local immigration 
enforcement policies, there is limited understanding on pathways or mechanisms through which 
TF, JE, and SC differentially or similarly affect health. Future studies on mechanisms of how 
enforcement policies affect health and mental health could help identify potential points of entry 
to provide interventions to prevent adverse health effects. Second, although NHIS provides ideal 
data for the inquiry of this study as it is the principal source of information on the health of the 
US population (Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, 2015), NHIS has the limitation of not 
collecting sufficient information that can help identify legal status, such as visa category upon 
entry. Third, this study is unable measure the scale of potential biases stemming from policy 
effects on migration and non-response among Latino immigrants. Fourth, the policy measure in 
this study relies on using a dummy to indicate whether a county was influenced by an 
enforcement policy. Enforcement policy implementation practices likely vary by localities. 
Future studies using other avenues to capture the intensity of enforcement can depict other 
dimensions of policy effects.  
Despite these limitations, this study offers the first evidence that examines health effects 
of local immigration enforcement policies using nationally representative data. This study 




went beyond certain geographical regions (e.g., Arizona or North Carolina) and were not limited 
to anecdotal evidence on personal experience (Rhodes et al., 2015; Hardy et al., 2011; Hacker et 
al., 2011). Local immigration enforcement policies affected lives of immigrants in counties 
across the country, and adverse effects of enforcement manifested in not only mental health but 
also self-rated health. The knowledge on health and mental health consequences of immigration 
enforcement offers evidence for cost and benefit calculation of immigration enforcement 
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Figure 1. Number of 287(g) Agreements by Type 
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Figure 2. Number of Counties Covered by Local Immigration Enforcement Policies 
  
Note: SC is the Secure Communities Program, TF represents Task Force Enforcement, and JE represents Jail 
Enforcement. The TF number and the JE number here include counties that had both TF and JE agreements, while 
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Figure 3. Proportion of Counties with Local Immigration Enforcement Policies 
 













2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
SC All Counties SC NHIS All counties SC NHIS 20+ Obs
TF All Counties TF NHIS All counties TF NHIS 20+ Obs







           Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Characteristics 
 Hispanic FB in HH 
w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic FB in HH 
w/ All NC 
Non-Hispanic 
White US-born 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Age 34.89 10.56 34.30 11.28 39.44 11.47 
Male 0.52 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.49 0.50 
Married 0.65 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.61 0.49 
Education       
     Less than 9 years of education 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.01 0.10 
     9-12 years of education (no degree) 0.22 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.07 0.25 
     HS Degree or GED 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.26 0.44 
     Some college education or more 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.64 0.48 
     Unknown educational level 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.15 
Household Size       
     1 person 0.05 0.23 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.36 
     2 people 0.11 0.31 0.24 0.42 0.31 0.46 
     3-4 people 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.41 0.49 
     5 or more people 0.44 0.50 0.22 0.41 0.13 0.33 
Family income  43687 34028 34684 27409 88112 53402 
Interview Language – Not English 0.60 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.00 0.04 
Note: NHIS (2000-2001). FB: foreign born; HH: households; NC: non-citizen. Samples include (1) adults 
aged 18-60 and (2) living in counties with at least 20 non-citizen Hispanic observations. Family income is 









    Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Health Conditions 
 Hispanic FB in HH 
w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic FB in HH 
w/ All NC 
Non-Hispanic 
White US-born 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Self-reported Health (Fair/poor) 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 
Self-reported Health (Excellent/very good) 0.61 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.74 0.44 
Total Mental Health Scores (Range: 0-24; higher values 
indicating higher levels of mental health distress) 2.18 3.92 2.26 4.17 2.58 3.79 
Some Mental Health Distress (Dichotomous; ≥6) 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 
Mental health conditions interfere with life & 
activities  0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.31 
In the past 30 days, did the respondent feel … 
(some of the time to all of the time)?       
   Sad 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.32 
   Nervous 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39 
   Hopeless 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.25 
   Worthless 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 
   Restless 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.40 
   Everything was an effort 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 
Note: NHIS (2000-2001). FB: foreign born; HH: households; NC: non-citizen. Samples include (1) adults aged 18-60 








Table 3: Self-Rated Health (NHIS 2000-2012) 
 Fair/Poor Health Excellent/Very Good Health 
Sample 
Hispanic FB in 
HH w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic FB in 
HH w/ All NC 
Non-Hispanic 
White US-born 
Hispanic FB in 
HH w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic FB in 
HH w/ All NC 
Non-Hispanic 
White US-born 
Model 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Secure Communities 0.015+ 0.015+ 0.028* 0.028* 0.001 -0.000 -0.019 -0.019 0.006 0.006 -0.008 -0.006 
      (SC) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.022) (0.022) (0.034) (0.034) (0.007) (0.007) 
Task Force Enforcement 0.011 0.005 0.016 0.019 -0.003 -0.007+ -0.037 -0.038 -0.045 -0.057 0.001 0.001 
      (TF) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.031) (0.031) (0.039) (0.041) (0.007) (0.007) 
Jail Enforcement (JE) 0.005 0.005 0.017 0.017 -0.003 -0.003 -0.035* -0.037* -0.075** -0.075** 0.007 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.010) (0.009) 
County poverty rates  0.002  0.001  0.002*  -0.005+  -0.007  -0.002+ 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
County unemployment rates  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.002  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
Dream Act  -0.004  0.013  0.006  -0.026  -0.044  -0.014* 
  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.020)  (0.038)  (0.007) 
Driver’s license  0.000  0.096  -0.000  0.018  0.004  -0.006 
  (0.042)  (0.064)  (0.008)  (0.043)  (0.117)  (0.025) 
Omnibus bills  -0.021  -0.028  0.009  0.099**  0.111+  0.010 
  (0.013)  (0.049)  (0.014)  (0.033)  (0.060)  (0.019) 
E-Verify  0.007+  0.003  0.004*  -0.015  -0.006  -0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.003) 
Wald-tests             
    TF vs. JE         ** **   
    SC vs. TF *  * *     ** **   
    SC vs. JE + + ** **         
             
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County/State Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
N 71241 71241 18948 18948 172185 172185 71241 71241 18948 18948 172185 172185 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **p<0.01. FB: foreign born; HH: households; NC: non-citizen. Each model in each column is based on a separate regression. The analysis is 
restricted to counties with at least 20 Latino non-citizen observations across the survey years. The samples of analyses are adults aged 18-60 years. All models control for age 
((omitted category 19-24), 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-60), gender (male), marital status (married), education level (less than 9 years, 9-12 years (no high school 
degree), (omitted category: high school degree or GED), some colleges or more), household size dummies (1, 2, (omitted category: 3-4), 5+), log family income, language of 







cohort of arrival ((omitted category before 1987), 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2012), citizenship status, and regions of origin ((omitted category: Central America), 
Mexico, South America). In the second model, county/state controls account for county unemployment rate, county poverty rate, whether the state of residence has legislations 











          Table 4: Mental Health Distress (the higher the worse) (NHIS 2000-2012) 
Sample 
Hispanic FB in HH 
w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic FB in HH 
w/ All NC 
Non-Hispanic 
White US-born 
Model 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Secure Communities 0.203 0.186 0.292 0.299 0.093 0.051 
      (SC) (0.163) (0.166) (0.294) (0.295) (0.071) (0.071) 
Task Force Enforcement 0.464* 0.413+ 0.707* 0.913** 0.049 0.036 
      (TF) (0.182) (0.210) (0.338) (0.315) (0.096) (0.100) 
Jail Enforcement (JE) -0.307 -0.322 -0.426 -0.354 -0.100 -0.106 
 (0.245) (0.229) (0.287) (0.288) (0.128) (0.123) 
County poverty rates  0.004  -0.013  0.023 
  (0.034)  (0.056)  (0.015) 
County unemployment rates  0.023  0.031  -0.007 
  (0.026)  (0.049)  (0.021) 
Dream Act  -0.041  -0.045  0.263** 
  (0.206)  (0.394)  (0.082) 
Driver’s license  1.184  0.208  0.033 
  (0.771)  (1.324)  (0.211) 
Omnibus bills  0.154  -0.894  0.610** 
  (0.302)  (0.563)  (0.228) 
E-Verify  0.042  -0.187+  0.032 
  (0.057)  (0.104)  (0.041) 
Wald-tests       
    TF vs. JE * +  *   
    SC vs. TF *   *   
    SC vs. JE       
       
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County/State Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
N 24210 24210 7680 7680 75090 75090 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **p<0.01. FB: foreign born; HH: households; NC: non-citizen. Each column 
in each panel is based on a separate regression. See notes in Table 3 for sample and model specifications. 














Table 5: Mental Health Indicators (NHIS 2000-2012) 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Sample 
Hispanic 
FB in HH 
w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic 








FB in HH 
w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic 








FB in HH 
w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic 








FB in HH 
w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic 







             
Outcomes Some mental health distress  Any mental health limitation Sad Nervous 
 (Kessler 6 Scale ≥ 6 points)    
SC 0.009 0.010 0.005+ 0.018 0.019 0.001 0.020+ 0.028 -0.002 0.022+ 0.039+ 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.003) (0.011) (0.023) (0.006) (0.011) (0.021) (0.006) (0.013) (0.024) (0.008) 
TF 0.029+ 0.081** -0.002 0.021+ 0.034+ 0.000 0.014 0.040 -0.005 0.028* 0.060* 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.003) (0.012) (0.020) (0.008) (0.014) (0.031) (0.006) (0.014) (0.030) (0.010) 
JE -0.031+ -0.030 -0.004 -0.011 0.002 -0.009 -0.029+ -0.030 -0.006 -0.034* -0.062** -0.010 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.003) (0.015) (0.022) (0.008) (0.015) (0.022) (0.007) (0.015) (0.019) (0.010) 
             
N 24210 7680 75090 24240 7688 75177 24291 7714 75235 24290 7711 75244 
             
             
Outcomes Hopeless Worthless Restless Everything is an effort 
     
SC 0.008 0.015 -0.003 0.000 0.015 0.002 0.017 0.012 0.006 0.004 0.010 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.004) (0.009) (0.016) (0.004) (0.013) (0.022) (0.008) (0.012) (0.022) (0.006) 
TF 0.020* 0.039* -0.001 0.011 0.027* -0.000 0.033* 0.063* 0.015 0.022* 0.051** -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.014) (0.026) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.008) 
JE -0.019+ -0.023+ -0.006 -0.010 -0.005 -0.007+ -0.018 -0.011 -0.003 -0.014 -0.006 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.009) 
             
N 24273 7701 75235 24259 7699 75220 24278 7704 75240 24253 7699 75218 
             
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **p<0.01. FB: foreign born; HH: households; NC: non-citizen; SC: Secure Communities; TF: Task Force Enforcement; JE: 
Jail Enforcement. Each model for each outcome and sample is based on a separate regression. The dependent variable, listed as column headings, is based on 
questions relating to mental health of the respondent in the past 30 days. The “some mental health distress” outcome is coded from the linear Kessler 6 Scale, with 
scores above 6 points defined as experienced some mental health distress. The outcome ‘any mental health limitation’ is coded as 1 if it happened some to a lot of 
the time and as 0 if it happened a little of the time or not at all. Experiencing a given outcome (‘sad’ through ‘everything was an effort’) some to all of the time is 
coded as 1, and none to a little of the time is coded as 0. See notes in Table 3 for sample specifications, and models in this table are equivalent to the Model 2 in 








Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis I (NHIS 2000-2012)  

























































































                   
SC 0.014 0.026* 0.013 0.025+ 0.017+ 0.034* -0.021 0.012 -0.019 0.011 -0.025 0.006 0.252 0.400 0.181 0.236 0.232 0.326 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.017) (0.023) (0.034) (0.023) (0.035) (0.019) (0.033) (0.168) (0.303) (0.170) (0.306) (0.171) (0.374) 
TF 0.006 0.024+ 0.004 0.017 0.001 0.012 -0.051 -0.061 -0.042 -0.060 -0.024 -0.029 0.459* 1.001** 0.509* 1.003** 0.464* 1.086** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.034) (0.042) (0.031) (0.041) (0.033) (0.044) (0.201) (0.308) (0.203) (0.338) (0.204) (0.303) 
JE 0.006 0.015 0.007 0.018 0.005 0.024+ -0.038* -0.076** -0.039* -0.077** -0.032+ -0.083** -0.300 -0.324 -0.300 -0.300 -0.431+ -0.534 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.027) (0.240) (0.294) (0.235) (0.283) (0.221) (0.343) 
                   
N 67630 17806 65147 17410 62135 14629 67630 17806 65147 17410 62135 14629 22898 7215 21995 7044 20975 5918 
                   
 




















































                   
SC -- -- 0.004 0.021 0.015+ 0.005 -- -- -0.012 0.049 -0.019 -0.016 -- -- 0.053 0.427 0.232 0.131 
   (0.010) (0.020) (0.008) (0.010)   (0.025) (0.040) (0.022) (0.025)   (0.188) (0.308) (0.165) (0.192) 
TF 0.006 0.011 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.002 -0.038 -0.062 -0.087** -0.124* -0.046 -0.091** 0.497* 1.076** 0.270 0.824* 0.410+ 0.248 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.009) (0.013) (0.047) (0.053) (0.028) (0.049) (0.031) (0.029) (0.195) (0.302) (0.252) (0.330) (0.223) (0.283) 
JE -0.005 0.011 0.007 0.014 0.008 0.009 -0.036* -0.097** -0.038+ -0.093** -0.041* -0.042* -0.805** -0.789** -0.390+ -0.544+ -0.266 -0.374 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.018) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.018) (0.020) (0.202) (0.273) (0.211) (0.298) (0.236) (0.231) 
                   
N 52782 14845 45716 10941 63098 41624 52782 14845 45716 10941 63089 41624 18079 5959 15082 4290 21760 13859 
                   
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **p<0.01. FB: foreign born; HH: households; NC: non-citizen; SC: Secure Communities; TF: Task Force Enforcement; JE: Jail Enforcement. 
Each model for each sample is based on a separate regression. The sample of “50+ observations” represents counties with at least 50 Latino non-citizen observations across the 
survey years. The sample of “all years” represents counties survey by all years between 2000 and 2012. The sample of “arrived before 2002” represents immigrants arrived to the 
US prior to 2002. The sample of “2000-2008” represents those responded to the survey between 2000 and 2008, a period before the Great Recession happened. The sample of 
“Mexican” includes respondents born in Mexico. The sample of “non-citizens” includes respondents who are not citizens. The samples of analyses are adults aged 18-60 years 
born in Latin America. See notes in Table 3 for sample specifications, and models in this table are equivalent to the Model 2 in Table 3 (controlling for county/state 




         Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis II (NHIS 2000-2012) 
Sample 
Hispanic FB in HH 
w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic FB in HH 
w/ All NC 
Non-Hispanic White 
US-born 
    
Panel 1: Poor/Fair Health    
    
Secure Communities 0.014+ 0.027+ -0.001 
      (SC) (0.008) (0.014) (0.004) 
Task Force     0.006 0.021+ -0.007+ 
      Enforcement (TF) (0.008) (0.012) (0.004) 
Jail Enforcement 0.004 0.015 -0.003 
      (JE) (0.008) (0.012) (0.004) 
287(g) requests 0.012 0.018 0.005 
   (0.008) (0.014) (0.004) 
    
N 71241 18948 172185 
    
Panel 2: Good/Excellent 
Health 
   
    
Secure Communities -0.016 0.009 -0.004 
      (SC) (0.022) (0.034) (0.007) 
Task Force     -0.042 -0.060 0.002 
      Enforcement (TF) (0.032) (0.041) (0.007) 
Jail Enforcement -0.034+ -0.071** 0.007 
      (JE) (0.018) (0.024) (0.009) 
287(g) requests -0.039** -0.035 -0.010 
   (0.014) (0.025) (0.007) 
    
N 71241 18948 172185 
    
Panel 3: Mental Health    
    
Secure Communities 0.167 0.268 0.044 
      (SC) (0.166) (0.304) (0.072) 
Task Force     0.429* 0.951** 0.034 
      Enforcement (TF) (0.208) (0.310) (0.101) 
Jail Enforcement -0.343 -0.397 -0.115 
      (JE) (0.219) (0.274) (0.121) 
287(g) requests 0.188 0.377+ 0.072 
   (0.159) (0.228) (0.077) 
    
N 24210 7680 75090 
    
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **p<0.01. FB: foreign born; HH: households; NC: non-citizen. Each column in 
each panel is based on a separate regression. The analysis is restricted to counties with at least 20 Latino non-citizen 
observations across the survey years. The samples of analyses are adults aged 18-60 years. See notes in Table 3 for 
sample specifications, and models in this table are equivalent to the Model 2 in Table 3 (controlling for county/state 







        Appendix Table A: Sensitivity Analysis III (NHIS 2000-2012) 
Sample 
Hispanic FB in 
HH w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic FB in 
HH w/ All NC 
Non-Hispanic 
White US-born 
Hispanic FB in 
HH w/ 1+ NC 
Hispanic FB in 
HH w/ All NC 
Non-Hispanic 
White US-born 
Panel 1: Poor/Fair Health       
Secure Communities 0.015+ 0.029* -0.000 0.015+ 0.028* -0.000 
      (SC) (0.008) (0.013) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013) (0.004) 
Any Task Force       0.006 0.021+ -0.008+    
      Enforcement (TF) (0.008) (0.012) (0.004)    
Any Jail     0.006 0.018 -0.004 
      Enforcement (JE)    (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) 
JE  (no TF) 0.006 0.016 -0.003    
  (0.008) (0.013) (0.005)    
TF (no JE)    0.006 0.022+ -0.004 
    (0.009) (0.013) (0.004) 
N 71241 18948 172185 71241 18948 71241 
Panel 2: Very Good/Excellent 
Health 
      
Secure Communities -0.021 0.000 -0.005 -0.019 0.005 -0.005 
      (SC) (0.022) (0.033) (0.007) (0.022) (0.034) (0.007) 
Any Task Force       -0.041 -0.061 0.002    
      Enforcement (TF) (0.033) (0.043) (0.007)    
Any Jail     -0.038+ -0.075** 0.006 
      Enforcement (JE)    (0.019) (0.025) (0.010) 
JE  (no TF) -0.032 -0.056* 0.005    
  (0.019) (0.026) (0.010)    
TF (no JE)    -0.027 -0.035 -0.000 
    (0.032) (0.041) (0.008) 
N 71241 18948 172185 71241 18948 71241 
Panel 3: Mental Health       
Secure Communities 0.179 0.289 0.049 0.187 0.309 0.054 
      (SC) (0.165) (0.293) (0.070) (0.165) (0.290) (0.071) 
Any Task Force       0.371+ 0.872** 0.015    
      Enforcement (TF) (0.216) (0.324) (0.103)    
Any Jail     -0.298 -0.277 -0.101 
      Enforcement (JE)    (0.235) (0.300) (0.126) 
JE  (no TF) -0.349 -0.375 -0.124    
  (0.231) (0.287) (0.124)    
TF (no JE)    0.404+ 0.968** 0.040 
    (0.228) (0.328) (0.106) 







Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **p<0.01. FB: foreign born; HH: households; NC: non-citizen. Each column in each panel is based on a 





Appendix Table B: Descriptive Statistics of Non-Hispanic Immigrants and Hispanic US-
born  
Sample Non-Hispanic FB Hispanic US-born 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Demographic characteristics     
Age 38.60 11.10 33.16 11.53 
Male 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Married 0.69 0.46 0.47 0.50 
Education     
     Less than 9 years of education 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 
     9-12 years of education (no degree) 0.06 0.23 0.20 0.40 
     HS Degree or GED 0.19 0.39 0.34 0.47 
     Some college education or more 0.59 0.49 0.39 0.49 
     Unknown educational level 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.14 
Household Size     
     1 person 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.28 
     2 people 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38 
     3-4 people 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.50 
     5 or more people 0.22 0.41 0.30 0.46 
Family income  79898 55305 60485 43594 
Interview Language – Not English 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.35 
Outcomes     
Self-reported Health (Fair/poor) 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.29 
Self-reported Health (Excellent/very 
good) 0.70 0.46 0.65 0.48 
Total Mental Health Scores (Range: 0-24; 
higher values indicating higher levels of mental 
health distress) 2.09 3.44 2.71 4.26 
Some Mental Health Distress 
(Dichotomous; ≥6) 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.39 
Mental health conditions interfere with 
life & activities  0.09 0.28 0.13 0.33 
In the past 30 days, did the respondent 
feel … (some of the time to all of the 
time)?     
   Sad 0.13 0.33 0.16 0.37 
   Nervous 0.15 0.35 0.18 0.38 
   Hopeless 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.28 
   Worthless 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 
   Restless 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.39 
   Everything was an effort 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.37 
Note: NHIS (2000-2001). FB: foreign born; HH: households; NC: non-citizen. 
Samples include (1) adults aged 18-60 and (2) living in counties with at least 20 non-





Appendix Table C: Health and Mental Health of Non-Hispanic Foreign Born and US-born 
Latinos (NHIS 2000-2012) 





Models 1 2 1 2 1 2 
 
Panel 1: 
Non-Hispanic Foreign Born 
      
Secure Communities 0.004 0.004 -0.015 -0.014 0.136 0.131 
      (SC) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.018) (0.166) (0.167) 
Any Task Force Enforcement -0.002 -0.003 -0.014 -0.012 0.147 0.136 
      (TF) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.018) (0.186) (0.188) 
Any Jail Enforcement (JE) -0.003 -0.004 -0.022+ -0.020 -0.055 -0.076 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (0.174) (0.165) 
287(g) requests  0.003  -0.015  0.141 
  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.155) 
N 40629 40629 40629 40629 14687 14687 
       
Panel 2: 
Hispanic US-Born 
      
Secure Communities 0.006 0.004 -0.012 -0.012 0.109 0.047 
      (SC) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.154) (0.160) 
Any Task Force Enforcement -0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.006 0.149 0.225 
      (TF) (0.010) (0.011) (0.023) (0.023) (0.238) (0.236) 
Any Jail Enforcement (JE) -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.119 -0.100 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.274) (0.254) 
287(g) requests  0.005  0.003  0.385* 
  (0.006)  (0.015)  (0.188) 
N 49914 49914 49914 49914 17978 17978 
       
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **p<0.01. Each model in each column and panel is based on a separate 
regression. The analysis is restricted to counties with at least 20 Latino non-citizen observations across the survey 
years. The samples of analyses are adults aged 18-60 years. All models control for age ((omitted category 19-24), 
25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-60), gender (male), marital status (married), education level (less than 
9 years, 9-12 years (no high school degree), (omitted category: high school degree or GED), some colleges or more), 
household size dummies (1, 2, (omitted category: 3-4), 5+), log family income, language of interview (not English), 
county/state controls account for county unemployment rate, county poverty rate, whether the state of residence has 
legislations related to undocumented immigrants (Dream Act, driver’s license, omnibus bills and E-Verify) in year t, 
and county and year fixed effects. The foreign born sample in panel 1 further controls for years since immigration 
(0-5, 6-10, 11-15, (omitted category: 15+)), cohort of arrival ((omitted category before 1987), 1987-1991, 1992-
1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2012), citizenship status, and regions of origin ((omitted category: Europe), Russia, Africa, 
Middle East, Indian subcontinent, East Asia, Southeast Asia, elsewhere, unknown). Standard errors clustered on 









Aim: After almost two decades since welfare reform, it is crucial to understand how participating 
in the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program is associated with parental 
investments, important determinants for child well-being. This study investigates this association 
and how different stringencies in state TANF policies on time limit and sanctions on non-
compliance to work requirements impact this association.  
 
Data and Methods: Data from the nationally-representative Survey on Income and Program 
Participation, 2004 and 2008 panels, provide a unique opportunity to observe parental 
investments at two time points. This study includes children living in households headed by 
women without a Bachelor degree. In order to account for pre-existing characteristics that 
determine TANF participation, I use individual fixed-effect models to compare individual-level 
changes over time.  
 
Results and Conclusion: TANF participation was associated with increased family meal times 
and decreased incidence of family outings and reading time. TANF participation was not 
associated with other areas of parenting (e.g., extracurricular activity participation, family rules 
on watching TV, positive parenting in forms of praising the child or having fun time with them, 
parenting stress, and parental expectation). Stringent state TANF policy characteristics were not 
associated with negative parenting behaviors. To improve well-being of children in low-income 
families, social assistance programs need to consider services that could support parents to 
eliminate challenges to employment, to cope with life circumstances that led them to apply for 







In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), also known as the welfare reform. The PRWORA abolished a 
long-standing cash-assistance program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and 
established a new a time-limited and work-focused cash safety net program, Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Dunifon, Hynes, & Peters, 
2006; Waldfogel, 2007).7 The main goal of TANF is to promote work and reduce dependency on 
welfare. Under TANF, state public assistance provisions have to be contingent upon work or 
work-related activities. The reform also imposes time limits for receiving welfare as well as 
sanctions on non-compliance to work requirements. However, states could utilize their own 
funds to extend the welfare provision beyond the federal time limits, and states have the 
autonomy to decide the severity of sanctions (Dunifon et al., 2006). This creates a great variation 
in state TANF policies. 
Despite abundant studies on impacts of welfare reform on welfare use, labor 
participation, and poverty, how participating in this new form of social assistance program that 
involves work requirements and time limits affects parental investments in children remains an 
important yet understudied topic (Chase-Lansdale & Pittman, 2002; Coley et al., 2007). Past 
literature on impacts of AFDC/TANF on children mostly focuses on outcomes such as children’s 
cognitive development, school achievement, health status, and behavioral problems, and results 
from these studies are generally mixed (Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Ziliak, forthcoming). Few 
studies have examined impacts of AFDC/TANF on parental investments in a child in areas of 
family interactions, family routines, parenting stress, and parenting expectation (Chase-Lansdale 
                                                          




& Pittman, 2002; Dunifon et al., 2006). Since parental investment is an important contributor to 
child outcomes, examining impacts of TANF participation on parental investments, an under-
examined outcomes, may extend current knowledge and contextualize mixed findings in past 
literature on TANF and child well-being.  
In addition, this study addresses three limitations in past literature by examining impacts 
of TANF participation and using more recent data from 8-13 years after the nation-wide 
implementation of TANF. First, most existing evidence on TANF in relation to parenting is 
based on experimental studies in a few states prior to TANF’s nationwide implementation or 
observational studies that use data from a few years before and after the welfare reform (Chase-
Lansdale et al., 2003; Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Dunifon et al., 2006; Coley et al., 2007; Ziliak, 
forthcoming). Limited evidence exists documenting impacts of TANF participation in more 
recent years. Second, in past literature, comparisons are generally made between those who 
received traditional cash assistance (cash only) and those who were subject to work-promoting 
measures (e.g., time limits, work requirements, sanctions, earnings supplements) in addition to 
receiving cash assistance (combo). Yet, comparisons between “cash only” and “combo” do not 
reflect opportunities available for low-income families now. A low-income family faces options 
of whether to abide by TANF requirements and receive cash assistance or get nothing. Third, 
there is a dearth of research on impacts of different state TANF requirements (Grogger & 
Karoly, 2005). This study aims to address these limitations by focusing on two research 
questions, using more recent data from 8-13 years after the welfare reform. First, what is the 
association between TANF participation (as a bundle of cash assistance, time limits and work 




participation and parental investments differ by stringencies of states TANF policies on time 
limits and work sanctions? 
These questions are not easy to answer because TANF participation is not random. 
Families receiving TANF are very likely to be fundamentally different from those not 
participating in TANF (e.g., less need, less knowledge about resources, stronger motivation to be 
self-reliant). As an attempt to derive plausible evidence to describe the sheer impact of TANF 
participation, this study uses the individual fixed effects (FE) models to account for time 
constant unobserved factors correlated with TANF participation and parental investments. 
Conceptual Framework  
This study examines impacts of TANF participation on parental investments to enrich our 
understanding of intermediary link between TANF participation and child well-being. TANF 
participation may influence child well-being through parental investments since the family’s 
income and employment changes resulted from TANF receipts could affect parental investments, 
and parental investments in turn affect child well-being. This pathway is supported by the Family 
Stress Model, which depicts the entangling relationships among economic resources, economic 
pressure, the emotional state of caregivers, conflicts between caregivers, parenting practices, and 
child well-being (Conger & Elder, 1994; Conger, Rueter, & Conger, 2000; Conger et al., 2002). 
The Family Stress Model posits that economic hardship and family income affect the economic 
pressure families face (Elder & Caspi, 1998). Economic pressure influences caregivers’ 
emotions, which lead to their relational conflict/withdrawal and changes in parental involvement. 
Parental involvement ultimately determines child well-being (Conger et al., 2002). Given that 
prior studies found mixed findings on impacts of TANF on child well-being (Grogger & Karoly, 




participation and parental involvement can help shed light on intermediate impacts of TANF 
participation.   
TANF participation may affect parental involvements and child well-being through 
changing caregivers’ employment status and income. Since the welfare reform, there has been an 
increase in single parents’ labor force participation and a drop in welfare caseloads (Duncan & 
Chase-Lansdale, 2001; Grogger & Karoly, 2005). Employment changes may also lead to a shift 
in the composition of disposable family income, as income from earnings and expenditure for 
work-related purposes may increase and income from transfers may decrease (Grogger & 
Karoly, 2005). These employment and income changes may alter parental investments in 
children and family routines (Chase-Lansdale & Pittman, 2002; Coley et al., 2007). 
Employment Effects 
 Parents transitioning into employment may affect parental investments and child well-
being through several pathways. First, transitioning into employment may change parents’ time 
allocation. Parents might have less time to be with their children, meet their needs, and supervise 
them (Brooks-Gunn et al., 2001; Duncan & Chase-Lansdale, 2001; Lichter & Jayakody, 2002). 
Second, parental employment may provide a positive role model to the children (Lichter & 
Jayakody, 2002; Chase-Lansdale & Pittman, 2002). Third, parental employment may routinize 
daily life and improve the structure in family lives. Parents hence are more likely to set rules and 
provide appropriate discipline (Lichter & Jayakody, 2002; Chase-Lansdale & Pittman, 2002). 
Fourth, shifting into employment may improve parental mental health as their economic burden 
is reduced and self-esteem and self-efficacy are improved (Brooks-Gunn et al., 2001; Lichter & 
Jayakody, 2002; Grzywacz & Bass, 2003). However, the stress to balance work and child care 




(Duncan & Chase-Lansdale, 2001; Lichter & Jayakody, 2002; Bitler & Hoynes, 2006). Also, 
parents forced into work often take low-wage jobs or jobs at odd hours, which provide little 
flexibility and autonomy (Morris, Duncan, & Clark-Kauffman, 2005; Waldfogel, 2007). In short, 
parental employment has competing implications for children’s lives.  
Income Effects 
Pathways through which income might influence parental investments and child well-
being are shown in areas of home environment, quality of child care, economic pressure, parental 
mental health, parent-child relationships, and neighborhood residence (Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, 
2000). First, when families have more income, they are more likely to have better home learning 
environments (e.g., access to library card, museum visits, availability of learning oriented toys). 
Better home learning environments are associated with better cognitive outcomes for children 
(Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Votruba‐Drzal, 2003; Morris et al., 2005). Second, an income 
increase may accompany choosing childcare or afterschool programs of better quality (Fuller et 
al., 2002). Intensive early-childhood education programs for poor children have proven to 
increase their verbal ability and reasoning skills (Karoly et al., 1998; Peisner et al., 2001; 
Vandell & Pierce, 2003). Third, an increase in income may reduce family economic pressure, 
which is often associated with conflict between children and parents, lower school grades, 
reduced emotional health, or impaired social relationships (Mistry et al., 2002). Fourth, improved 
economic circumstances may improve parents’ physical and mental health; hence, parent 
irritability and depressive symptoms are reduced and so are conflictual parent-child interactions 
(Jones & Wildman, 2008). Fifth, if an income increase could lead to a positive change in 
neighborhood characteristics (potentially via moving), child well-being may be improved. 




resources for child development (e.g., school, childcare, playgrounds, after-school programs, 
healthcare facilities) (Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000).  
However, the income effects would only hold if welfare reform increased resources 
available for children. Extant literature indicates that the reform does not always lead to an 
increase in family income, since work participation reduces welfare transfer income (Morris et 
al., 2001; Blank, 2002; Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Ziliak, forthcoming). Also, when parents are 
employed, they might have additional expenses for work-related purposes, such as childcare, 
transportation, and clothing, which would reduce disposable income and shifting resources away 
from children (Kaushal, Gao, & Waldfogel, 2007). Furthermore, for welfare recipients whose 
benefits are sanctioned due to failure to meet behavioral requirements, facing reduced welfare 
assistance may further deteriorate their family economic condition.  
In short, the extent to which employment affects parental investments in children is 
ambiguous since employment may improve the self-esteem and economic well-being of 
caregivers while also inducing stress as caregivers may lack skills to sustain stable employment 
(Coley et al., 2007). In terms of income effects, although an income increase allows caregivers to 
have more economic resources to invest in children, prior studies showed that TANF programs 
did not consistently lead to an increase in total family income (Coley et al., 2007).  
Literature Review 
Given competing influences of employment changes and ambiguous effects of TANF on 
income described in the previous section, it is not surprising that empirical studies show mixed 
findings about impacts of work-promoting welfare programs on parental investments in children. 
In the pre-PRWORA period, several experimental studies randomly assigned families to work-




policy effects. In the post-PRWORA period, observational studies either compared outcomes 
before and after the welfare reform to examine policy impacts or used post-PRWORA 
longitudinal data to compare how changes in welfare participation and work status predicted 
outcomes. Overall, these studies found mixed program effects, and there is a dearth of study on 
effects of work-focused welfare programs on parental investments (Chase-Lansdale & Pittman, 
2002; Coley et al., 2007). 
With regards to parental investments in child care environment, studies on Pre-PRWORA 
programs that focused on earnings supplements, work requirements, or time limits found that 
most programs (the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies [NEWWS] in Michigan, 
California, and Georgia, the New Hope Program in Wisconsin, the Self-Sufficiency Project in 
Canada, and the full Minnesota Family Investment Program [MFIP], the Family Transition 
Program in Florida) increased children’s participation in center-based child care and afterschool 
programs (e.g., attending clubs and youth groups, taking lessons, attending religious activities), 
with the exception that some programs that did not mandate employment service attendance 
found no program effect on child care (Morris et al., 2001; Huston et al., 2001; Huston et al., 
2005). Studies post-welfare reform also found that an increase in non-parental child care use 
following the expansion in federal funding for child care subsidies (Meyers et al., 2001; Fuller et 
al., 2002), but no effect was found on participating in after school activities (Dunifon, Hynes, & 
Peters, 2006). 
Despite the overall increase in stimulation from non-parental child care, studies revealed 
that cognitive stimulation of the home environment did not consistently respond to work-
promoting welfare programs (Dunifon, Hynes, & Peters, 2006; Coley et al., 2007). Specifically, 




home as parents moved from receiving welfare into employment (Smith et al., 2001; Brooks-
Gunn et al., 2001), while other studies found no significant link (Wilson, Ellwood, & Brooks-
Gunn, 1995). In regards to changes during the welfare reform, Dunifon and colleagues (2006) 
used SIPP data before and after the reform and found that frequencies of home cognitive 
stimulating activities in the form of parents reading to their children did not change with welfare 
reform (Dunifon, Hynes, & Peters, 2006). After the welfare reform, findings from the Three-City 
Study that surveyed low-income families in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio between 1999 
and 2001 also suggested that, transitioning into or out of welfare was not associated with 
cognitive stimulation at home (Coley et al., 2007).  
With respect to parenting behaviors in forms of parent-child interactions, parental 
monitoring, and family routines, studies showed that work-promoting welfare programs had very 
few effects on parenting behaviors (Morris et al., 2001; Dunifon, Hynes, & Peters, 2006; Coley 
et al., 2007). In the pre-PRWORA experimental studies, only two out of six NEWWS programs 
that had mandatory employment services increased parent-reported parenting warmth towards 
their children, while the other four programs found no effects on parenting (Morris et al., 2001). 
Even for programs that provided generous work support for low-income families did not 
consistently show positive program impacts on parenting behaviors (Morris et al., 2001; Huston 
et al., 2005). Taking the New Hope Project in Milwaukee, Wisconsin as an example, it is a pre-
PRWORA experiment that randomly assigned families to receive generous wage supplements 
and child care and health insurance subsidies. Two years after the randomization, studies found 
that the project increased parental warmth and the parent’s monitoring of the child’s activities 
only among parents who were employed full-time at random assignment, and no effect was 




Observational studies during and after the welfare reform also find mixed evidence on 
impacts of TANF on parenting behaviors (Dunifon, Kalil, & Danziger, 2003; Dunifon, Hynes, & 
Peters, 2006; Coley et al., 2007). Comparing parenting practice before and welfare reform, 
Dunifon et al. (2006) found that the reform did not affect parental monitoring in watching TV, 
while strict sanctions decreased the number of family outings and income disregard increased 
family outings. In terms of studies using post-welfare reform data, on one hand, findings from 
the longitudinal Women’s Employment Study (WES) that followed Michigan welfare recipients 
spanning 1997-1999 revealed that, welfare recipients transitioning into combining welfare and 
work is associated with decreased harsh parenting (e.g., spanking and yelling) and increased 
positive parenting (praising the child and laughing with the child) (Dunifon, Kalil, & Danziger, 
2003). On the other hand, the Three-City Study found that transitioning into or out of welfare 
was not associated with changes in family routines, the quality of parenting (e.g., discipline and 
frequencies of interactions), or parental monitoring (Coley et al., 2007).  
In terms of parenting stress, studies also found mixed evidence on effects of work-
promoting welfare programs on maternal psychological health (Huston et al., 2001; Morris et al., 
2001; Dunifon, Kalil, & Danziger, 2003; Coley et al., 2007). In the pre-PWROWA experiments, 
the New Hope Project that provided wage supplements showed to reduce parenting stress and 
increase low income mothers’ social support and sense of hope (Huston et al., 2001). Meanwhile, 
the New Hope Project and two out of six NEWWS programs that had mandatory employment 
services showed to increase parents’ feeling of time pressure, and no effect was found in areas of 
self-esteem, depression, or worries about finances (Morris et al., 2001; Huston et al., 2001). In 
post-welfare reform observational studies, low-income mothers’ movements from welfare reliant 




study (Dunifon, Kalil, & Danziger, 2003), while the Three City Study found that transition into 
employment predicted improved self-esteem and decreased depression when compared to 
mothers remaining unemployed or moving out of employment (Coley et al., 2007). With respect 
to parental expectation of children, few studies examined this outcome in relation to welfare 
recipiency. The pre-PRWORA New Hope Project found that parents that received the wage 
supplement program had lower expectation on their children’s educational achievement, contrary 
to the expectation (Huston et al., 2001). 
Few studies have directly investigated how different levels of TANF state policy 
stringencies are associated with family dynamics and parental involvement. Paxson and 
Waldfogel (2003) examined the relationship between welfare reform and harsh parenting in the 
form of child maltreatment, and they found that reduced welfare benefits was associated with 
more children living in out-of-home placements, and that shorter time limits and tougher 
sanctions on noncompliance are related to higher levels of substantiated maltreatment. Another 
study by Dunifon et al. (2006) used the SIPP dataset (as in this study) and pooled 1992 through 
1996 panels and examined how different state TANF policy characteristics affect parental 
investments and child well-being. Their results were inconclusive and do not suggest that 
specific policy characteristics have a systematic and uniform effect on aspects of parenting 
behaviors and child well-being. However, they only observed well-being of a child at one point 
in time; thus they were not able to control for unobserved child and family characteristics. Also, 
they did not employ a comparison group to control for any potentially confounding trends 
(Ziliak, forthcoming). This study will address these weaknesses by using SIPP data from two 





Overall, there are four limitations in prior research. First, earlier studies generally focus 
on children’s health, behavioral, and cognitive outcomes. Parental investments, important 
determinants of child well-being, are often overlooked. This study investigates into a wide range 
of outcomes related to parental investments and family environment available in the SIPP 
dataset, including family cognitive stimulation activities, family routines, family interactions, 
parenting stress, and parental expectation. Second, a decade after TANF’s nationwide 
implementation, results from pre-PRWORA state-wide experiments or observational studies 
covering time periods until 3-5 years after the reform would not be able to capture influences of 
changes in norms and expectations on welfare recipiency, work, and childrearing (Duncan & 
Chase-Lansdale, 2001; Grogger & Karoly, 2005). This study, hence, uses nationally 
representative panel data SIPP from more years after the reform (2004 and 2008 panels). Third, 
most current literature compares participants in traditional cash assistance programs to 
participants in cash plus work promotion programs. Yet, this comparison does not reflect options 
available to low-income families today. TANF contains a wide range of requirements, and it is 
important to understand how TANF participation as a package lifts or fails families in need. 
Therefore, the first aim of this study is to investigate the associations between parental 
investments and TANF participation. Fourth, limited research examines how different state 
TANF policy stringencies may affect children. However, as an aftermath of the Great Recession, 
many states experience budget constraints and have cut TANF benefits or have shortened time 
limits (Schott & Pavetti, 2011). It is extraordinarily important to evaluate and understand impacts 
of increases in stringencies in TANF requirements. The second aim of this study is to evaluate 
whether varying degrees of TANF state policy stringencies have impacts on parental 




participation and its policy characteristics might enhance or worsen the family environments of 
children. 
Methods 
Data and Sample 
This study uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 2004 
and 2008 panels. In SIPP, each respondent is interviewed every 4-month to collect information 
from each of the previous 4 months. The 2004 and 2008 panels contain 12 waves and 15 waves 
of information, respectively (Census Bureau, 2012). The parental investment information, the 
main outcomes of this study, is derived from the two Child Well-Being Topical Modules in each 
panel collected in the last month of Wave 3 and 8 in the 2004 panel (2004 and 2006) and Wave 4 
and 10 in the 2008 panel (2009 and 2011). The intervals between the two time points are 20 
month and 24 month respectively for the 2004 and the 2008 panel. This study compares the 
changes in levels of parental investments in relation to TANF participation status.  
In SIPP, the parental investment information was collected on all children in the 
household aged 0 to 17, and information was reported by the designated parent/guardian. I 
restricted the sample using four criteria: first, children who responded to the first Child Well-
Being Topical Module survey; second, children aged 0 to 15 during the first survey as they will 
be in the universe (under age 17) during the second survey; third, children who lived in 
households with a female household head not having a bachelor degree and without the father’s 
presence in the household in the first survey. This criteria allows me to study families most likely 
to receive TANF. It is shown that 94% of TANF adult recipients had 12 or fewer years of 
education and 87% were not married (ACF, 2012); and fourth, children who are citizen, because 




The response rates for the second survey was 79.7% and 73.4% in the 2004 and 2008 
panel, respectively. I further use the multiple imputation strategy to account for potential biases 
from attrition (detailed in the empirical strategies section). The final sample size is 8,570 
children or 17,140 observations for each imputation (2004 panel: 4,801 children; 2008 panel: 
3,769 children). Power analysis revealed that in a model with 24 controls that explains 10% of 
variability in an outcome, a sample size of 136 will have 80% power with a significance level of 
0.05 to detect an R-Squared of 0.05 attributed to one independent variable (TANF participation 
in this case) (Cohen, 1988). Since the sample sizes in this study are larger than 136, this study 
has more than 80% power to detect the associations between TANF participation and parental 
investments. 
Measures 
Key Independent Variables: TANF Participation and State TANF policies 
 A child is defined as receiving TANF if he/she received TANF at time of the interview. 
Participating in TANF is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. This leads to 1,633 children (9.5% of all 
children meeting the inclusion criteria) who participated in TANF in any of the two surveys, and 
841 children received TANF at both survey time points.  
 Information on state TANF policy characteristics were obtained and recoded from the 
Urban Institute Welfare Rule Database. State TANF policies are coded into the following 
categories. First and the reference category, states not having extreme TANF policies; that is the 
most common policy bundle –– having a 60-month time limit and having partial sanction at the 
initial incidence of noncompliance to work requirements. Second, states having harsh sanctions, 
imposing sanctions on the full family or closing the case in the initial incidence of 




TANF participation. Fourth, states having stringent time limits –– having a time limit of less than 
60 months for TANF participation, which is shorter than the federally allowed 60 months.  
Dependent Variables: Parental Investments 
 Parental investments information was collected in two SIPP topical modules in each 
panel. Descriptions of parental investment variables and their coding are listed in Table 1. These 
variables cover a wide range of areas in parental investments. I categorize them into five 
dimensions. First, they captured the cognitive stimulation opportunities a family provides to the 
child (e.g., frequency of family reading time, or the child’s participation in extracurricular 
activities in terms of sports teams, lessons, or clubs). Second, family routines and life structures 
are measured by a family’s frequency of eating breakfast or dinner together and whether parents 
set rules on watching TV. Third, family interactions are measured by a family’s frequency to 
share fun time together, the frequency of child outings, and the frequency of praising the child. 
Fourth, family stress is characterized by how often the designated guardian/parent considered the 
child as hard to care, felt bothered by the child, found him/herself giving up life to meet the 
child’s needs, or felt angry with the child. Fifth, parental expectation is measured by guardians’ 
confidence in the child’s potential to finish college education.  
Covariates: Child, Guardian, Household, and State Characteristics 
This study controls for time-varying child, guardian, and household characteristics to 
account for characteristics associated with parental investments and changes in family condition 
that may correlate with TANF participation. These characteristics include the child’s and the 
guardian’s age in categories, guardian’s marital status, guardian’s educational levels, and 
whether the guardian is a parent of the child, household size, number of children in the 




unemployment rates in the child’s state of residence during the year of interview are also 
controlled for in order to account for influences of local economic environments. Since some 
changes in family conditions are endogenous to TANF participation, I also examine models 
without these controls or models only including age categories. Results from these parsimonious 
models are qualitatively the same as results with the full list of controls (not shown in this paper 
but available upon request). I therefore present results including a full list of covariates as they 
yield estimates accounting for changes in family conditions. With these controls, the estimated 
associations between TANF participation and parental investments will not simply be effects 
from marriage dissolution, having one additional child, the guardian completing an advance 
degree, or living in a state with growing unemployment rates.  
Empirical Strategies 
The major challenge in assessing impacts of TANF participation is selection into program 
participation. Families participating and not participating in TANF are different in observable 
characteristics (e.g., family financial conditions) as well as unobservable characteristics (e.g., 
ability to navigate through the welfare application process or the intention to seek support from 
government programs). Comparing parental investment levels between TANF participating and 
not participating families capture effects from factors other than TANF participation, such as 
disadvantaged economic condition or a stronger intention to use transfer programs among TANF 
participating families.  
Selection bias may stem from differences in meeting program eligibility criteria and 
differences in program take-up intentions. To address the selection problem related to program 
eligibility, I restrict the samples to the population groups fitting the common family profiles of 




without the fathers’ presence in the households. To address the selection bias in program take-up, 
I use an individual fixed effect (FE) model. A fixed effect model relates the changes in a 
mother’s TANF participation status to her own changes in parental investments to the child. FE 
models effectively control for unobservable factors that are constant over time for this child and 
this household, such as personality, motivation, ability, and intention to seek welfare support. 
Other time-varying factors can be included as controls to account for changes that may affect 
parental investments and/or program participation.  
One major limitation of a FE model is its assumption that individuals are affected by 
similar time trends. Yet, children may face different time-varying factors (e.g., neighbourhood 
environment changes, family relation changes), and these factors, if unobserved, cannot be 
controlled for in fixed effects models. This study tackle this limitation by narrowing the sample 
to a restricted group children in order to better meet the assumption on identical time trends, 
since children living in households headed by low-skilled women are subject to similar risks and 
changes in life. To the extent that there are unobserved time-varying characteristics that 
differentially affect the outcomes or likelihood of TANF participation, this study will be still 
subject to selection bias. 
Although other strategies like experimental or instrumental variables design are ideal 
strategies to address selection bias, each method has its limitation in execution. The most ideal 
empirical strategy to examine effects of TANF participation is to randomly assigned families in 
need of cash assistance to receiving TANF and not receiving TANF. However, random 
assignment generally requires much resources to execute and is not currently feasible, so this 
study has to resort to other identification strategies. An instrumental variable strategy is another 




impacts. This approach relies on identifying instruments that correlate with TANF participation 
and that are not related to the outcome unless it is through the effects of TANF participation. 
This way, impacts of TANF participation can be modelled using instrumental variables through a 
two stage least square model. Following prior studies, I uses variations in state TANF policy 
requirements as instruments (Bartik, 2002; Osborne & Knab, 2007), yet the value of the F-tests 
in the first stage regression was below 2, which is much lower than the acceptable standard of 10 
or above, indicating that the instruments are weak to investigate the effects of TANF 
participation. Given these limitations, an individual fixed effect model is the most appropriate 
approach to address the selection bias in this study. 
In addition to the selection problem, attrition is another source of study bias. This study 
uses repeated measures for the same individual to study effects of program participation. Prior 
studies have shown that respondents leaving SIPP during the follow-up interviews exhibit more 
disadvantaged characteristics (e.g., lower earnings at baseline) (Vaughan & Scheuren, 2002). 
This attrition pattern may contribute to biased estimates on associations between TANF 
participation on parental investments, since responses from children in more disadvantaged 
families are more likely to be unavailable in the follow-up survey. To account for potential bias 
from missing data, I use a multiple imputation strategy to impute observations with missing data 
during the follow-up survey. Multiple imputation is preferred over mean or regression 
imputation due to its strength of preserving variation. I multiply imputed 10 datasets for each 
panel. I pool multiply imputed 20 datasets from two panels and use the –mi estimate– command 
in Stata to adjust coefficients and standard errors for the variability between imputations in 





What is the association between TANF participation and parental investments?  
To answer the first research question, I use two analytic models (Equation 1 and Equation 
2). The first model is described below: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑈𝑝𝑡 + ⅀𝛽3 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ⅀𝛽4 𝐺𝑖𝑡 + ⅀𝛽5𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑈𝑅𝑠𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 …… (1) 
where i represents individual, t represents time, and s represents state; 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents various 
parental investment outcomes; 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 shows the TANF program participation status at time t 
for individual i;  𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑈𝑝𝑡 represents an indicator variable showing whether the response 
comes from the follow-up interview; 𝐶𝑖𝑡 represents child time-varying characteristics such as the 
child’s age in categories (0-3, 4-7, 8-11 (ref.), 12-17), 𝐺𝑖𝑡 represents the primary caregiver’s 
time-varying characteristics, including gender, whether the caregiver is a parent of the child, age 
in categories (15-20, 21-25, 26-30 (ref.), 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46+), marital status, and 
educational levels (less than high school (ref.), high school, some college or more); 𝐻𝑖𝑡 
represents household time-varying characteristics, such as number of children in the household 
(1 (ref.), 2, 3+), household sizes, and whether the household is in a metropolitan area; 𝑈𝑅𝑠𝑡 is the 
unemployment rate in state s in the given survey year; 𝛼𝑖 is the unique intercept for each 
individual; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the unobserved error term. The FE model in Equation (1) can also be 
written in the following way: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡2 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡1 = 𝛽1(𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡2 − 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡1) + 𝛽2(𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑈𝑝𝑖𝑡2 − 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡1) + ⅀𝛽3 (𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑡
̅̅̅̅ )
+ ⅀𝛽4 (𝐺𝑖𝑡 − 𝐺𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ) + ⅀𝛽5 (𝐻𝑖𝑡 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝛽6 (𝑈𝑅𝑠𝑡 − 𝑈𝑅𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡2 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡1) 
 
To examine mechanisms behind the association between TANF participation and parental 
investments, I conduct employment and income mediation and moderation analyses.8 For 
                                                          
8 I examine mediating and moderating effects of employment by defining employment as whether having a paid job 
or work hours. The findings are qualitatively the same. For brevity, I present results defining employment as having 




mediation analyses, I first run regressions including two potential mediators, having a paid job 
and log family income levels, into Equation 1. Next, I run two models separately to predict the 
likelihood of having a job and log family income levels using TANF participation status. Finally, 
I use the Sobel test to examine whether the mediation effect is statistically significant for each 
outcome (Preacher & Leonardelli, 2001). In terms of models for moderation analysis, I include 
two moderators, employment and income, and their interactions with TANF participation status 
into Equation 1. If the moderation effects exist, the interaction terms should have coefficients 
that are statistically significant. 
To understand how the associations between TANF participation and parental 
investments differs by age group, I introduce in Equation 1 interactions between 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 and 
child age categories (0-4, 5-11, 12-17) to estimates the differential effects by age groups, and 
results are presented in Appendix 2. 
In the second model, changes in parental investments from baseline to follow-up are 
differentially estimated by detailed TANF participation status:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑈𝑝𝑡 + ⅀𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑋𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑈𝑝𝑡 + ⅀𝛽3 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ⅀𝛽4 𝐺𝑖𝑡 + ⅀𝛽5𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑈𝑅𝑠𝑡 +
𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 …(2) 
where 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 is a time-invarying categorical variable with four categories, with not 
participating in TANF at both time points coded as 1 (the reference category), transition into 
TANF participation from baseline to follow-up coded as 2, participating in TANF at both time 
points coded as 3, and transition out of TANF coverage coded as 4. The interactions between 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 dummies and 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑈𝑝𝑡 estimates the differential trends in parental investments from 
baseline to follow-up across four groups. I administered Wald tests after each model to test 




Does the association between TANF participation and parental investments differ 
by stringencies of states TANF policies on time limits and work sanctions? 
 
The FE model used to tackle the second research question is:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + ⅀𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠 +  𝛽3𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑈𝑝𝑡 + ⅀𝛽4 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ⅀𝛽5 𝐺𝑖𝑡 + ⅀𝛽6𝐻𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑈𝑅𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 …… (3) 
In Equation 3, the interactions between TANF participation status and 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠 are introduced to 
Equation 1. 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑠 represents three policy dummies: full family sanctions in the initial 
incidence of noncompliance to work requirements, having a time limit of less than 60 month 
time limits, and having no time limit. The reference category is not having extreme TANF 
policies, the most common policy bundle –– having a 60-month time limit and having partial 
sanction at the initial incidence of non-compliance to work requirements. I administered Wald 




 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of parental investment indicators at the first and 
the second time points. The descriptive results show that among children living in households 
headed by low-skilled women, TANF participating children received lower levels of parental 
investments across many indicators compared to non-participating children. For example, they 
were less likely to participate in extracurricular activities, had fewer numbers of family outings, 
and lived with caregivers who had fun time with them less frequently, who praised them less 
frequently, who experienced a higher level of parenting stress, and had lower education 




investments in a few indicators such as numbers of family meal times each week and the 
frequencies of family reading time.  
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of sample characteristics (pooling information 
from two time points). Results show that the child sample was evenly split across gender, with a 
mean age of 9. Forty eight percent of the child sample was non-Hispanic White, 36% was non-
Hispanic Black, 20% was Hispanics, and 8% was other races. Primary caregivers of these 
children had an average age of 36, and more than half of them did not have any college 
education. Nine percent of children lived with guardians who were not their parents, and 77% of 
them lived in metropolitan areas. These households had an average size of 4 people, and more 
than half of the households had three or more children. Next, I use individual fixed effect models 
to examine associations between TANF participation and parental investments. 
Multivariate Analysis  
TANF Participation and Parental Investments 
Table 3 reports results from individual fixed effects models examining associations 
between TANF participation (TANF hereafter) and parental investments (PI hereafter). Model 1 
compares the change in the PI level as a child’s TANF participation status changes. In other 
words, the model conducts within-person comparison across the two time points – how a child’s 
parental investment environment changes when his/her family participated and not participated 
in TANF. Model 2 in Table 3 further delineates the changes in parental investment levels across 
children with different TANF participation sequences: constantly not participating in TANF 
across two time points, transition into TANF participation, constantly participating in TANF, and 
transition out of TANF participation. Wald tests are administered after each model to check 




significant. All outcomes (including dichotomous ones) are examined using linear individual FE 
models.9  
Both Model 1 and Model 2 control for time-varying child, caregiver, and household 
characteristics to account for changes in life circumstances that led to TANF participation.10 In 
addition to the main sample, children living in households headed by women not having a 
Bachelor degree and households without the presence of fathers at the first time point, I also run 
the same models on two additional sample restriction criteria to check the robustness of findings. 
First, I further restrict the main sample to women who do not have any college education 
(excluding those who have obtained an associate degree or have ever attended college for some 
time). Second, I further restrict the main sample to households had received AFDC or TANF 
prior to baseline. These sample restrictions allow this study to compare results from narrower 
samples who are more vulnerable to TANF participation. 
To understand whether the associations observed in Model 1 of Table 3 is mediated or 
moderated by changes in the caregiver’s employment status and changes in family income, I 
conducted mediation and moderation tests and presented results in Table 4.11 Results from 
Tables 3 and 4 will be discussed together by each outcome.  
                                                          
9 Alternatively, I used logistic fixed effect regressions to run the same model as in Table 3 to examine associations 
between TANF participation and dichotomous parental investment indicators, and results are presented in Appendix 
1 and the coefficients are reported in odds ratio. In logistic fixed effect models, only children who experienced a 
change in an outcome are retained in the sample, whereas in linear fixed effect models, all children are included in 
the sample. I consider children who did not experience a change in a dichotomous outcome valuable to include in 
the sample as no change in an outcome is also a valid response to the TANF participation.  
In Appendix 2, interactions between age categories (0-4, 5-11, 12-17) and TANF participation status are introduced 
into Model 1 to show the differential associations between TANF and PI across age groups. 
10 I acknowledge that changes in guardian or household characteristics may also be a result of TANF participation. 
Therefore, I ran the same model without these controls, and the results are qualitatively the same. I present results 
from models with these controls as it is important to account for life circumstances that led to TANF participation.  
11 In Table 4, Model 1, 2, and 3 is each a separate regression. Model 1 controls for whether the caregiver has a paid 
job at time t and the log family income level at time t. Model 2 uses TANF participation status to predict 
employment status. Results show that TANF participation is associated with an 18% to 25% decrease in the 
likelihood to have a paid job. Model 3 uses TANF participation status to predict family income level, and results 




In terms of cognitive stimulation, results from Model 1 in Table 3 show that while TANF 
participation was not associated with likelihoods of children participating in extracurricular 
activities, TANF participation was associated with lower number of times families read to 
children in the past week (β=-0.75, se=0.34, p<0.05) when compared to not participating in 
TANF. Results from Model 2 in Table 3 show that children in households transitioning out of 
TANF experienced an increase in family reading time relative to other children in other TANF 
participating sequences (consistently participating in TANF, consistently not participating in 
TANF, and transitioning into TANF), and children in households constantly participating in 
TANF show a marginally significant decrease in family reading time from the first time point to 
the next. Results from mediation tests (in Table 4) show that the decrease in family reading time 
was mediated by the lower likelihood of caregivers to have paid jobs when they participate in 
TANF. Results from the moderation test reveals that, among TANF participants, family reading 
time was higher when the caregiver combined welfare and work (β=0.74, se=0.10, p>0.1) 
relative to when they rely on TANF and do not work, though the association is not statistically 
significant. Taken together, TANF participation is associated with decreased family reading 
times, which is majorly explained by the lower likelihood of guardians to have a job when 
participating in TANF.  
In the areas of family routines and life structures, results in Table 3 show that the 
likelihood of guardians to set rules on watching TV was not related to TANF participation. Yet, 
TANF participation was statistically significantly associated with higher numbers of days 
                                                          
are administered to test whether the mediation effects are statistically significant, and the p-values are reported. If 
results from Sobel tests are statistically significant, it suggests that employment/family income is mediating the 
associations between TANF and PI. Model 4 is the employment and income moderation tests on the association 
between TANF and PI. Model 4 is similar to Model 1 except that Model 4 introduces interaction terms between 
TANF and employment as well as TANF and log family income. If the interaction terms are statistically significant, 




families sharing breakfast (β=0.28, SE=0.13, p<0.05) or dinner (β=0.23, SE=0.10, p<0.05) 
together in a week. When comparing changes over time across TANF participation sequences, 
children in households transitioning out of TANF experienced the largest decreases in the 
number of dinner families shared together, followed by families constantly participating in 
TANF. Results from mediation tests reveal that the increases in family breakfast and dinner 
times were mediated by the guardians’ lower probability to be employed when participating in 
TANF, and neither income nor employment changes had moderation effects. In brief, TANF 
participation was associated with increases in family meal times, and this positive correlation 
was mediated by the lower likelihood of guardians to have jobs when participating in TANF.    
With regards to family interactions, TANF participation was negatively associated with 
frequencies of positive interactions. Children’s TANF participation status was associated with a 
lower frequency of families taking children out to parks, churches, playgrounds, or visiting 
relatives (β=-1.10, SE=0.65, p<0.1). The associations between TANF participation and having 
fun time with children (talk or play with children more than once a day) or praising the children 
(complimenting on children more than once a day) were also negative yet not statistically 
significant. When comparing trends in family interactions across TANF participation sequences, 
results show that families transition out of TANF experienced higher likelihoods to take their 
children out (β=1.35, SE=0.48, p<0.01) or to have fun time with children (β=0.04, SE=0.02, 
p<0.1) when compared to trends of families constantly not participating in TANF. Results from 
mediation tests in Table 4 suggest that the decrease in the number of outings when participating 
in TANF was mediated by guardian’s lower likelihood of employment when on welfare. The 
income and employment moderation tests reveal positive moderation effects, yet these estimates 




frequency in family interactions, and the association was mediated by guardians’ lower 
likelihood to work when participating in TANF. 
With respect to parenting stress, TANF participation was weakly associated with 
guardians’ likelihood to experience frustration in parenting (e.g., finding their children hard to 
care or feeling having to give up life to meet the needs of children) (β=0.01, SE=0.02, p>0.1), 
and the association was not statistically significant. In terms of parental expectation, TANF 
participation was associated with a lower likelihood of guardians expecting their children to at 
least complete college (β=-0.03, SE=0.02, p>0.1), and this finding was also not statistically 
significant. Children living in households transitioning out of TANF, compared to those 
constantly not participating in TANF, experience an improvement in parental expectation of their 
educational attainment. 
TANF Participation, Policy Stringencies, and Parental Investments 
In Table 5, interactions between state TANF policies and TANF participation status are 
introduced into Model 1 in Table 3 to examine the differential associations between TANF 
participation and parental investments in different policy environments. Results from individual 
fixed effects models show that there was no indication that more severe sanctions or shorter time 
limits negatively impact parental investments.  
Results point to four worth-noting associations. First, TANF participation in states with 
full sanction is associated with more family breakfast time, perhaps due to that TANF 
participants in states with severe sanction were more negatively selected in terms of employment 
status. Second, more severe sanctions were associated with higher parental expectations of 
children’s educational achievement when participating in TANF. Third, TANF participation in 




likelihood of children to participate in extracurricular activities. Fourth, participating in TANF in 
states having no time limit is marginally associated with a higher likelihood of guardians to 
praise their children when compared to TANF participation in states with other policies. 
Discussion 
This study found that TANF participation was associated with higher levels of family 
routines, manifested in the increased numbers of breakfasts and dinners families shared together, 
and lower frequencies of family reading times and outing times. These associations were all 
mediated by the lower likelihood of employment among guardians when participating in TANF. 
TANF participation was not statistically significantly associated with the likelihoods of 
guardians to invest in extracurricular activities, to set rules regarding watching TV, to praise their 
children, to report parenting difficulties, or to expect their children to complete college. Also, 
TANF participation in more stringent states (in terms of short time limits and full family 
sanctions on noncompliance to work requirements) did not adversely impact parental 
investments.  
When families are in need of public assistance, they are generally under greater stress 
financially and mentally (Cheng 2007). The null association between TANF participation and 
parenting difficulties is consistent with findings from some earlier studies (Morris et al., 2001; 
Dunifon, Kalil, & Danziger, 2003). The absence of negative effect on parenting difficulties may 
also suggest that the support from TANF participation offsets the escalation in stress associated 
with events that led families to participate in TANF. Meanwhile, the null association also 





The contrast of positive associations between TANF participation and family shared meal 
time and negative associations between TANF participation and family reading time or having 
family outings is worth noting. This finding suggests that caregivers’ lower employment rates 
when receiving TANF freed off time for families to share meals together. However, gaining 
additional time did not translate into caregivers spending more time to read to children or to take 
them to go out. The unknown mechanisms behind how TANF families determine their time use 
warrant future examination. This contrast also signifies the importance of identifying and 
incorporating supportive services for caregivers in need of public assistance so they could better 
cope with the circumstances that lead them to welfare programs and have strengths to continue 
investing in their children. 
Given that transitioning families from welfare to work is one of the major goals of 
welfare reform, the negative association between TANF participation and employment in Table 
4 indicates that work requirements did not fully bring TANF participants to work to the level 
they worked prior to receiving TANF. This shows that there is still room for growth in 
incorporating TANF adult participants into the labor market. Studies have shown that TANF 
participants who are not working generally face challenges to take on or sustain employment, 
such as health or mental health conditions, substance abuse problems, or domestic violence 
(Danziger et al., 2000). More research is needed to identify effective services to incorporate 
families into the labor market or eliminating obstacles to employment (Chase-Lansdale & 
Pittman, 2002).   
Findings from this study should be interpreted with caution in light of several limitations. 
First, although individual fixed effects models control for time constant characteristics, it cannot 




outcomes. This study cannot identify causal relationships or avoid the reverse causality problem. 
Second, the TANF participation status is defined as receiving TANF at the two survey time 
points, and the associations between TANF participation and parental investments could only be 
examined across 20- or 24-month intervals. The associations between TANF and PI may vary 
had the intervals been shorter or longer. Also, TANF participating families oftentimes use more 
than one program and may transition in and out of TANF (Moffitt, 2015). The collected 
information cannot capture changes parental investments in relation to heterogeneous TANF 
participation patterns (e.g., different spells and duration in between the intervals). Lastly, most 
parental investment questions in the survey were answered by designated guardians of children 
unless the child was above 15 years old. Not having child-reported responses to complement 
with parent-reported data is a limitation of the outcome measures.   
Despite these limitations, this study is one of the few studies that use data post-2000 to 
examine relationships between TANF participation and parental investments after TANF’s 
nation-wide implementation. This study further examines how different state TANF policy 
characteristics were associated with impacts of TANF participation on parental investments. 
Findings on negative associations between TANF participation and family outings and parental 
investments in cognitive stimulation suggest that, to improve well-being of children in low-
income families, social assistance programs need to strengthen its current level of support for 
families, either in forms of financial support or service provision. That way, the social safety net 
could truly help caregivers cope with adverse life circumstances and invest in children, and, 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of parental investment outcomes 










About how many times in the past week, in 
total, did any family member read stories to 
child? 



















(1) Is [child’s name] on a sports team either 
in or out of school? (2) Does [child’s name] 
take lessons after school or on weekends in 
subjects like music, dance, language, 
computers, or religion? (3) Does [child’s 
name] participate in any clubs or 
organizations after school or on weekends, 
such as Scouts, a religious group, or a Girls 






















Family Routines and Life Structures 
# of 
breakfasts 
In a typical week last month, how many days 
did [designated parent] eat breakfast with 
child? 















# of dinners  
In a typical week last month, how many days 

















TV rules Are there family rules for [child’s name] 
about what TV program he/she can watch; 
how early or late he/she may watch TV; how 






















# of outings About how many times in the past month 
did ... or any family member take child on 
any kind of outing - out to the park, to 
church, to a playground, to visit with friends 
or relatives, etc.? 

















Fun How often do/does [designated parent] and 
child talk or play with each other for five 
minutes or more, just for fun? 
0-17 0=Not every 
day 
1=Once or 

















Praise How often do/does [designated parent] praise 
or compliment child by saying something 
like, "good for you!" or "what a nice thing 
you did!" or "way to go!"? 
0-17 0=Not every 
day 
1=Once or 




















(1) My [child/children][is/are] much harder 
to care for than most children. How 
often do you feel this way? 
(2) My [child/children] [do/does] things 
that really bother me a lot. How often 
do you feel this way? 
(3) I find myself giving up more of my life 
to meet my child/children's needs than I 
0-17 0=Never to 




very often to 

























Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
ever expected. How often do you feel 
this way? 
(4) I feel angry with my child/children. 
























*Note: Estimates are derived from the first imputation (m=1). The samples are restricted to children aged 0-15 
during the first survey living in households headed by women who do not have a Bachelor degree and living in 















    Table 2: Demographic characteristics 
Levels Characteristics Categories 
Mean / 
Proportion 
Child Gender Female 49.8% 
 Race White 48.0% 
  Black 36.3% 
  Hispanic 19.7% 
  Other race 7.9% 
 Age  9.4 
Parent/ 
Guardian 
Gender Female 98.6% 
Age  35.8 
 Education Less than high school 20.9% 
  High school 30.9% 
  Some college education 48.2% 
 Marital status Married 11.0% 
 Guardian is not a parent of the child 9.2% 
Household Non-metropolitan area  23.1% 
 Household size  4.1 
 # of children under 18 One child 26.3% 
  Two children 27.2% 
  Three or more children 53.8% 
State Unemployment rates  7.2 
*Note: Estimates are derived from the first imputation (m=1) across the two time points. See 









Table 3: TANF participation and parental investments 
Sample No BA No College Past TANF No BA No College Past TANF No BA No College Past TANF No BA No College Past TANF No BA No College Past TANF 
Outcome 
Cognitive Stimulation Family Routines and Life Structures 
Read   Extracurricular activities Breakfast   Dinner   TV Rules   
Model 1                
TANF -0.752 -0.865 -0.729 -0.002 -0.020 0.024 0.280 -0.006 0.283 0.231 0.284 0.336 0.010 0.006 0.008 
  (0.343)* (0.402)* (0.370)+ (0.028) (0.036) (0.030) (0.131)* (0.154) (0.139)* (0.099)* (0.128)* (0.104)** (0.023) (0.030) (0.024) 
Model 2                
Time 0.134 0.187 0.421 0.014 0.010 0.040 0.072 0.125 0.271 -0.344 -0.354 -0.208 -0.032 -0.022 -0.049 
   (0.132) (0.175) (0.225)+ (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)* (0.056) (0.076) (0.092)** (0.042)*** (0.057)*** (0.068)** (0.009)*** (0.012)+ (0.014)*** 
Tran. in -0.344 -0.399 -0.264 0.056 0.063 0.123 0.353 -0.068 -0.137 -0.009 0.352 0.038 -0.034 -0.050 -0.018 
X time (1) (0.523) (0.592) (0.633) (0.050) (0.064) (0.065)+ (0.246) (0.280) (0.279) (0.183) (0.218) (0.207) (0.040) (0.050) (0.047) 
TANF -0.746 -0.984 -0.969 -0.024 -0.026 -0.043 0.103 0.161 -0.125 -0.318 -0.375 -0.433 -0.053 -0.065 -0.037 
X time (2) (0.417)+ (0.507)+ (0.438)* (0.039) (0.051) (0.041) (0.164) (0.210) (0.173) (0.124)* (0.151)* (0.129)** (0.030)+ (0.037)+ (0.031) 
Tran. out 0.931 1.087 0.770 0.030 0.061 0.009 -0.242 -0.020 -0.453 -0.357 -0.417 -0.479 -0.033 -0.038 -0.019 
X time (3) (0.444)* (0.526)* (0.463) (0.034) (0.045) (0.036) (0.157) (0.195) (0.171)** (0.114)** (0.153)** (0.122)*** (0.025) (0.035) (0.027) 
Wald test                
(1) vs. (2)   +   +    + + **    
(1) vs. (3) + +       * * * ***    
(2) vs. (3) * * *      * *** ** ***    
N 11054 6031 4470 12666 6470 5240 17140 9094 6958 17140 9094 6958 15714 8196 6438 
Outcome 
Family Interactions Parenting Stress Parental Expectation 
Outing   Fun    Praise   Parenting difficulties Child completing college 
Model 1                
TANF -1.104 -1.703 -1.008 -0.032 -0.030 -0.035 -0.024 -0.008 -0.019 0.006 0.023 -0.010 -0.027 -0.057 -0.028 
 (0.648)+ (0.758)* (0.700) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021)+ (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.031) (0.026) (0.021) (0.028)* (0.023) 
Model 2                
Time 1.745 1.933 2.153 -0.027 -0.024 -0.021 -0.040 -0.032 -0.037 -0.023 -0.011 -0.051 -0.007 0.002 0.012 
   (0.278)*** (0.378)*** (0.460)*** (0.009)** (0.013)+ (0.013) (0.008)*** (0.012)** (0.015)* (0.009)* (0.014) (0.016)** (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) 
Tran. in 0.041 -0.520 -0.496 -0.009 -0.018 -0.006 -0.038 -0.016 -0.028 -0.023 -0.029 -0.025 0.029 -0.018 0.010 
X time (1) (1.144) (1.270) (1.459) (0.035) (0.045) (0.044) (0.034) (0.042) (0.045) (0.039) (0.047) (0.049) (0.036) (0.050) (0.048) 
TANF -0.177 1.072 -0.679 -0.004 0.026 0.003 -0.008 -0.000 -0.013 0.009 -0.014 0.037 0.020 0.037 0.009 
X time (2) (0.834)* (1.022) (0.919) (0.026) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.036) (0.032) (0.029) (0.038) (0.032) 
Tran. out 1.346 2.369 1.110 0.043 0.057 0.046 0.018 0.004 0.014 -0.020 -0.051 0.007 0.055 0.079 0.043 
X time (3) (0.484)** (0.932)* (0.825) (0.024)+ (0.031)+ (0.026)+ (0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.041) (0.033) (0.025)* (0.034)* (0.028) 
Wald test                
(1) vs. (2)                
(1) vs. (3)  *           + +  
(2) vs. (3) + *           + + ** 
N 11053 6031 4470 17140 9094 6958 17140 9094 6958 17140 9094 6958 17140 9094 6958 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p>0.001. Each column is one of the three sample groups (no BA, no college, past TANF) for a given outcome. All samples are restricted to 
children aged 0-15 during the first survey living in households headed by women who do not have a Bachelor degree and living in households without the presence of fathers. The second sample (no 
college) further excludes children with guardians having any college education, and the third sample (past TANF) is based on the first sample and further restricts samples to children living in families 
having received TANF in the past. Each model is a separate linear regression model. All models control for individual fixed effects and time-varying characteristics, including the timing of survey 
(whether the survey is the follow-up survey), the child’s age in categories (0-3, 4-7, 8-11 (ref.), 12-17), the guardian’s age in categories (15-20, 21-25, 26-30 (ref.), 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46+), whether 
the guardian is not a parent, guardian’s gender (female), guardian’s marital status (married), guardian’s educational levels (less than high school (ref.), high school, some college or more), household 
sizes, number of children in the household (1 (ref.), 2, 3+), whether the household is located in a non-metropolitan area, and state unemployment rates in a given year. In Model 2, “Time” represents 
changes from the first time point to the second time point; “Tran. in X time” estimates changes in PI among children going from not receiving TANF to receiving TANF from the first time point to the 
second time point relative to those constantly not participating in TANF; “TANF X time” estimates changes in PI among children participating in TANF in both time points relative to those constantly 
not participating in TANF; and “Tran. out X time” estimates changes in PI among children going from receiving TANF to not receiving TANF from the first time point to the second time point relative 






Table 4. Employment and income mediation and moderation tests 
 Cognitive Stimulation Family Routines and Life 
Structures 










Mediation Tests (Models 1 & 2 for employment mediation tests and Models 1 & 3 for income mediation tests)  
Model 1           
TANF -0.412 -0.004 0.212 0.099 0.007 -0.642 -0.030 -0.024 0.007 -0.028 
 (0.337) (0.028) (0.135) (0.099) (0.023) (0.656) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) 
Paid job 1.336 0.000 -0.378 -0.653 -0.003 1.736 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.002 
 (0.193)*** (0.020) (0.083)*** (0.062)*** (0.014) (0.392)*** (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) 
Log family -0.023 0.003 -0.016 0.000 0.003 -0.069 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
     Income (0.044) (0.003) (0.019) (0.012) (0.003) (0.090) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Model 2 
TANF -> Job 
          
-0.246 -0.180 -0.202 -0.202 -0.189 -0.246 -0.202 -0.202 -0.202 -0.202 
(0.030)*** (0.023)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)*** (0.030)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** 
P-value: Job 
Mediation 
0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.830 0.000*** 0.539 0.669 0.947 0.878 
Model 3 
TANF -> 
     Income 
          
0.535 0.554 0.551 0.551 0.574 0.535 0.551 0.551 0.551 0.551 




0.604 0.329 0.405 1.000 0.326 0.452 0.739 0.739 0.739 0.739 
Moderation Tests (Model 4) 
Model 4           
TANF -0.449 0.050 0.652 0.394 0.123 -2.327 -0.114 -0.081 -0.003 0.029 
 (1.257) (0.132) (0.499) (0.416) (0.092) (2.637) (0.098) (0.086) (0.109) (0.124) 
Paid job 1.225 -0.001 -0.395 -0.624 0.005 1.491 0.007 -0.000 0.005 0.001 
 (0.201)*** (0.021) (0.088)*** (0.064)*** (0.014) (0.424)*** (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
TANF X 0.743 0.013 0.137 -0.189 -0.058 1.542 0.003 0.040 -0.023 0.008 
      job (0.098) (0.050) (0.208) (0.156) (0.050) (1.055) (0.035) (0.033) (0.039) (0.038) 
Log family -0.018 0.003 -0.013 0.000 0.003 -0.066 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
     income (0.044) (0.003) (0.019) (0.012) (0.003) (0.088) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
TANF X -0.038 -0.009 -0.074 -0.033 -0.014 0.166 0.012 0.006 0.003 -0.009 
      income (0.193) (0.019) (0.072) (0.062) (0.014) (0.415) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) 
N 11054 12666 17140 17140 15714 11053 17140 17140 17140 17140 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p>0.001. See Table 3 for sample model specifications. Each model in each column is a separate linear regression model. The first model uses TANF participation status, 
employment status of guardian, and log family income to predict parental investments. The second model uses TANF participation to predict whether the guardian has a paid job, and the third model uses TANF participation status 
to predict log family income levels. Sobel tests were administered using estimates from Models 1 and 2 for employment mediation tests and Model 1 and 3 for income mediation tests. The p-values from Sobel test results are 
reported in the table. The fourth model introduce interaction terms between TANF participation and job status and income to the first model. All models control for individual fixed effects and time-varying characteristics, including 
the timing of survey (whether the survey is the follow-up survey), the child’s age in categories (0-3, 4-7, 8-11 (ref.), 12-17), the guardian’s age in categories (15-20, 21-25, 26-30 (ref.), 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46+), whether the 
guardian is not a parent, guardian’s gender (female), guardian’s marital status (married), guardian’s educational levels (less than high school (ref.), high school, some college or more), household sizes, number of children in the 






Table 5: State TANF policies, TANF participation and parental investments 
 Cognitive Stimulation Family Routines and Life 
Structures 




 Read  Extracurricular 
activities 




TANF -0.639 -0.054 0.049 0.292 0.017 -0.922 -0.021 -0.049 0.026 -0.053 
  (0.455) (0.042) (0.175) (0.134)* (0.027) (0.817) (0.027) (0.027)+ (0.031) (0.028)+ 
TANF X full 0.280 0.035 0.750 -0.231 -0.011 0.517 -0.009 0.037 -0.023 0.087 
  sanction (1) (0.671) (0.067) (0.270)** (0.203) (0.041) (1.301) (0.039) (0.045) (0.052) (0.044)* 
TANF X no -0.374 0.112 -0.029 0.124 -0.025 -0.742 -0.006 0.100 0.002 -0.007 
  time limit (2) (0.817) (0.081) (0.352) (0.239) (0.054) (1.636) (0.058) (0.052)+ (0.064) (0.055) 
TANF X  -1.190 0.170 -0.047 -0.064 0.004 -1.873 -0.064 -0.034 -0.110 -0.010 
  <60M (3) (0.860) (0.091)+ (0.428) (0.286) (0.065) (2.169) (0.064) (0.063) (0.073) (0.070) 
Wald test           
(1) vs (2)   *        
(1) vs (3)   *        
(2) vs (3)  +         
N 11054 12666 17140 17140 15714 11053 17140 17140 17140 17140 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p>0.001. See Table 3 for sample model specifications. Each column is a separate linear regression model. Full sanction 
represents children living in states imposing sanctions on the full family or closing the case in the initial incidence of non-compliance to work requirements. No time limit 
represents children living in states not having time limit on TANF participation. <60M represents children living in states having a time limit of less than 60 months for TANF 
participation. The reference category for TANF policies is not having extreme policies; that is the most common policy bundle –– having a 60-month time limit and having partial 
sanction at the initial incidence of non-compliance to work requirements. All models additionally control for individual fixed effects and time-varying characteristics, including the 
timing of survey (whether the survey is the follow-up survey), the child’s age in categories (0-3, 4-7, 8-11 (ref.), 12-17), the guardian’s age in categories (15-20, 21-25, 26-30 
(ref.), 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46+), whether the guardian is not a parent, guardian’s gender (female), guardian’s marital status (married), guardian’s educational levels (less than high 
school (ref.), high school, some college or more), household sizes, number of children in the household (1 (ref.), 2, 3+), whether the household is located in a non-metropolitan 
area, and state unemployment rates in a given year. Wald tests were administered to examine whether there are differential associations between parental investments and TANF 







Appendix 1: TANF participation and parental investments (Same as in Table 3; dichotomous outcomes reported in Odds Ratios) 
Sample No BA No College Past TANF No BA No College Past TANF No BA No College Past TANF No BA No College Past TANF No BA No College Past TANF 
Outcome 
Cognitive Stimulation Family Routines and Life Structures 
Read   Extracurricular activities (Odds Ratio) Breakfast   Dinner   TV Rules (Odds Ratio) 
Model 1                
TANF -0.752 -0.865 -0.729 1.004 0.903 1.198 0.280 -0.006 0.283 0.231 0.284 0.336 1.078 1.012 1.050 
  (0.343)* (0.402)* (0.370)+ (0.164) (0.197) (0.217) (0.131)* (0.154) (0.139)* (0.099)* (0.128)* (0.104)** (0.233) (0.281) (0.243) 
Model 2                
Time 0.134 0.187 0.421 1.098 1.084 1.310 0.072 0.125 0.271 -0.344 -0.354 -0.208 0.743 0.843 0.611 
   (0.132) (0.175) (0.225)+ (0.084) (0.107) (0.160)* (0.056) (0.076) (0.092)** (0.042)*** (0.057)*** (0.068)** (0.062)** (0.087)+ (0.085)*** 
Tran. in -0.344 -0.399 -0.264 1.445 1.466 2.708 0.353 -0.068 -0.137 -0.009 0.352 0.038 0.657 0.464 0.722 
X time (1) (0.523) (0.592) (0.633) (0.461) (0.573) (1.378)+ (0.246) (0.280) (0.279) (0.183) (0.218) (0.207) (0.259) (0.254) (0.329) 
TANF -0.746 -0.984 -0.969 0.872 0.868 0.758 0.103 0.161 -0.125 -0.318 -0.375 -0.433 0.587 0.578 0.676 
X time (2) (0.417)+ (0.507)+ (0.438)* (0.199) (0.270) (0.185) (0.164) (0.210) (0.173) (0.124)* (0.151)* (0.129)** (0.171)+ (0.179)+ (0.201) 
Tran. out 0.931 1.087 0.770 1.156 1.396 1.012 -0.242 -0.020 -0.453 -0.357 -0.417 -0.479 0.738 0.726 0.809 
X time (3) (0.444)* (0.526)* (0.463) (0.227) (0.377) (0.213) (0.157) (0.195) (0.171)** (0.114)** (0.153)** (0.122)*** (0.178) (0.225) (0.220) 
Wald test                
(1) vs. (2)   +   +    + + **  +  
(1) vs. (3) + +       * * * ***    
(2) vs. (3) * * *      * *** ** ***    
N 11054 6031 4470 4252 2160 1744 17140 9094 6958 17140 9094 6888 3334 1962 1370 
Outcome 
Family Interactions Parenting Stress Parental Expectation 
Outing   Fun  (Odds Ratio) Praise (Odds Ratio) Parenting difficulties (Odds Ratio) Child completing college (Odds Ratio) 
Model 1                
TANF -1.104 -1.703 -1.008 0.765 0.765 0.730 0.781 0.901 0.822 1.039 1.237 0.901 0.832 0.687 0.836 
 (0.648)+ (0.758)* (0.700) (0.143) (0.191) (0.151) (0.145) (0.201) (0.175) (0.162) (0.270) (0.159) (0.119) (0.130)* (0.129) 
Model 2                
Time 1.745 1.933 2.153 0.781 0.828 0.816 0.704 0.767 0.715 0.851 0.923 0.706 0.946 1.017 1.084 
   (0.278)*** (0.378)*** (0.460)*** (0.065)** (0.096) (0.106) (0.052)*** (0.075)** (0.087)** (0.057)* (0.093) (0.076)** (0.069) (0.090) (0.125) 
Tran. in 0.041 -0.520 -0.496 0.949 1.199 1.027 0.678 0.807 0.757 0.915 0.929 0.844 1.182 0.831 1.015 
X time (1) (1.144) (1.270) (1.459) (0.286) (0.457) (0.418) (0.205) (0.299) (0.285) (0.238) (0.292) (0.300) (0.291) (0.279) (0.308) 
TANF -0.177 1.072 -0.679 1.014 1.226 1.022 0.958 0.984 0.884 1.113 0.883 1.323 1.158 1.274 1.039 
X time (2) (0.834)* (1.022) (0.919) (0.225) (0.361) (0.241) (0.212) (0.271) (0.207) (0.225) (0.243) (0.294) (0.231) (0.331) (0.225) 
Tran. out 1.346 2.369 1.110 1.477 1.783 1.572 1.190 1.031 1.164 0.901 0.666 1.107 1.448 1.621 1.310 
X time (3) (0.484)** (0.932)* (0.825) (0.353) (0.625) (0.422)+ (0.272) (0.287) (0.296) (0.181) (0.206) (0.240) (0.261)* (0.373)* (0.250) 
Wald test                
(1) vs. (2)                
(1) vs. (3)  *           + +  
(2) vs. (3) + *            +  
N 11053 6031 4470 3870 2056 1502 3896 2146 1664 4784 2566 2086 4424 2624 2002 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p>0.001. See notes in Table 3 for model and sample description. Each model is a separate regression model, with 






Appendix 2: Regression results of TANF participation and parental investments by age categories 
 Cognitive Stimulation Family Routines and Life 
Structures 




 Read Extracurricular 
activities 




TANF -0.925 -0.001 0.411 0.277 0.002 -0.879 -0.033 -0.023 -0.009 -0.015 
  (0.408) (0.033) (0.189)* (0.142)+ (0.035) (0.781) (0.027) (0.024) (0.031) (0.029) 
Age 5-11 0.245  1.182 0.036 0.021 0.034 0.015 -0.004 -0.016 -0.011 
 (0.249)  (0.118) (0.091) (0.018) (0.466) (0.018) (0.041) (0.022) (0.020) 
TANF 0.385  -0.097 -0.006 -0.010 -0.472 -0.029 -0.016 0.007 -0.026 
    X 5-11  (0.473)  (0.241) (0.170) (0.039) (0.975) (0.039) (0.028) (0.040) (0.038) 
Age 12-17  -0.000 0.270 -0.073 -0.002  -0.009 0.006 -0.005 -0.017 
  (0.023) (0.171) (0.138) (0.027)  (0.025) (0.018) (0.031) (0.030) 
TANF  -0.012 -0.454 -0.200 0.046  0.051 -0.012 0.055 -0.010 
    X 12-17  (0.049) (0.302) (0.211) (0.053)  (0.044) (0.035) (0.050) (0.050) 
N 11054 12666 17140 17140 15714 11053 17140 17140 17140 17140 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p>0.001. See Table 3 for sample model specifications. Each column is a separate regression model, and the differential 
TANF participation effects across age groups (0-4, 5-11, 12-17) are tested in these interaction models. Children aged 0-4 serve as the reference group in all outcomes except for 
extracurricular activities, where children aged 5-11 served as the reference group. All models additionally control for individual fixed effects and time-varying characteristics, 
including the timing of survey (whether the survey is the follow-up survey), the guardian’s age in categories (15-20, 21-25, 26-30 (ref.), 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46+), whether the 
guardian is not a parent, guardian’s gender (female), guardian’s marital status (married), guardian’s educational levels (less than high school (ref.), high school, some college or 
more), household sizes, number of children in the household (1 (ref.), 2, 3+), whether the household is located in a non-metropolitan area, and state unemployment rates in a given 





Paper 3: State TANF Stringencies and Long-Term Trajectories of Welfare Use, Labor 
Supply, and Earned Income 
 
Abstract 
Background: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996 ended the longstanding unconditional cash assistance program and installed 
a new time limited and work-focused social assistance program –– Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF). TANF has aimed to promote work and self-reliance, and it has 
established that individuals are subject to work requirements and a federal 60-month time limit 
on welfare. Under TANF, states are able to impose further restrictions beyond the federal 
requirements, and many have done so. While PRWORA showed positive effect in employment 
immediately after its implementation in 1996, little is known of the extent to which stringencies 
in various state TANF policies have impacted individuals long-term. In this study, I investigate 
how stringencies of welfare approaches are associated with single mothers’ long-term 
trajectories of welfare use, labor supply, and earned income. 
 
Methods and Data: I use a nationally representative longitudinal dataset – Survey on Income 
and Program Participation 1996, 2001, 2004 Panels (1996-2007), covering a decade since TANF 
implementation across states. Samples are restricted to women who were single mothers aged 
18-45 with a high school degree or less at time of TANF implementation. State TANF policy 
stringencies are categorized into lenient, standard, and stringent. The outcomes include welfare 
use (participation in TANF, SNAP, and SSI), labor supply (employment and work hours, and 
earned income (earnings and hourly wage). I use multilevel regressions to adjust for the 
clustering nature of data, and I control for state fixed effects to account for time-invarying state 
differences. To address influences of time-varying factors on outcomes, I control for state time-
varying characteristics and adopt a comparison group approach, with married mothers and single 
women without children served as the two comparison groups.  
 
Results and Conclusion: Findings indicate that stringent state TANF policies were associated 
with single mothers’ lower likelihood to participate in TANF, but they use other welfare 
programs (e.g., SNAP and SSI) to the same extent as single mothers living in states with less 
stringent TANF policies. Also, stringent policies did not lead to higher levels of labor supply or 
earned income. By examining whether stringent requirements encourage individuals to work 
more, earn more, and be less likely to receive welfare over the long-term, this study may help 
inform states to restructure welfare rules. Findings may also help shed light on debates over the 






 The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
ended the longstanding entitlement cash assistance program, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), and fundamentally transformed the social assistance system in the US. The 
welfare reform established a new work-focused and time-limited program, Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The main goals of TANF are to end welfare 
dependence, to promote work and self-reliance, and to reduce out-of-wedlock childbearing 
among the poor. To achieve these goals, states adopted varying TANF policy requirements, of 
which the most controversial features were work requirements, sanctions and time limits (Ziliak, 
forthcoming).  
TANF law stipulated that adults must participate in work activities, and noncompliance 
to work requirements will result in sanctions on benefits in most states. TANF also imposed a 
maximum lifetime limit of 60 months on federal welfare benefits (Grogger & Karoly, 2005; 
Ziliak, forthcoming). Each state was given the options to set their own requirements. Examples 
of more stringent TANF requirements that states have adopted include sanctions on full benefits 
after the initial incidence of non-compliance to work requirements as opposed to partial benefit 
cut, or short lifetime limits in receiving the benefits as opposed to longer time limits. These 
requirements are intended to bring families a sense of urgency regarding the temporary nature of 
welfare assistance, so they would promptly move from welfare to work (Pavetti, Derr, & 
Hesketh, 2003; Farrell et al., 2008). Studies find that stringent measures reduced welfare use and 
increased employment levels in the immediate aftermath of the welfare reform (Blank, 2002; 
Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Farrell et al., 2008; Ziliak, forthcoming). However, whether stringent 




reform into the long-term remains unknown. This study evaluates this critical question of how 
state TANF policy requirement stringencies are associated with the long-term welfare use, labor 
supply, and earned income trajectories of disadvantaged single mothers.  
In this study, the outcomes under examination are families’ economic self-sufficiency 
levels, captured by whether families use welfare programs less, participate in work activities 
more, and earn more income (Freeman, 1996; Morgen, 2001).Understanding the long-term 
impacts of state TANF policy stringencies on welfare use, labor supply, and earned income has 
implications for families in need of government assistance and for policymakers crafting the next 
phase of cash assistance system. From the standpoint of needy families, state TANF policies has 
each year affected millions of people in poverty in their experience of obtaining governmental 
support.12 If stringent requirements are not effective in achieving the main policy goal – 
promoting families to achieve economic self-sufficiency – in the long-run, the necessity of 
adopting harsh measures may warrant reevaluation. From the standpoint of policy reform, 
empirical evaluations offer much needed evidence in reevaluating and redesigning the cash 
assistance system. For example, as states faced budget constraints, especially during the Great 
Recession, many have cut down costs via making welfare requirements more stringent (e.g., 
shortening time limits) and making welfare less desirable. Such policy change would have 
benefited from more knowledge on long-term impacts of stringent policy requirements.  
Twenty years after the welfare reform, more years of data become available and offer 
opportunities to assess the long-term impacts of TANF policies. Despite the flurry of literature 
on welfare reform, a recent review of TANF research by Ziliak (forthcoming) has concluded that 
                                                          
12 The number of families receiving TANF assistance was 3.7 million in 1997, 1.7 million in 2007, and 1.3 million 
in 2015 (Administration for Children & Families (ACF), 2016). However, families affected by TANF policies will 
be even more since some are eligible yet deterred by applying for it due to the harsh requirements, and some could 




it is still premature to draw firm conclusions about impacts of TANF, especially the policy 
effects over time. Our knowledge is generally limited to the evidence from the first five years 
after the introduction of TANF. Yet, it is alarming that the amount of research on welfare reform 
has tapered off in recent years (Ziliak, forthcoming). This study responds to this call and extends 
our knowledge about the long-term impacts of state TANF policies stringencies on employment, 
earnings, and welfare use.  
Against this backdrop, this study uses a nationally representative longitudinal dataset – 
Survey on Income and Program Participation – to assess long-term impacts of TANF 
stringencies. The key research question that I address is: do stringent TANF requirements 
successfully prompt individuals to work more, increase their earnings, and lower welfare 
dependence in the long-run? In particular, I compare welfare use, labor supply, and earned 
income trajectories among low-skilled single mothers who have a high school degree or less 
living in states with varying policy stringency levels. I account for state pre-existing differences 
in lenient and stringent states using state fixed effects and multilevel models. Findings from this 
study could inform redesign of state TANF policies and may help shed light on debates around 
the world over effectiveness of workfare policies.   
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) 
Under the long-standing cash-assistance program, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), the welfare caseloads increased substantially by one million (from 3.7 to 4.7 
millions) just within six years from 1986 to the early 1992 (ACF, 2016). Concerns over AFDC 
creating disincentives for poor single mothers to work gave rise to the passage of Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996. The PRWORA 




Families. Under this new program, state public assistance provision is contingent upon work or 
work-related activities, such as job training, job search, and job readiness assistance. In the 
typical guideline, adult caretakers who are not exempted from work requirements need to work 
at least 30 hours per week no later than 24 months of benefit receipt (Ziliak, forthcoming). In 
addition, individuals are subject to a federal 60-month lifetime limits on welfare.  
Under TANF, states set their own welfare rules in areas of eligibility, benefit, behavioral 
requirements, time limits, welfare sanctions, etc. This devolution has created a great variation in 
TANF program policies across the country. For example, some states choose to use their own 
funds to extend benefits for families beyond the 60-month time limit (e.g., Vermont), and some 
forego the federal funds and set the time limits to be shorter than 60-month (e.g., Connecticut 
having a 24-month time limit) (Farrell et al., 2008). In terms of work sanctions, some states 
terminate the entire benefits or close the case in the initial incidence of noncompliance to work 
requirements (e.g., Florida and Idaho), some impose partial sanctions on the benefits (e.g., 
Alabama and Illinois), and there are a few states that have no sanction (e.g., Massachusetts). In 
terms of the maximum monthly benefit for a 3-person family in 2014, it could be as low as $170 
in Mississippi or as high as $789 in New York (Huber et al., 2015). Taking different aspects of 
TANF requirements together, states’ decisions on each TANF policy rule have formed a myriad 
of state social assistance policy packages.  
 To evaluate impacts of policy stringencies, the policy characteristics that affect lives of 
families in need, one major challenge is to define stringencies. Despite numerous attempts in past 
literature to construct measures summarizing state TANF policy rules in a parsimonious manner, 
there has not been a consensus on the measure of stringencies. Hence, no scale or indices was 




Rosenbaum, 2001; Grogger & Karoly, 2005; De Jong et al., 2006; Ziliak, forthcoming). Most 
studies on state TANF policy features define the lenient to stringent gradient incorporating time 
limits and sanctioning policies on work requirements, two features that are the focus of most 
prominent TANF policy-centric papers (Lindhorst & Mancoske, 2006; Danielson & Klerman, 
2008; Ziliak, forthcoming). Following these studies, I focus on these two policy features to 
define state TANF policy stringencies. 
Literature Review 
Extant research has documented that the AFDC waiver policies13, the TANF policy 
bundle, and stringent state TANF requirements were successful in reducing welfare caseloads, 
promoting employment, and modestly increasing earnings among low-income families prior to 
the welfare reform or in the immediate years following the reform (Grogger & Karoly, 2005; 
Ziliak, forthcoming). In the long-term, the employment and earnings effects of waiver policies 
taper off (Grogger & Karoly, 2005), and such effects of stringent requirements remain largely 
unknown.  
Welfare Use 
 The welfare reform has led to a remarkable reduction in welfare participation (Huang, 
Garfinkel, & Waldfogel, 2000; Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Ziliak, forthcoming). The welfare 
caseloads fell from 5 million families in 1993, 3.7 million in 1997, 1.7 million in 2007, to 1.3 
million in 2016 (Loprest, 2012; ACF, 2016). Nearly half of the decline in caseloads was driven 
by a reduction in welfare entry rather than welfare exit (Grogger, Klerman, & Haider, 2003). The 
                                                          
13 The Title IV-A of the Social Security Act establishes the AFDC program. Section 1115 of the Act authorizes the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to waive certain requirements for a state to carry out an 
experimental or pilot project to promote purposes of the AFDC programs. Between January 1993 and August 1996, 
the HHS approved welfare waivers in 43 states. These waivers introduced time limits, work requirements, sanctions, 





take-up rates of cash benefits dropped from 79% in the last year of AFDC to 36% in 2007 
(Loprest, 2012). Research has also shown that this decline was not entirely due to the effects of 
welfare reform. To a larger extent, the decline was attributed to the booming economy in the late 
1990s and the expansion of earned income tax credit (Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001; Blank, 2002; 
Klerman & Haider, 2004; Ziliak, 2009). Studies utilizing data in recent years showed that TANF 
caseloads became less responsive to the economic cycle (e.g., Great Recession), suggesting the 
weakening role of TANF in providing needed support to families during economic downturns 
(Bitler & Hoynes, forthcoming).  
 Prior research on specific state TANF policy requirements revealed that time limits 
accounted for 6 to 25 percent of decline in welfare participation, depending on the study time 
periods and the data sets being used (Council of Economic Advisors, 1999; Moffitt, 1999; 
Grogger, 2004; Swann, 2005; Mazzolari, 2007). Both behavioral effects, such as reducing 
welfare use prior to exhausting benefits, and mechanical effects, meaning not receiving welfare 
due to reaching the time limits, were observed in prior studies (Grogger & Karoly, 2005). 
Furthermore, time limits were observed to have larger effects on reducing welfare use among 
families with younger children (Grogger, 2004). 
Stringent sanctioning policies on noncompliance for work requirement, compared to 
lenient ones, decrease welfare caseloads, with more stringent sanctions having stronger effects 
(Council of Economic Advisors, 1999; Rector & Youssef, 1999; Grogger & Karoly, 2005). More 
stringent sanctions also increased participation of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program 
(Schmidt & Sevak, 2004), since reassigning former AFDC recipients to receive SSI has been a 
tactic for states to shift their budget burden to the federal budget (Ziliak, forthcoming).  




 Studies revealed that welfare reform and work requirements in waiver programs had 
positive effects on extensive and intensive margins of employment (Blank, 2002; Grogger & 
Karoly, 2005). Low-skilled mothers (e.g., those with a high school degree or less) responded to 
the waiver policies by increasing annual hours worked by 41 to 68 hours and employment rates 
by an average of 5.6 percentage points (Moffitt, 1999; Schoeni & Blank, 2000; Grogger & 
Karoly, 2005). However, the employment effect faded out in the three years after the policy 
change (Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Dyke et al., 2006; Hotz, Imbens, & Klerman, 2006).  
In regards to earnings, state waiver policies increased the annual earnings among mothers 
during the pre-PRWORA period (Moffitt, 1999; Schoeni & Blank, 2000; Blank, 2002; Grogger 
& Karoly, 2005). Among 13 waiver programs evaluated by Grogger and Karoly (2005), nine 
produced positive and significant earnings effects, with an average $700 earnings gain over the 
first two years. In the long-term, earnings impacts modestly faded from $378 per year in the 
short-term to $324 per year in years 4 and 5 (Grogger & Karoly, 2005). In regards to the earnings 
effects of the TANF policy (post-PRWORA), studies showed a modest positive or no increase in 
earnings post-reform (Grogger, 2003; Grogger & Karoly, 2005). None of the estimates on 
earnings effect of TANF suggested that the reform raised earnings by very much, and definitely 
not by the amounts that would raise many poor families out of poverty (Grogger & Karoly, 
2005). 
 Although prior research attributes 60% to 73% of employment growth post-welfare 
reform to EITC and/or macroeconomy rather than the reform itself (Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001; 
Fang & Keane, 2004), state welfare policies also play roles in promoting employment. For 
example, time limit has shown to boost the employment rate of mothers by as much as 7 




total employment growth 1993-2002 (or 15 percent of employment growth between 1984-
1996)(Kaushal & Kaestner, 2001; Grogger, 2003; Fang & Keane, 2004). Nonetheless, there are 
still other studies showing that time limits have null impact on employment or earnings 
(Grogger, 2003; Lim, Coulton, & Lalich, 2009). With respect to sanctions, few studies identified 
sanctions’ impacts on labor supply and earnings, and among the few, sanctions’ impacts were 
null or positive on employment (Pavetti et al., 2003; Lee, Slack, & Lewis, 2004). In particular, 
some evidence revealed that sanctions promoted individuals to engage in informal work and job 
preparation activities (Lee, Slack, & Lewis, 2004; Wu, Cancian, & Wallance, 2014).  
Overall, there are two main limitations in prior research. First, long-term impacts of 
various state requirements are largely unexplored. Requirements such as time limit or sanctions 
take a toll on families in need. In 2009, 6.2% of welfare case closure were due to families being 
sanctioned for non-compliance to work requirements, and 2.3% was due to reaching the time 
limits (ACF, 2009).14 Case closure due to sanctions and time limits is associated with material 
hardships experienced by families (Kalil, Seefeldt, & Wang, 2002; Reichman et al., 2004; 
Reichman, Teitler, & Curtis, 2005). Still many more families did not take-up the program even 
when they were eligible, and one likely contributing factor is the punitive nature of some 
program requirements. Limited knowledge in long-term effects of these requirements hinders the 
capacity of states to make informed decision on policy decisions. Another limitation in earlier 
research is that evaluations of TANF requirement stringencies based on state-wide experiments 
or observational design generally only examined policy impacts around the period of welfare 
reform and used data up to 2000, when few recipients exhausted their time limits and the 
economy was strong. Evaluations in that time period also could not capture influences of larger 
                                                          
14 Other major reasons for welfare case closure are employment (17.5%), not meeting eligibility criteria (15.1%), 




scale changes in norms and expectation on welfare recipiency and work after PRWORA’s 
nationwide implementation (Duncan & Chase-Lansdale, 2001; Ziliak, forthcoming).  
This study addresses these two limitations by focusing on examining associations 
between state requirement stringencies and long-term welfare use, labor supply, and earned 
income trajectories as well as following affected population until 10 years after TANF 
implementation, capturing trajectories beyond the time period right after the welfare reform.  
Conceptual Frameworks 
 More stringent sanctions on noncompliance to work requirements and shorter time limits 
may reduce welfare use and increase employment and earnings several ways. First, in terms of 
sanctions, severe sanctions will reduce welfare caseloads due to dropping noncompliant 
recipients from the welfare rolls. Adults from sanctioned families may increase labor supply to 
recover from the sanction and to make up for the loss of income due to the sanction. Non-
sanctioned welfare recipients in states with more stringent sanctions may also engage in work 
activities more consistently to avoid the financial penalty of sanctions or to avoid dealing with 
bureaucracies to recover from a sanction (Grogger & Karoly, 2005). In addition, other welfare 
eligible non-recipients may also choose to be more self-reliant and not to apply for welfare to 
avoid the complication of facing work requirements and sanctions (Pavetti, Derr, & Hesketh, 
2003). In short, current welfare recipients, sanctioned families, and welfare eligible non-
recipients would all increase their levels of employment and labor supply and use welfare at a 
lower rate when facing stringent sanction requirements.  
Second, a welfare eligible person in states with shorter time limits may also reduce their 
welfare use and increase employment. Responding to time limits, individuals who are eligible 




limited time quota for the unknown future (Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Ziliak, forthcoming). Also, 
welfare recipients who have reached their time limits will also have to work more and be forced 
to leave the TANF welfare roll. These behavioral responses to time limit are expected to be 
stronger among families with young children, because the price of welfare use today is higher for 
those who have a longer horizon to utilize it (Grogger & Karoly, 2005; Farrell et al., 2008; 
Ziliak, forthcoming).  
In sum, in the short-run after the welfare reform, when most families have not yet 
exhausted their time limits to receive benefits, low-income individuals living in stringent regimes 
are likely to work more, earn more, and use welfare less, because TANF benefit is a less 
dependable source of financial support in stringent states –– easier to be sanctioned and time 
limits quota sooner to be exhausted (Grogger & Karoly, 2005). 
These short-run behavioral effects likely could result in long-run effects, because if 
potential welfare recipients work more in the short-run, their levels of human capital will 
increase through accumulated job experience. Specifically, their human capital in the long-run is 
a function of their initial human capital level, work history, and hours worked (Ziliak, 
forthcoming). This increase in human capital will lead to higher future wages among those who 
are induced to work more in the short-run (Ziliak, forthcoming). Based on this mechanism, 
wages for low-income individuals living in stringent states in the long-run are likely to be higher 
since stringent policies lead to higher levels of employment. Also, the increase in human capital 
improves individuals’ chances to secure a job that offers more work hours and to be less 
dependent on welfare programs in the long-term.  
One may argue that, in the long-run, individuals in states having any time limits could 




economically self-sufficient. Therefore, it is unlikely to see differences in levels of economic 
self-sufficiency across stringent and lenient states in the long-run. However, some states do not 
have time limits, and even among states with time limits policies, evidence suggests that many 
families do not use up their time limits and portion their welfare time quota (Farrell et al., 2008). 
Reaching the time limits only account for 2% of welfare case closure in each month, and 
individuals facing harsher sanctions or shorter time limits policies are not more likely to reach 
their time limits (Farrell et al., 2008; Loprest, 2012). So, state TANF requirements still affect 
many families in the long-run as welfare remains an alternative income source. Also, the 
assumption that individuals will work if welfare is not available is challenged by the presence of 
families that are “disconnected’, those who are not working and not receiving welfare (Turner, 
Danziger, Seefeldt, 2006; Black & Kovak, 2009). Even when families exhaust their time limits, 
they may not pursue employment. In sum, the intuition that in the long-run individuals in 
stringent and lenient states will all exhaust their benefits and pursue work loses sights of the 
complexity of family behavioral responses. It is due to the lack of evidence on long-term 
trajectories of welfare use, labor supply, and earned income across lenient and stringent states 
that necessitates the inquiry of this study. If behavioral responses to welfare requirements were 
short-lived and not sustained, social assistance systems should resort to other strategies to 
support the poor to achieve economic self-sufficiency.  
Based on the conceptual framework, I hypothesize that low-skilled single mothers 
exposed to more stringent state TANF requirements, compared to those facing lenient 
requirements, are more likely to work more, use welfare programs less, and earn more, both in 




hypothesize that the gap in welfare use, labor supply, and earned income levels across stringent 
and lenient states may be somewhat narrower in the long-term compared to the short-term. 
Methods 
Data 
This study uses nationally representative data from Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels. Each panel lasted 3 to 4 years, and 
respondents were interviewed every four months to collect employment, income, and program 
participation information in the previous four months. The three non-overlapping panels are 
stacked together to observe trajectories of families during 1996-2007, a period covering a couple 
of years prior to and 10 years after the TANF implementation. This study examines impacts of 
TANF policies on women who did not receive any college education (having a high school 
degree or less) at time of policy implementation (described in the samples section below), and 
information from subsequent panels is used to serve as the follow-up for women observed in the 
1996 panel. I summarize the SIPP data into annual information to address the seam bias in SIPP 
data (Moore, 2008). Annual information also helps depict trends over time avoiding volatile 
fluctuations in earnings, labor supply, and program participation status had the data been 
structured monthly or quarterly.  
SIPP is an ideal dataset for this study for several reasons. First, it provides rich 
information on labor force performance, welfare usage, and socio-demographic characteristics. 
Second, topical modules in fertility, marital, education, and migration history provide crucial 
information for this study to identify individuals most likely to be affected by the welfare reform. 
This information is not available in other major national household surveys collecting 




Community Survey. Third, having longitudinal data allows this study in some models to account 
for time-invariant fixed individual characteristics (e.g., ability and motivation) which may 
correlate with welfare use, labor supply, and earned income outcomes.15 
Sample 
Individuals most likely to be affected by TANF policies are unmarried mothers with 
lower levels of education. It is shown that 94% of TANF recipients had 12 or fewer years of 
education and 87% were not married (ACF, 2012). The affected group in this study is hence 
defined as unmarried mothers with high school degrees or less. Specifically, I retain samples 
who are female, not born abroad16, having lived in the current state of residence before 1996, and 
did not move during the panel (reasons detailed in the empirical strategies section). I exclude 
individual observations from the years in which they enroll in school for more than one third of 
the observed months in a year. In addition, utilizing the individual history information collected 
in the SIPP topical module, this study can restrict the samples to women who aged 18-45, have a 
child below 18 years of age, and have a high school degree or less at time of TANF 
implementation in a given state. For instance, at the end of the 2004 panel, the age range of 
mothers is 30-57, and some of these mothers may be married, have acquired a college degree, or 
have children aged above 18 years old. The inclusion criteria is only imposed on mothers’ 
characteristics at time of policy implementation. In total, 4,012 mothers (or 14,592 observations) 
met this inclusion criteria. Based on a hypothesized interclass correlation (ICC) of 0.1 at the state 
level and an ICC of 0.5 at the individual level, this study has 3,543 independent observations. A 
power analysis suggests that, in a model with 66 controls (including dummies for states) that 
                                                          
15 Appendix Tables 3-7 present findings accounting for individual fixed effects, and results are similar to main 
findings from models accounting for state fixed-effects. 
16 Most states changed their TANF eligibility requirements for immigrants during the study period, restricting the 




explains 15% of variance in an outcome, a sample size of 393 can have a power of 0.9 with a 
significance level of 0.05 to detect an R-Squared of 0.05 attributed to the fifteen key variables 
(categorical years since policy influence and their interactions between stringent and lenient 
policies) (Cohen, 1988). Since the sample sizes in this study are larger than 393, this study has 
more than 90% power to detect the associations between stringencies and years since policy 
influence. 
Measures 
The outcomes of this study capture three dimensions: welfare participation (TANF and 
other welfare programs such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)), labor supply (employment status and monthly average 
hours worked), and earned income (monthly average earnings and average hourly wage). 
Furthermore, this study examines two additional outcomes: financial independence and 
disconnect. Financial independence is defined not receiving financial support from relatives, 
friends, or welfare programs such as TANF, SNAP and SSI. Disconnect is defined as not 
working and not receiving welfare programs (TANF, SNAP or SSI) (Black & Kovak, 2009). 
These two outcomes investigate whether families are financially independent from public and 
private support and whether families are isolated from common means to financial security, such 
as employment and public safety net.    
The dependent variables are coded using the following definitions. First, TANF 
participation is defined as receiving TANF in any month of the year. Second, SNAP and SSI 
participation is defined as receiving any of these benefits in any month of the year. Third, 
employment status is coded as 1 when a person worked for some hours in anytime in a year and 




by multiplying the usual hours worked in a week and weeks worked in that month, and averaging 
the monthly hours worked information in that year. Fifth, log monthly total earnings is calculated 
through averaging monthly earnings information in a given year, and then taking the log of the 
average monthly earnings. Sixth, log average hourly wage is calculated through the following 
steps: (1) for wage earners, I use the monthly hourly wage from a particular job and compute the 
annual average; (2) for others (salary earners or workers who are both wage and salary earners), I 
calculate the annual average hourly wage using monthly earnings, usual hours worked in a week, 
and actual weeks worked in that month; (3) when an individual has two hourly paid jobs, I 
calculate the average hourly wage weighted by hours worked in each job. Wage and earnings 
data are expressed in January 1996 currency using Consumer Price Index. Seventh, financial 
independence is coded as 1 if the respondent did not receive any money from relatives, friends, 
TANF, SNAP, or SSI, and 0 otherwise. Eighth, disconnect is coded as 1 if the respondent did not 
receive TANF, SNAP, or SSI and did not work at all in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
The main independent variables are the time indicator for long term effects (years since 
state TANF implementation) and the TANF policy stringency measure. The first key 
independent variable is years since policy implementation (YRS). This variable is the count of 
years relative to the timing of TANF implementation in a given state. For example, Colorado 
implemented its state TANF policies in July 1997. YRS is coded as -1 for July 1996 to June 
1997, 0 for July 1997 to June 1998, 1 for July 1998 to June 1999, … and 9 for July 2006 to June 
2007. The first states that implemented TANF were Massachusetts and Vermont in September 
1996, and the last state to implement TANF was California in January 1998. YRS was coded 
relative to the timing of implementation specific to a state. According to the study hypothesis, as 




promoting financial self-reliance, the overall trend in labor force participation and earnings will 
be more positive or less negative, and welfare participation will be more negative in stringent 
states than in lenient states, holding all other factors constant.  
The second key independent variable is a measure of state TANF policy stringencies. As 
described in the TANF policy introduction section, following prior studies, I use time limits and 
sanctions to define stringency levels. For each survey year, when a state does not have time limit 
or sanctions, this state is defined as lenient. When a state has a 60-month time limit and imposes 
partial sanctions, this state is defined as having the “standard” package, because this represents 
what most states provide. When a state has a time limit below 60-month or imposes sanctions on 
full-family at the initial incidence of noncompliance to work requirements, this state is defined as 
stringent. 17 Since some states changed their TANF requirements during the study period, I use 
sequence analysis based on Ward's hierarchical fusion algorithm to classify transitions of 
categorical variables (stringency category from each year) across time (more details on sequence 
analysis could be found in Brzinsky-Fay & Kohler, 2006; Aisenbrey & Fasang, 2010). Through 
the analysis, policy features during the study period are classified into three categories: standard, 
lenient, and stringent. Table 1 detailed the stringency classification of each state, and Figure 1 
shows the policy features across years and stringency classification. The data source for this 
variable is Urban Institute Welfare Rules Database. I coded their textual data into numeric forms.  
This study additionally controls for individual characteristics and state economic 
environment. Individual-level controls include time-invarying characteristics such as single 
                                                          
17 If a state has more than one TANF programs, I use information from the program covering the majority of welfare 
recipients. Respondents from North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming between 1996-2003 are dropped from the 
sample because SIPP collapsed these states in the same category in 1996 and 2001 panels, and these states have 
different TANF stringency levels. Maine and Vermont were collapsed into one category by SIPP. They remain in 




mothers’ race and time-varying characteristics such as age categories, marital status, and number 
of children, and household sizes.18 State economic environment is measured by state 
unemployment rates in a given year.   
Empirical Strategies 
There are three major factors that may confound the effect of welfare stringency on the 
observed difference in welfare use, labor supply, and earning: preexisting differences between 
stringent and lenient states, differences on account of changes in economic and other factors over 
time, and cross-state migration in response to policy. Stringencies of TANF policies are 
correlated with state characteristics, including economic circumstances, political ideology, or 
racial compositions (De Jong et al, 2006), and individual welfare use, labor supply, and earned 
income trajectories are embedded in state environments. In order to adjust for pre-existing 
differences between states having stringent and lenient requirements, I use state fixed effects 
models to address this source of bias. State fixed effects control for state differences that are 
constant over time.  
Time-varying changes across states are another factors that may confound the trajectories 
observed in this study. To address this problem, I control for state unemployment rates in each 
responding year and state to account for influences from exogenous state economic 
environment.19 I also control for individual time-varying characteristics such as marital status 
                                                          
18 In sensitivity analyses, I exclude controls of individual demographic characteristics since family formation and 
fertility patterns may be affected by TANF policies. Results without these controls are qualitatively the same as 
findings presented in this paper. The presented main findings include demographic controls to account for 
differential family compositions trends across states.  
19 In sensitivity analyses, I control for more state-level characteristics to account for other state policy environment 
that may correlate with state TANF policy stringencies and outcomes. These characteristics include state EITC 
maximum benefits and a range of TANF state policy characteristics (e.g., maximum income eligibility for a family 
of three, maximum benefits for a family of three with no income, whether having a family cap policy, age of a child 
(in months) that a mother could be exempted from work requirements, earned income disregards for benefits) 





and household compositions to account for differential trends in marital and fertility patterns 
across states. Despite these attempts, there could still be other unobserved time-varying factors 
correlated with state policy stringencies that affect the association between stringency levels and 
long-term welfare use, labor supply, and earned income trajectories. To describe unobserved 
time-varying state trends that affect welfare use, labor supply, and earned income trajectories 
(e.g., other policy characteristics such as child care subsidies, SCHIP) (Blank, 2002), I adopt a 
comparison group approach to run the same models on samples who shared the same skill levels, 
are not or less affected by TANF policies, yet are subject to similar state trends. The comparison 
groups adopted in this study include low-skilled married mothers and low-skilled single women 
without children.  
In terms of cross-state migration, state TANF policies may encourage inter-state 
migration and bias the trajectories observed in this study. Studies have documented that lenient 
policies may attract disadvantaged families to move into the state (McKinnish, 2005), and 
stringent policies may push low-income families to migrate out the state (De Jong, Graefe, & St. 
Pierre, 2005). This cross-state migration trend may negatively bias the detected trajectories in 
lenient states (lower levels of labor supply and earned income and higher levels of welfare use). 
Restricting the sample to those who have lived in a state prior to the welfare reform allows this 
study to exclude respondents who migrated into lenient states after the reform and to more 
accurately capture long-term relationships.20 However, this residence restriction is unable to 
account for effects from mothers who moved out of a stringent state, so trajectories of stringent 
policies may be a higher-bound estimation. Nevertheless, the magnitude of welfare migration is 
                                                          
20 The cutoff of 1996 is selected because PRWORA was passed in 1996. In the sensitivity analysis, (1) I change the 
cutoff to 1991 as states started to implement AFDC waiver policies as early as 1992 (assuming that no one could 
foresee state TANF policy choices before 1992), and results were qualitatively the same as main findings presented 




found to be small (Schram, Nitz, & Krueger, 1998). In addition, the residence restriction is 
necessary to measure the long-term patterns for another reason. For a person who moves from 
one type of states to another, his/her welfare use, labor supply, and earned income trajectory over 
time would not reflect behavioral responses to a particular type of policies. For example, if a 
person moves from a stringent state to a lenient state at the 5th year after TANF policy 
implementation, his/her self-sufficiency status at the 6th year does not reflect his/her response to 
a lenient policy in the 6th year. The residence restriction employed in this study allows me to 
properly track individual trajectories over time.   
In this study, the samples of focus are low-skilled single mothers regardless of her status 
of TANF benefit recipiency. Mothers not receiving TANF are included in this study for two 
reasons. First, the effect of TANF policy requirements may and may not go through the actual 
participation of TANF. Taking TANF nonparticipants as an example, as described in the 
conceptual framework, they may prefer to work more and not to use welfare to save his/her time 
limit quota or to avoid the hassle of dealing with TANF behavioral requirements. Behavioral 
responses to policy characteristics may not go through the actual program participation. Second, 
TANF policy stringencies are correlated with the program participation rates. Participants in 
states with more stringent requirements are on average more disadvantaged than participants in 
lenient states, such as having worse health and higher rate of disability (Moffitt & Stevens, 2001; 
Frogner et al., 2009). If focusing on the samples that receive TANF benefits, the comparison 
between stringent and lenient states would be comparing apples and oranges. Both reasons 
signify the importance of including both TANF participating and non-participating mothers, so 





 I use a three-level multilevel model to examine the long-term welfare use, labor supply, 
and earned income progress in stringent and lenient states among low-skilled single mothers. 
Multilevel models have the strength of adjusting for the clustering nature of data and allowing 
the standard errors to be more robust (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In this study, observations at 
each time point / in each year (level 1) are nested within individual (level 2), and individuals are 
nested within state (level 3). Below I describe the model for each level. The level 1 model is as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑡𝑖𝑠 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑠 + ⅀𝛽1𝑖𝑠𝑌𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑠𝑈𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡𝑖𝑠             𝜀𝑡𝑖𝑠~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) 
where 𝑌𝑡𝑖𝑠 is the outcome for individual i in state s at time t. Each outcome is regressed on time 
categories (𝑌𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑠), so a vector of 𝛽1𝑖𝑠 captures how the outcomes change with years elapsed 
since TANF implementation. 𝑌𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑠 includes five time categorical dummies, representing 0-1 
year, 2-3 years, 4-5 years, 6-7 years, and 8-10 years since TANF implementation, with 2 to 1 
year prior to TANF implementation as the reference group. This model also accounts for state 
unemployment rates (𝑈𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑠) for state s at time t. 𝛽0𝑖𝑠 is the mean self-sufficiency level across 
time-points for person i in state t, and the error term is noted as 𝜀𝑡𝑖𝑠, which is assumed to be 
independent and to conform to normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜀
2. The level 2 
model is as follows: 
𝛽0𝑖𝑠 =  𝛾00𝑠 + ⅀ 𝛾01𝑠𝑋𝑖𝑠 +  𝜁0𝑖𝑠                           𝜁0𝑖𝑠~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜁0
2 ) 
𝛽1𝑖𝑠 =  𝛾10𝑠 +  𝜁1𝑖𝑠                                                𝜁1𝑖𝑠~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜁1
2 ) 
𝛽2𝑖𝑠 =  𝛾20𝑠 
where a vector of 𝑋𝑖𝑠 is individual time-invarying characteristics (e.g., race) and time-varying 
characteristics (e.g., age categories, marital status, number of children in the households, and 




𝛾00𝑠 is the mean welfare use, labor supply, and earned income levels across individuals in state s, 
𝜁0𝑖𝑠 represents the random intercept specific to individual i, and 𝜁1𝑖𝑠 represents the random slope 
specific to individual i. The level 3 model is as follows: 
𝛾00𝑠 = 𝑏000 + ⅀𝑏001𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜂00𝑠                    𝜂00𝑠~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂0
2 ) 
𝛾01𝑠 = 𝑏010 
𝛾10𝑠 = 𝑏100 + ⅀𝑏101𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +  𝜂10𝑠             𝜂10𝑠~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂1
2 ) 
𝛾20𝑠 =  𝑏200 
where 𝑏000 is the average outcome level across states, a vector of 𝑏001 is state fixed effects, 𝜂00𝑠 
and 𝜂10𝑠 represents state-specific random intercepts and random slopes, respectively. The vector 
of 𝑏101 represents the main coefficients of interests in this study: cross-level interaction between 
state TANF policy stringencies (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠, state-level variables) and years since policy 
implementation (𝑌𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑠, time-level variables). Coefficients from 𝑏101 show whether welfare use, 
labor supply, and earned income trajectories over time among low-skilled single mothers differ 
by the TANF policy environment they live in. 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 includes two TANF policy stringency 
categories: lenient – having no time limits or sanctions, , and stringent – having time limits for 
less than 60 month or having full sanctions, with the reference group of standard – 60 month 
time limits with partial sanctions (the policy bundle in most states).  
Level 1, 2, and 3 equations can be combined into a single equation or a composite 
model/reduced form: 
𝑌𝑡𝑖𝑠 = 𝑏000 + ⅀𝑏100𝑌𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑠 + ⅀𝑏001𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + ⅀𝑏101𝑌𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑥𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + ⅀𝑏010𝑋𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏200𝑆𝑡𝑠
+ 𝜁0𝑖𝑠 + 𝜁1𝑖𝑠𝑌𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑠 +  𝜂00𝑠 + 𝜂10𝑠𝑌𝑅𝑆𝑡𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡𝑖𝑠 
where a vector of 𝑏101 is the main coefficients of interests that represents the cross-level 




low-skilled single mothers as well as mothers in comparison groups – low skilled married 
mothers and single women without children. 
Results 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of demographic characteristics and outcomes of 
samples in 1 or 2 years prior to TANF implementation. Characteristics of the treatment group, 
single mothers, and comparison groups, married mothers or single women without children, are 
presented separately. I further delineate the characteristics of single mothers by policy 
stringencies. There are few observations to note. One, among each sample group, there was a 
higher proportion of Black women in the single mothers’ group (37%) compared to 7% in the 
married mothers’ group and 22% in the childless single women’s group. States with stringent 
TANF policies had a higher proportion of single mothers who are Black (50%) than states with 
lenient policies (having 27% of single mothers who are Black). Two, 38% of low-educated 
single mothers received AFDC prior to the welfare reform, 55% of them received Food Stamps, 
and 11% received SSI. Overall, single mothers in states adopting stringent TANF policies 
showed a slightly higher rate of welfare program participation. Three, single mothers living in 
states that later adopted stringent TANF policies on average had lower monthly earnings and 
hourly wage than those in non-stringent states.  
Multivariate results compare outcomes (welfare participation, labor force participation, 
and earned income) 1 to 2 years before the welfare reform to 0 to 10 years after the welfare 
reform across states with a standard TANF time limits and sanction policy bundle (the reference 
category; standard TANF policies hereafter), having lenient TANF policies, or having stringent 
TANF policies. Analyses were conducted on a cohort of women who were 18 to 45 years old at 




reform. All models control for women’s race, women or state time-varying characteristics (e.g., 
age categories, marital status, household size, number of children, unemployment rates in the 
state of residence at time t), and state fixed effects. Results from models accounting for 
individual fixed effects are presented in Appendix Tables 3-7, which are qualitatively similar to 
findings from models accounting for state fixed effects. 
Table 3 presents results for TANF participation. Among women who were single mothers 
at time of TANF policy implementation, the treatment group, their TANF participation rates 
post-reform were significantly lower than pre-reform, dropping by 4.1 percentage points 
(p<0.001) in the initial two years after the reform to 10.5 (p<0.001) to 16.6 (p<0.001) percentage 
points in 2-10 years post-reform. Single mothers living in states with stringent polices 
experienced a sharper decrease in TANF participation than those living in states with less 
stringent policies. TANF participation in stringent states decreased for 8 percentage points in the 
first two years right after the reform, which was almost 4 percentage points (p<0.05) more than 
the decline in other states. Their TANF participation rates further dropped by 18.9 percentage 
points to 23.2 percentage points in 2-10 years post-reform, drops that were 5 (p<0.05) to 10 
(p<0.001) percentages further than the decline under standard TANF policies.  
In the next two columns in Table 3, the same model is run on two comparison group 
samples: married mothers and single women without children. Again, this characteristic refers to 
women’s marital and fertility status at time of TANF policy implementation. The comparison 
group analyses provide information on levels of welfare use, labor force participation, or earned 
income among women with a similar skill level (not having received any college education in 
this case) yet having a low likelihood of being affected by the welfare reform. Married mothers 




incomes that are too high to qualify for TANF, and single childless women do not have children 
to meet the eligibility criteria to receive TANF. Therefore, their levels of outcomes may serve as 
approximate reference points to understand the extent of policy effects on single mothers. There 
is one complication in comparison group analyses in this study. In a longitudinal context, 
women’s marital and fertility status may change over time. Women who were married at time of 
the welfare reform may separate or divorce from their spouses later, and childless single women 
at time of the reform may give birth or get married later. Hence, likelihoods of women in either 
comparison group to qualify for TANF may become higher later on. Likewise, single mothers, 
the treatment group, may be married later on and have a lower likelihood to quality for TANF. I 
control for time-varying marital status, number of children, and household size to account for the 
differential trends in marriage and fertility across states over time.  
The impacts of welfare reform on TANF participation was modest among the two 
comparison groups relative to single mothers. Among the first comparison group, married 
mothers showed slightly lower TANF participation rates post-reform relative to pre-reform (by 
less than 3 percentage points). The magnitude of the decline in TANF participation was much 
smaller than the drop of single mothers. It is not surprising to see some minor effects among 
married mothers post-reform since married mothers were still eligible for applying for TANF in 
many states.21 The smaller impact of welfare reform on this group than on single mothers could 
be explained by the fact that households with married couples likely had higher income and were 
hence harder to meet the income eligibility criteria to receive TANF. In addition, among married 
                                                          
21 In 1999, 18 states imposed additional eligibility rules beyond the standard eligibility criteria for two-parent 
households, while the remaining 32 did not have additional rules (Rowe, 2000). In 2007, the last year covered by 
this study, 12 states imposed additional eligibility rules for two-parent households (Rowe, Murphy, & Kaminski, 
2008). Among the states that imposed additional rules in 1999 and 2007, North Dakota did not allow two-parent 
households to receive TANF (Rowe, 2000; Rowe, Murphy, & Kaminski, 2008). In 2014, nine states imposed 
additional eligibility rules for two-parent households, and three states (Louisiana, New Hampshire, and North 




mothers, lenient policies were associated with higher likelihoods to receive TANF in the first 4 
years and the 8 to 10 years after the reform.  
Among the second comparison group, childless single women was the least affected by 
the welfare reform. Women who were childless and single at time of the reform experienced a 
1.4 percentage point (p<0.05) increase in TANF participation in the first two years post-reform, 
likely related to their transitions into motherhood. As time elapsed, in 6-10 years after the 
welfare reform, childless single women in stringent states were less likely to receive TANF than 
similar women in states with standard or lenient policies. 
Table 4 compares the SNAP and SSI participation status 1 to 2 years prior to the welfare 
reform and 0 to 10 years after the welfare reform across states with standard, lenient, or stringent 
policies. In short, for single mothers, the welfare reform was associated with decreases in SNAP 
participation but was not associated with SSI participation, except for those living in lenient 
states showing some increases in SSI participation. Specifically, results indicate that the 
likelihoods of single mothers to participate in SNAP decreased post-reform, just as their TANF 
participation rates. This decrease showed signs of rebound, yet the SNAP participation rates 
never reached back to the same level as in the pre-reform period. Among the comparison groups, 
the SNAP participation rate showed minor declines among married mothers or no change among 
childless single women. In terms of impacts of policy stringencies, unlike TANF participation 
was negatively associated with stringent TANF policies for single mothers, SNAP participation 
rates did not differ by TANF policy stringency levels. In terms of SSI participation, the welfare 
reform was not associated with changes in SSI participation across the treatment and the 
comparison groups. However, in 6 to 10 years after the reform, single mothers in lenient states 




years after the welfare reform. This finding is consistent with literature that documented the 
practices that welfare offices shifted welfare caseloads to SSI programs (Schmidt & Sevak, 2004; 
Ziliak, forthcoming). 
Table 5 presents results from analyses on labor supply, characterized by employment 
rates and work hours. After the welfare reform, employment rates of single mothers increased by 
8 (p<0.001) to 10.4 (p<0.001) percentage points relative to the pre-reform era, and the 
employment increase sustained throughout the 10 years of post-reform period. Such an increase 
in employment was not shown among single childless women, and married women showed a 
smaller increase in employment rates post-reform (3 (p<0.01) to 4.8 (p<0.001) percentage 
points) than those experienced by single mothers. There was no indication that women living in 
stringent states work more, except for childless single women in the initial years post-reform. 
Among those who worked, the number of hours worked were not related to the welfare reform or 
policy stringencies for single mothers or married mothers.22 Among childless single mothers 
(who may become mothers later), there was indication that they worked fewer hours in lenient 
states and more work hours in stringent states in the 4-10 years after the welfare reform.23  
Table 6 presents results from earned income among women who worked sometime in a 
year.24 Relative to monthly average earnings prior to the welfare reform, single mothers 
experienced a 13.9 percent (p<0.001) growth in earnings in the initial two years after the reform, 
and in later years their earnings increased further up to 24.2 percent (p<0.001) higher monthly 
earnings relative to the pre-reform period. Such increases were similar to or slightly higher than 
                                                          
22 For models on work hours, individual random slopes of years since policy influence were not estimated due to 
non-convergence issues for single mothers. To allow models for treatment and comparison groups to be comparable, 
individual random slopes were not estimated for all three samples.   
23 The same analyses are conducted including women who did not work at all (with zero hour worked), and results 
are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
24 The same results including women who did not work where their earnings/wages are coded as 0 are presented in 




those shown among married mothers and single childless women. Lenient or stringent TANF 
policies were not associated with differential growth patterns in earnings. In terms of annual 
average hourly wage, single mothers experienced a 6.7 (p<0.05) to 12 (p<0.001) percent wage 
increase post-reform, with mothers in lenient states showing the highest increases in hourly wage 
in 6-10 years post welfare reform, followed by those in stringent states, and then states having 
standard policies. The increases in wages during the post-reform era was also shared by married 
mothers with children and single childless women.  
Table 7 presents results from the examination of whether welfare reform or stringent 
TANF policies was related to the likelihoods of being financially independent (not receiving 
financial assistance from welfare programs [TANF, SNAP, or SSI], relatives, or friends) and 
being disconnected (not working and not receiving TANF, SNAP, or SSI). Results reveal that, 
for single mothers, welfare reform was associated with 4.7 (p<0.001) to 13.9 (p<0.001) 
percentage points increases in not receiving assistance from welfare programs, relatives, or 
friends. An increase of this magnitude was not shown on comparison groups. On the contrary, 
among single childless women who might have children later, they experienced decreased 
likelihoods in being financially independent. With regards to effects of policy stringencies on 
financial independence trajectories, stringent TANF policies did not have differential impacts. In 
terms of examining whether welfare reform is associated with the likelihood of being 
disconnected, results show that in 2-10 years after the reform, single mothers and single childless 
women were more likely to be disconnected by 1.9 (p<0.1) to 4.2 (p<0.01) percentage points. 
The increase was not shared by married mothers. Although stringent TANF policies did drive 
single mothers off TANF welfare rolls, stringent policies did not increase the chances of single 




Discussion and Conclusion 
This study examines long-term welfare use, labor supply, and earned income trajectories 
since the welfare reform, and whether these trajectories differ by state TANF policy stringencies. 
I focus on women who were single mothers at time of policy implementation, a group most 
affected by the welfare reform. Over all, the welfare reform was strongly associated with single 
mothers’ decreases in TANF and SNAP participation and an increase in employment throughout 
the 10 years since the reform. Despite the increase in employment post-reform, the reform did 
not change work hours among working single mothers, and their growth in earnings or wages 
were not different from the increases shown among women in comparison groups. Although 
welfare reform was also associated with higher likelihoods to be financially independent (not 
receiving support from welfare programs or relatives or friends), it was also associated with 
being disconnected (neither employed nor receiving public assistance).  
When examining impacts of state TANF policy stringencies, this study finds that more 
stringent TANF policies were associated with much lower TANF participation rates among 
single mothers throughout the 10 years after state TANF policy implementation, when compared 
to similar women living in states with lenient or standard TANF policy. In terms of program 
participation status in other welfare programs, there was no indication that TANF policy 
stringencies was associated with SNAP participation rates. Yet, single mothers in states with 
lenient policies were more likely to receive SSI in 6-10 years after the reform, when some 
families started to reach their time limits. With regards to labor supply, TANF policy 
stringencies were not associated with levels of employment or work hours among single mothers, 
but childless single mothers, who might become mothers after policy implementation, showed 




earned income, although TANF policy stringencies were not related to different levels of 
monthly earnings among single mothers, both lenient and stringent TANF policies were 
associated with their higher hourly wage in 6-10 years since the welfare reform when compared 
to standard TANF policies. Lastly, stringent policies were not related to financial independence, 
and both lenient and stringent policies were related to lower levels of being disconnected at 8-10 
years after the reform when compared to standard TANF policies. 
Impacts of welfare reform and stringent policies on lower TANF use found in this study 
were consistent with the declined trends in welfare caseloads post-PRWORA (ACF, 2016). This 
study further reveals that states with more stringent policies reduced caseloads to a greater extent 
by 4 to 10 percentage points when compared to less stringent policies until at least 10 years after 
the reform. These declines are considerably large given that the original gap between stringent 
and less stringent states in AFDC participation rates in 1-2 years before TANF implementation 
was only 2 percentage point. Though stringent policies were shown to bring down welfare 
caseloads, their program participation levels in SNAP and SSI programs were the same when 
compared to states with standard TANF policy bundles. This shows that effects of stringent 
policies to reduce welfare use were only confined to TANF program.  
 Findings from this study shows that the welfare reform moved 8-10 percentage points of 
single mothers into the labor force, compared to a 3-5 percentage point increase for married 
mothers with the same education levels. This employment rate increase sustained even until 10 
years after the reform. The employment trend also indicates that on average the growth in 
employment happened around the time of welfare reform, and employment rates did not show a 
clear trend of growth afterwards. Furthermore, the increase in labor supply among single mothers 




employed single mothers did not show to respond to the welfare reform. However, the absence 
of a decline in average work hours may be a remarkable trend itself given that more single 
mothers who were detached from the labor market entered into employment post-reform (when 
compared to comparison group women), and this increase expanded the sample base for work 
hours among employed single mothers. Their lack of work experience could have driven down 
the average work hours. Also, the monthly work hours among single mothers prior to the reform 
were already high (at an average 155 hours), so those newly employed single mothers had a long 
way to catch up so as not to drive down the average work hours. Next, in regards to impacts of 
policy stringencies, unlike their strong association with TANF participation, stringent policies 
did not lead to higher levels of labor supply in terms of employment or work hours. 
While welfare reform led more single mothers to be employed, their trajectories of 
earnings and wage growth among those who worked were not distinct from the trajectories of 
married mothers and single. If the sustained employment effects that were only shown among 
single mothers raised their levels of work experience and human capital, one could expect to see 
a higher growth in earnings or wages specific to single mothers as they integrate into the labor 
market (since they have lower earned income). This finding on lack of higher earned income 
growth indicates that although welfare reform pushed low-income families off welfare and into 
employment, the wage of single mothers integrating into the labor market did not catch up at a 
faster rate. Also, single mothers living in states with standard TANF policy bundles (60 month of 
time limits and having partial sanction on non-compliance to work requirements) showed to have 
lower wage growth in 6-10 years since TANF implementation.  
Overall, stringent policies’ lack of effects on increasing employment and earned income 




“announcement effects” of the welfare reform (Blundell, Francesconi, & van der Klaauw, 2011) 
and the marked decrease in the caseloads of TANF program, which reduced the influence of 
TANF requirements on families (Loprest, 2012; ACF, 2016). First, most individuals across 
stringent and lenient states might have uniformly responded to the announcement of welfare 
requirements introduction, such as time limits and sanctions on non-compliance to work 
requirements, and had shifted their work behaviors and welfare participation patterns (other than 
TANF participation) around the time of welfare reform. Individuals might be more responsive to 
the presence of the requirements rather than the degree of requirement stringencies. Second, the 
TANF program caseloads decreased markedly since the welfare reform due to its policy features 
that discouraged TANF participation as well as the fact that TANF benefits were not available to 
families when time limits were reached. The degree to which that the levels of unavailability of 
TANF as income alternatives to families were similar across stringent and lenient states may 
explain the null findings of stringent TANF requirements on outcomes.  
 In conclusion, this study extends prior TANF literature in following low-skilled single 
mothers’ trajectories in welfare use, labor supply, and earned income into 10 years after the 
welfare reform. Furthermore, this study examines how TANF policy stringencies were related to 
long-term outcomes. Findings reveal that single mothers living in states with stringent TANF 
policies were significantly less likely to participate in TANF, suggesting that stringent 
requirements were effective in suppressing TANF caseloads and containing the cash assistance 
portion of TANF expenditure. Meanwhile, single mothers used other welfare programs to the 
same extent compared to single mothers living in states with less stringent policies. Stringent 
policies also did not drive single mothers to work or earn at a high level than those living in less 




restructuring welfare rules as well as for states to assess the cost-effectiveness and necessity of 
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Table 1: State TANF Policy Stringency Measures 
State Standard Lenient Stringent 
Alabama ○   
Alaska ○   
Arizona ○   
Arkansas   ○ 
California ○   
Colorado ○   
Connecticut   ○ 
Delaware   ○ 
District of 
Columbia  ○  
Florida   ○ 
Georgia   ○ 
Hawaii   ○ 
Idaho   ○ 
Illinois ○   
Indiana ○   
Iowa   ○ 
Kansas   ○ 
Kentucky ○   
Louisiana   ○ 
Maine  ○  
Maryland   ○ 
Massachusetts  ○  
Michigan   ○ 
Minnesota ○   
Mississippi   ○ 
Missouri ○   
Montana ○   
Nebraska   ○ 
Nevada   ○ 
New 
Hampshire ○   
New Jersey ○   
New Mexico ○   
New York ○   
North Carolina   ○ 
North Dakota ○   
Ohio   ○ 




Oregon  ○  
Pennsylvania ○   
Rhode Island ○   
South Carolina   ○ 
South Dakota  ○  
Tennessee   ○ 
Texas   ○ 
Utah   ○ 
Vermont  ○  
Virginia   ○ 
Washington  ○  
West Virginia ○   
Wisconsin ○   
Wyoming   ○ 






Table 2: Descriptive characteristics 1 to 2 years prior to TANF implementation  
 Treatment group Comparison groups 
 





 All Standard Lenient Stringent All All 
Demographics       
Age 30.79 30.78 31.66 30.73 33.35 30.68 
Race       
    Whites 0.50 0.56 0.75 0.42 0.82 0.66 
    Black 0.37 0.27 0.11 0.50 0.07 0.22 
    Hispanics 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.09 
    Other race 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Household size       
    1 person 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 
    2 people 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.28 
    3-4 people 0.54 0.54 0.61 0.52 0.65 0.37 
    5 or more people 0.31 0.30 0.24 0.32 0.34 0.17 
Number of children       
    0-1 child 0.49 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.33 0.94 
    2 children 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.43 0.04 
    3 or more children 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.23 0.25 0.02 
Outcomes       
AFDC participation 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.05 0.05 
Food Stamp (SNAP) participation 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.13 0.19 
SSI participation 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.14 
Employed 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.59 0.65 0.69 
Monthly work hours (including zero)  99.46 98.43 105.67 100.01 103.25 117.75 
Monthly work hours (excluding zero) 154.29 154.86 155.86 153.57 148.22 161.27 
Average monthly earnings (including zero) 669.14 674.38 717.89 659.22 827.31 860.80 
Average monthly earnings (excluding zero) 1166.51 1193.6 1156.81 1138.97 1312.29 1275.47 
Average hourly wage (including zero) 4.61 4.68 5.28 4.47 5.86 5.63 
Average hourly wage (excluding zero) 7.44 7.65 8.24 7.14 8.68 7.97 
Financial independence (not receiving 
public assistance or help from relatives or 
friends) 
0.40 0.4 0.43 0.38 0.84 0.73 
Disconnect (not receiving public assistance 
nor working) 
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.08 
Note: All samples are restricted to US-born women aged 18-45 at time of TANF implementation in a given state, not having any 
college education, having lived in the current state of residence before 1996, and did not move during the panel. Individual 
observations from years in which they enroll in school for more than one third of the observed months in a year were excluded. 
Sample categorization (single mothers, married mothers, or childless single mothers) is based on the sample characteristics at 




    Table 3: Trajectories of TANF participation and policy stringencies  








Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year -0.041*** -0.014*** 0.014* 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) 
2-3 Year -0.105*** -0.029*** -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.009) 
4-5 Year -0.134*** -0.016** 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.010) 
6-7 Year -0.166*** -0.019** 0.006 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.010) 
8-10 Year -0.148*** -0.017** 0.008 
 (0.026) (0.007) (0.011) 
YPI X Lenient    
0-1 Year X Lenient 0.014 0.034* 0.018 
 (0.035) (0.014) (0.023) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -0.032 0.028+ 0.036 
 (0.040) (0.015) (0.025) 
4-5 Year X Lenient -0.053 0.031 0.025 
 (0.057) (0.022) (0.032) 
6-7 Year X Lenient 0.008 0.019 0.033 
 (0.058) (0.020) (0.029) 
8-10 Year X Lenient -0.021 0.043* 0.056+ 
 (0.065) (0.020) (0.030) 
YPI X Stringent    
0-1 Year X Stringent -0.039*^^ 0.005^^ -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.010) 
2-3 Year X Stringent -0.098***^^ 0.010^ -0.010 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) 
4-5 Year X Stringent -0.054* -0.000 -0.021 
 (0.026) (0.008) (0.014) 
6-7 Year X Stringent -0.066*^ 0.001 -0.031*^^ 
 (0.029) (0.008) (0.013) 
8-10 Year X Stringent -0.075*^ -0.002^ -0.040**^^ 
 (0.034) (0.009) (0.015) 
Constant 0.264*** 0.125*** 0.060** 
 (0.038) (0.015) (0.023) 
Variance terms    
State intercepts 0.000  0.000 0.000 
State YPI effects 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Ind. intercepts 0.066  0.016 0.017 
Ind. YPI effects 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Residuals 0.051  0.012 0.018 
N 14592 23730 11261 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
All samples are restricted to US-born women aged 18-45 at time of TANF implementation in a given state, not having any 
college education, having lived in the current state of residence before 1996, and did not move during the panel. Individual 
observations from years in which they enroll in school for more than one third of the observed months in a year were excluded. 
Sample categorization (single with children, married with children, or single without children) is based on the sample 
characteristics at time of TANF implementation. All models control for women’s race (White (ref.), Black, Hispanics, and other 
race), and time-varying characteristics, including age in categories (18-24 (ref.), 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-45, 45-49, 50-57), 
whether married, household size (1, 2, 3 or 4 (ref.), 5 or more), number of children (0, 1, 2 (ref.), and 3 or more), and 
unemployment rates in state s and year t, and state fixed effects. The reference group for TANF policy stringencies is the 




between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the particular YPI category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows 
(^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, if Wald tests reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is 
different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-value is smaller than 0.05, the “0-1 Year X Stringent” row will be 





Table 4: Trajectories of SNAP and SSI participation and policy stringencies 















Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year -0.044*** -0.012+ 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) 
2-3 Year -0.129*** -0.021* 0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) 
4-5 Year -0.108*** -0.006 0.045* 0.010 0.007 -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) 
6-7 Year -0.097*** -0.005 0.027 0.004 0.014* -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.006) (0.014) 
8-10 Year -0.060* 0.017 0.063** 0.002 0.009 0.007 
 (0.026) (0.012) (0.021) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016) 
YPI X Lenient       
0-1 Year X Lenient -0.075+ 0.035 0.032 0.004 0.005 -0.001 
 (0.040) (0.023) (0.039) (0.024) (0.012) (0.022) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -0.064 -0.007 -0.045 0.003 -0.003 -0.036 
 (0.047) (0.026) (0.044) (0.028) (0.014) (0.028) 
4-5 Year X Lenient -0.071 0.065+ -0.025 0.066 -0.024 -0.004 
 (0.065) (0.038) (0.058) (0.042) (0.022) (0.041) 
6-7 Year X Lenient -0.061 0.042 -0.016 0.100* -0.001 0.023 
 (0.065) (0.035) (0.055) (0.042) (0.021) (0.043) 
8-10 Year X Lenient -0.011 0.018 0.064 0.126** 0.010 0.037 
 (0.072) (0.038) (0.059) (0.046) (0.023) (0.046) 
YPI X Stringent       
0-1 Year X Stringent -0.017 -0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.008+ 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) 
2-3 Year X Stringent -0.013 -0.014 -0.034+ -0.011 0.011* -0.008 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013) 
4-5 Year X Stringent 0.039 0.005 -0.023 -0.011 0.019*^^ 0.013 
 (0.028) (0.014) (0.025) (0.017) (0.008) (0.018) 
6-7 Year X Stringent 0.009 0.004 -0.033 -0.008^^ 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.030) (0.014) (0.025) (0.018) (0.008) (0.020) 
8-10 Year X Stringent 0.002 0.007 -0.044 0.000^^ 0.005 -0.017 
 (0.035) (0.016) (0.029) (0.021) (0.010) (0.023) 
Constant 0.478*** 0.330*** 0.179*** 0.081** 0.046** 0.115*** 
 (0.046) (0.026) (0.042) (0.031) (0.015) (0.032) 
Variance terms       
State intercepts 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
State YPI effects 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ind. intercepts 0.104  0.045 0.070 0.065  0.021 0.077 
Ind. YPI effects 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.001 
Residuals 0.067  0.035  0.049 0.023  0.009  0.015  
N 14592 23730 11261 14592 23730 11261 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
See Table 3 for sample and model specifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Results from Wald tests examining whether 
coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the particular YPI category are 
presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, if Wald tests reveal that the 
“0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-value is smaller than 0.05, 






Table 5: Trajectories of labor supply and policy stringencies 















Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year 0.080*** 0.030** 0.012 0.978 0.639 -2.902 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (2.285) (1.524) (2.334) 
2-3 Year 0.097*** 0.048*** 0.008 2.287 2.797 0.735 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (2.717) (1.885) (2.902) 
4-5 Year 0.104*** 0.048** -0.011 -0.389 -1.763 -4.929 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.021) (3.000) (2.198) (3.269) 
6-7 Year 0.084*** 0.031+ -0.021 -0.455 1.175 -6.349+ 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (3.060) (2.301) (3.298) 
8-10 Year 0.080*** 0.019 -0.004 -1.147 2.539 -9.811** 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.025) (3.406) (2.574) (3.667) 
YPI X Lenient       
0-1 Year X Lenient 0.045 0.018 0.008 -8.632 -3.377 -11.511 
 (0.045) (0.033) (0.045) (7.096) (5.106) (7.629) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -0.008 0.053 0.040 3.453 4.918 -1.708 
 (0.050) (0.037) (0.051) (7.738) (5.471) (8.330) 
4-5 Year X Lenient 0.014 -0.006 0.062 2.051 11.976 -30.956** 
 (0.067) (0.055) (0.069) (9.732) (8.221) (10.282) 
6-7 Year X Lenient -0.006 0.000 0.002 -1.296 3.074 -28.058** 
 (0.064) (0.052) (0.067) (9.087) (7.497) (9.769) 
8-10 Year X Lenient 0.028 -0.003 -0.023 -2.168 5.985 -19.888* 
 (0.069) (0.056) (0.071) (9.652) (7.726) (10.139) 
YPI X Stringent       
0-1 Year X Stringent -0.006 0.005 0.045*^ 4.453 2.191 4.402^ 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (3.073) (2.058) (3.310) 
2-3 Year X Stringent -0.007 -0.021^ 0.037 4.072 2.122 -0.803 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.023) (3.364) (2.287) (3.713) 
4-5 Year X Stringent 0.004 -0.020 0.066*^ 1.947 1.267 5.582^^ 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.030) (4.130) (3.084) (4.710) 
6-7 Year X Stringent 0.006 0.008 0.049 4.167 -0.019 8.245+^^ 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.031) (4.025) (3.057) (4.532) 
8-10 Year X Stringent 0.007 0.019 0.012 3.452 -0.035 8.342+^^ 
 (0.031) (0.024) (0.034) (4.394) (3.356) (4.923) 
Constant 0.622*** 0.595*** 0.684*** 155.763*** 130.219*** 147.309*** 
 (0.047) (0.038) (0.051) (6.790) (5.623) (7.626) 
Variance terms       
State intercepts 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
State YPI effects 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Ind. intercepts 0.101  0.110  0.116 1377.257 1928.539 1501.613 
Ind. YPI effects 0.001  0.001  0.001  -- -- -- 
Residuals 0.086  0.069  0.067  1654.734 1253.816 1472.964 
N 14592 23730 11261 10860 17698 8153 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
For the outcome “Work Hours”, observations that did not work were excluded from the sample, and I set work hour values below 
1 to 1 before taking a logarithm of work hours. See Table 3 for sample and model specifications. In the work hours models, 
multilevel regressions that included in individual random slopes by YPI did not converge for the single mother samples, so this 
set of analyses for the treatment and comparison groups does not estimate individual random slopes by YPI. Results from work 
hour models are restricted to those who have non-zero work hours. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Results from Wald tests 
examining whether coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the particular YPI 
category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, if Wald tests 
reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-value is 




Table 6: Trajectories of earned income and policy stringencies 















Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year 0.139*** 0.082*** 0.095** 0.075*** 0.056*** 0.068*** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.029) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) 
2-3 Year 0.190*** 0.175*** 0.156*** 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.089*** 
 (0.035) (0.027) (0.039) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) 
4-5 Year 0.233*** 0.190*** 0.208*** 0.120*** 0.127*** 0.154*** 
 (0.041) (0.032) (0.046) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024) 
6-7 Year 0.242*** 0.233*** 0.222*** 0.107*** 0.149*** 0.210*** 
 (0.044) (0.035) (0.049) (0.023) (0.020) (0.026) 
8-10 Year 0.176*** 0.227*** 0.204*** 0.067* 0.125*** 0.180*** 
 (0.050) (0.041) (0.056) (0.026) (0.023) (0.030) 
YPI X Lenient       
0-1 Year X Lenient -0.001 -0.042 -0.054 -0.035 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.086) (0.070) (0.093) (0.043) (0.041) (0.052) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -0.034 0.077 -0.116 -0.038 0.038 0.056 
 (0.097) (0.080) (0.108) (0.050) (0.047) (0.060) 
4-5 Year X Lenient -0.014 -0.035 -0.163 0.088 -0.101 -0.024 
 (0.134) (0.123) (0.145) (0.068) (0.069) (0.077) 
6-7 Year X Lenient -0.037 -0.059 -0.138 0.086 -0.033 -0.138+ 
 (0.131) (0.118) (0.145) (0.068) (0.066) (0.076) 
8-10 Year X Lenient 0.038 0.036 -0.224 0.130+ -0.018 -0.119 
 (0.143) (0.126) (0.156) (0.075) (0.071) (0.082) 
YPI X Stringent       
0-1 Year X Stringent -0.022 0.028 0.007 -0.010 -0.012 -0.022 
 (0.037) (0.028) (0.041) (0.019) (0.016) (0.023) 
2-3 Year X Stringent 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.013 -0.010 -0.028 
 (0.043) (0.033) (0.049) (0.022) (0.019) (0.027) 
4-5 Year X Stringent -0.049 -0.017 0.009 0.022 0.002 -0.024 
 (0.057) (0.046) (0.067) (0.029) (0.026) (0.036) 
6-7 Year X Stringent -0.021 -0.026 0.070 0.066*^ -0.022 -0.032 
 (0.058) (0.047) (0.068) (0.030) (0.027) (0.036) 
8-10 Year X Stringent 0.043 0.004 0.048 0.108**^^ -0.002 -0.028 
 (0.065) (0.054) (0.077) (0.035) (0.031) (0.041) 
Constant 6.456*** 6.417*** 6.565*** 1.820*** 1.854*** 1.813*** 
 (0.098) (0.086) (0.113) (0.050) (0.048) (0.059) 
Variance terms       
State intercepts 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
State YPI effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ind. intercepts 0.414 0.512 0.461 0.100 0.136 0.107 
Ind. YPI effects 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Residuals 0.230 0.212 0.211 0.057 0.072 0.066 
N 10729 17241 8065 10741 17238 8044 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
For each of the two earned income outcomes, observations that did not work were excluded from the sample, and I set all income 
values below 1 to 1 before taking a logarithm of the outcome. See Table 3 for sample and model specifications. Results from 
earned income or hourly wage models are restricted to those who have earnings or wage information. Wage and earning values 
are expressed in January 1996 US dollars using Consumer Price Index. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Results from Wald 
tests examining whether coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the particular 
YPI category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, if Wald 
tests reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-value is 





Table 7: Trajectories of financial independence and disconnect and policy stringencies 
 Financial Independence 
















Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year 0.047*** 0.014+ -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.005 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
2-3 Year 0.139*** 0.024** 0.000 0.038*** -0.002 0.031* 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
4-5 Year 0.115*** 0.004 -0.054** 0.019+ -0.015 0.022 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
6-7 Year 0.115*** 0.002 -0.037+ 0.030** 0.002 0.038* 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
8-10 Year 0.087*** -0.017 -0.061** 0.042** 0.015 0.033+ 
 (0.026) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) 
YPI X Lenient       
0-1 Year X Lenient 0.070+ -0.054* -0.027 -0.005 -0.010 0.003 
 (0.039) (0.025) (0.039) (0.026) (0.027) (0.034) 
2-3 Year X Lenient 0.020 -0.005 0.059 -0.002 -0.031 0.063 
 (0.046) (0.027) (0.044) (0.029) (0.032) (0.039) 
4-5 Year X Lenient 0.057 -0.053 0.019 -0.016 0.002 -0.015 
 (0.065) (0.040) (0.062) (0.035) (0.047) (0.049) 
6-7 Year X Lenient 0.033 -0.033 0.013 -0.045 -0.005 0.047 
 (0.065) (0.038) (0.060) (0.034) (0.046) (0.047) 
8-10 Year X Lenient -0.006 -0.025 -0.021 -0.084* 0.005 0.006 
 (0.073) (0.041) (0.064) (0.037) (0.051) (0.051) 
YPI X Stringent       
0-1 Year X Stringent 0.014 0.001^ 0.002 0.005 -0.003 -0.017 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
2-3 Year X Stringent 0.002 0.008 0.025 0.008 0.022 -0.008 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
4-5 Year X Stringent -0.022 -0.010 0.020 -0.027+ -0.005 -0.030 
 (0.028) (0.015) (0.027) (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) 
6-7 Year X Stringent -0.012 -0.007 0.035 -0.023 -0.019 -0.012 
 (0.030) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) 
8-10 Year X Stringent -0.014 -0.003 0.047 -0.035*^^ -0.039+ 0.015 
 (0.035) (0.018) (0.031) (0.017) (0.023) (0.025) 
Constant 0.499*** 0.652*** 0.760*** 0.005 0.122*** 0.082* 
 (0.046) (0.028) (0.046) (0.025) (0.032) (0.036) 
Variance terms       
State intercepts 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
State YPI effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ind. intercepts 0.112 0.058 0.108 0.018 0.076 0.040 
Ind. YPI effects 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Residuals 0.063 0.039 0.049 0.028 0.045 0.038 
N 14592 23730 11261 14592 23730 11261 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
See Table 3 for sample and model specifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Results from Wald tests examining whether 
coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the particular YPI category are 
presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, if Wald tests reveal that the 
“0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-value is smaller than 0.05, 






Appendix Table 1: Trajectories of work hours and policy stringencies  
 Average Monthly Work Hours 




Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year 7.811*** 2.960+ -2.193 
 (2.182) (1.558) (2.291) 
2-3 Year 7.887** 5.817** -1.032 
 (2.846) (2.170) (3.066) 
4-5 Year 9.437** 1.791 -8.055* 
 (3.341) (2.728) (3.663) 
6-7 Year 8.674* 1.623 -10.742** 
 (3.643) (3.145) (4.001) 
8-10 Year 4.106 1.266 -12.416** 
 (4.249) (3.737) (4.639) 
YPI X Lenient    
0-1 Year X Lenient -4.396 -0.522 -9.009 
 (6.874) (5.034) (7.313) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -4.350 7.087 -1.303 
 (8.024) (6.243) (8.685) 
4-5 Year X Lenient -3.573 8.609 -21.507+ 
 (11.251) (9.717) (12.034) 
6-7 Year X Lenient -5.881 3.796 -27.971* 
 (11.184) (9.971) (12.027) 
8-10 Year X Lenient -3.479 4.639 -22.975+ 
 (12.352) (11.070) (13.032) 
YPI X Stringent    
0-1 Year X Stringent 2.442 1.157 5.284+^ 
 (2.909) (2.084) (3.197) 
2-3 Year X Stringent 2.511 -0.867 3.504 
 (3.480) (2.711) (3.905) 
4-5 Year X Stringent 0.798 1.703 11.903*^^ 
 (4.668) (3.854) (5.350) 
6-7 Year X Stringent 0.892 2.558 10.355+^^ 
 (4.831) (4.282) (5.593) 
8-10 Year X Stringent 1.083 3.561 5.907^ 
 (5.575) (5.067) (6.394) 
Constant 118.778*** 88.406*** 110.597*** 
 (8.125) (6.596) (8.979) 
Variance terms    
State intercepts 0.000 0.000 0.000 
State YPI effects 0.000 0.852 0.197 
Ind. intercepts 3707.513 4057.827 4263.661 
Ind. YPI effects 60.216 74.329 58.511 
Residuals 1967.386 1495.831 1663.585 
N 14592 23730 11261 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
The outcome “Work Hours” coded work hours from those who did not work as zero, and I set work hour values below 1 to 1 
before taking a logarithm of the outcome. See Table 3 for sample and model specifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Results from Wald tests examining whether coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the 
same at the particular YPI category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). 
For example, if Wald tests reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” 






Appendix Table 2: Trajectories of earned income and policy stringencies  















Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year 0.515*** 0.240*** 0.097 0.146*** 0.074*** 0.046+ 
 (0.076) (0.058) (0.077) (0.022) (0.017) (0.024) 
2-3 Year 0.426*** 0.258** -0.023 0.161*** 0.129*** 0.059+ 
 (0.101) (0.082) (0.106) (0.030) (0.024) (0.033) 
4-5 Year 0.632*** 0.301** 0.011 0.198*** 0.134*** 0.078* 
 (0.119) (0.103) (0.126) (0.036) (0.029) (0.039) 
6-7 Year 0.461*** 0.173 -0.078 0.176*** 0.108*** 0.090* 
 (0.131) (0.119) (0.139) (0.039) (0.033) (0.043) 
8-10 Year 0.244 0.088 -0.140 0.094* 0.062 0.070 
 (0.153) (0.142) (0.162) (0.046) (0.038) (0.050) 
YPI X Lenient       
0-1 Year X Lenient -0.088 0.044 -0.084 -0.003 0.018 -0.016 
 (0.240) (0.185) (0.246) (0.069) (0.057) (0.076) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -0.502+ 0.277 -0.102 -0.169* 0.115 0.045 
 (0.285) (0.236) (0.302) (0.084) (0.072) (0.093) 
4-5 Year X Lenient -0.250 0.486 0.055 0.004 -0.025 0.035 
 (0.404) (0.366) (0.422) (0.120) (0.113) (0.131) 
6-7 Year X Lenient -0.274 0.341 -0.197 -0.010 0.041 -0.141 
 (0.405) (0.381) (0.428) (0.122) (0.114) (0.133) 
8-10 Year X Lenient -0.198 0.335 -0.094 0.088 0.080 -0.159 
 (0.449) (0.425) (0.466) (0.136) (0.124) (0.144) 
YPI X Stringent       
0-1 Year X Stringent -0.115 -0.001 0.113 -0.029 -0.013 0.028 
 (0.102) (0.077) (0.108) (0.030) (0.023) (0.033) 
2-3 Year X Stringent -0.095 -0.125 0.161 -0.007 -0.051+^^ 0.021 
 (0.124) (0.103) (0.135) (0.037) (0.030) (0.042) 
4-5 Year X Stringent 0.064 0.232 0.401*^ 0.018 0.025 0.075 
 (0.167) (0.145) (0.186) (0.050) (0.041) (0.058) 
6-7 Year X Stringent 0.061 0.229 0.297 0.056 0.042 0.046 
 (0.175) (0.163) (0.197) (0.053) (0.045) (0.061) 
8-10 Year X Stringent 0.180 0.289 0.118 0.118+ 0.073 -0.007 
 (0.202) (0.193) (0.225) (0.061) (0.052) (0.070) 
Constant 4.974*** 4.276*** 5.079*** 1.310*** 1.153*** 1.266*** 
 (0.294) (0.248) (0.320) (0.089) (0.078) (0.099) 
Variance terms       
State intercepts 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
State YPI effects 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ind. intercepts 5.156 6.009 6.039 0.500 0.636 0.588 
Ind. YPI effects 0.091 0.133 0.106 0.010 0.014 0.010 
Residuals 2.368 1.954 1.815 0.195 0.189 0.173 
N 14592 23730 11261 14531 23500 11199 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
For each of the two earned income outcomes, observations not having any earned income are coded as 0, and I set all values 
below 1 to 1 before taking a logarithm of the outcome. See Table 3 for sample and model specifications. Wage and earning 
values are expressed in January 1996 US dollars using Consumer Price Index. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Results from 
Wald tests examining whether coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the 
particular YPI category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, 
if Wald tests reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-





 Appendix Table 3: Trajectories of TANF participation and policy stringencies (Individual Fixed Effects) 








Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year -0.047*** -0.018*** 0.015* 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) 
2-3 Year -0.108*** -0.033*** -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.010) 
4-5 Year -0.142*** -0.020** 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.008) (0.014) 
6-7 Year -0.186*** -0.024** -0.006 
 (0.023) (0.009) (0.016) 
8-10 Year -0.174*** -0.023* -0.005 
 (0.026) (0.010) (0.018) 
YPI X Lenient    
0-1 Year X Lenient 0.022 0.035** 0.020 
 (0.034) (0.014) (0.024) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -0.040 0.029+ 0.040 
 (0.039) (0.015) (0.027) 
4-5 Year X Lenient -0.064 0.016 0.033 
 (0.083) (0.042) (0.055) 
6-7 Year X Lenient -0.020 -0.002 0.040 
 (0.087) (0.044) (0.057) 
8-10 Year X Lenient -0.054 0.023 0.060 
 (0.092) (0.045) (0.060) 
YPI X Stringent    
0-1 Year X Stringent -0.035*^^ 0.006^^ -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.010) 
2-3 Year X Stringent -0.103***^^ 0.009^ -0.014^ 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.012) 
4-5 Year X Stringent -0.046 -0.008 -0.032 
 (0.031) (0.012) (0.022) 
6-7 Year X Stringent -0.061+ -0.011 -0.042+ 
 (0.034) (0.013) (0.024) 
8-10 Year X Stringent -0.068+ -0.017 -0.055*^ 
 (0.037) (0.014) (0.026) 
Constant 0.395*** 0.056*** 0.075** 
 (0.035) (0.016) (0.025) 
Rho 0.636 0.632 0.586 
N 14592 23730 11261 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
All samples are restricted to US-born women aged 18-45 at time of TANF implementation in a given state, not having any 
college education, having lived in the current state of residence before 1996, and did not move during the panel. Individual 
observations from years in which they enroll in school for more than one third of the observed months in a year were excluded. 
Sample categorization (single mothers, married mothers, or single women without children) is based on the sample characteristics 
at time of TANF implementation. All models control for women’s race (White (ref.), Black, Hispanics, and other race), and time-
varying characteristics, including age in categories (18-24 (ref.), 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-45, 45-49, 50-57), whether married, 
household size (1, 2, 3 or 4 (ref.), 5 or more), number of children (0, 1, 2 (ref.), and 3 or more), and unemployment rates in state s 
and year t, and individual fixed effects. The reference group for TANF policy stringencies is the standard policy. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis. Results from Wald tests examining whether coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient 
X YPI are the same at the particular YPI category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ 
indicates p<0.05). For example, if Wald tests reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X 





Appendix Table 4: Trajectories of SNAP and SSI participation and policy stringencies (Individual Fixed 
Effects) 















Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year -0.056*** -0.018* 0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) 
2-3 Year -0.154*** -0.034*** 0.011 0.001 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) 
4-5 Year -0.151*** -0.031* 0.045+ 0.008 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.023) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) 
6-7 Year -0.168*** -0.038* 0.025 -0.001 0.013 -0.002 
 (0.028) (0.015) (0.027) (0.017) (0.008) (0.015) 
8-10 Year -0.142*** -0.022 0.064* 0.002 0.008 0.013 
 (0.031) (0.017) (0.030) (0.019) (0.009) (0.017) 
YPI X Lenient       
0-1 Year X Lenient -0.067+ 0.037 0.022 0.003 0.006 -0.009 
 (0.041) (0.024) (0.040) (0.024) (0.012) (0.023) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -0.055 -0.001 -0.058 0.003 -0.001 -0.053* 
 (0.046) (0.026) (0.045) (0.027) (0.013) (0.026) 
4-5 Year X Lenient 0.009 0.026 -0.080 0.065 -0.017 -0.058 
 (0.098) (0.073) (0.092) (0.059) (0.038) (0.053) 
6-7 Year X Lenient 0.019 -0.017 -0.095 0.106+ 0.007 -0.033 
 (0.103) (0.076) (0.096) (0.062) (0.039) (0.055) 
8-10 Year X Lenient 0.062 -0.049 -0.019 0.131* 0.015 -0.022 
 (0.109) (0.079) (0.100) (0.065) (0.040) (0.058) 
YPI X Stringent       
0-1 Year X Stringent -0.014 -0.001 -0.006 0.003 0.007 0.000 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) 
2-3 Year X Stringent -0.014 -0.008 -0.031 -0.007 0.012* -0.009 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.021) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) 
4-5 Year X Stringent 0.070+ 0.028 -0.002 0.006 0.025*^ 0.024 
 (0.037) (0.021) (0.038) (0.022) (0.011) (0.022) 
6-7 Year X Stringent 0.056 0.029 -0.003 0.013 0.017 0.013 
 (0.040) (0.022) (0.040) (0.024) (0.012) (0.023) 
8-10 Year X Stringent 0.048 0.029 -0.016 0.021 0.013 0.001 
 (0.044) (0.025) (0.044) (0.026) (0.013) (0.025) 
Constant 0.506*** 0.255*** 0.213*** 0.127*** 0.054*** 0.140*** 
 (0.041) (0.028) (0.042) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024) 
Rho 0.702 0.669 0.694 0.778 0.761 0.849 
N 14592 23730 11261 14592 23730 11261 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
See Appendix Table 3 for sample and model specifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Results from Wald tests 
examining whether coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the particular YPI 
category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, if Wald tests 
reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-value is 






Appendix Table 5: Trajectories of labor supply and policy stringencies (Individual Fixed Effects) 















Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year 0.086*** 0.036*** 0.011 4.260+ 1.054 -1.699 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (2.380) (1.572) (2.432) 
2-3 Year 0.113*** 0.061*** 0.021 9.822** 5.133* 1.601 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (3.167) (2.128) (3.377) 
4-5 Year 0.131*** 0.068*** 0.022 11.614** 2.984 -8.661+ 
 (0.026) (0.019) (0.027) (4.248) (2.881) (4.642) 
6-7 Year 0.126*** 0.062** 0.024 13.731** 8.933** -13.054* 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (4.966) (3.387) (5.494) 
8-10 Year 0.125*** 0.058* 0.039 15.838** 12.438** -14.949* 
 (0.035) (0.024) (0.035) (5.650) (3.825) (6.163) 
YPI X Lenient       
0-1 Year X Lenient 0.038 0.015 0.011 -7.830 -2.754 -12.991+ 
 (0.045) (0.033) (0.046) (7.153) (5.137) (7.750) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -0.009 0.060 0.029 4.315 5.328 -6.317 
 (0.051) (0.037) (0.052) (8.149) (5.648) (8.813) 
4-5 Year X Lenient 0.058 0.072 0.035 1.757 11.875 -46.689** 
 (0.109) (0.103) (0.107) (17.268) (15.860) (17.419) 
6-7 Year X Lenient 0.059 0.071 0.014 -0.043 0.529 -41.728* 
 (0.114) (0.107) (0.112) (17.954) (16.562) (18.301) 
8-10 Year X Lenient 0.112 0.061 0.005 3.762 1.997 -36.991+ 
 (0.121) (0.111) (0.117) (19.050) (17.116) (19.275) 
YPI X Stringent       
0-1 Year X Stringent -0.007 0.003 0.046*^ 2.883 1.923 3.561^ 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (3.130) (2.075) (3.372) 
2-3 Year X Stringent -0.004 -0.017^ 0.031 0.517 0.740 -0.022 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.024) (3.677) (2.437) (4.080) 
4-5 Year X Stringent 0.013 0.011 0.083+ -5.033 0.868 17.138*^^ 
 (0.041) (0.029) (0.044) (6.720) (4.577) (7.869) 
6-7 Year X Stringent 0.008 0.038 0.052 -6.472 -2.167 21.787*^^ 
 (0.044) (0.032) (0.047) (7.301) (4.959) (8.541) 
8-10 Year X Stringent 0.006 0.047 0.014 -9.820 -3.639 22.186*^^ 
 (0.049) (0.035) (0.051) (8.005) (5.439) (9.236) 
Constant 0.642*** 0.664*** 0.591*** 157.876*** 149.071*** 154.847*** 
 (0.045) (0.039) (0.049) (7.450) (6.207) (8.468) 
Rho 0.640 0.684 0.711 0.594 0.680 0.643 
N 14592 23730 11261 10860 17698 8153 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
For the outcome “Work Hours”, observations that did not work were excluded from the sample, and I set work hour values below 
1 to 1 before taking a logarithm of work hours. See Appendix Table 3 for sample and model specifications. Results from work 
hour models are restricted to those who have non-zero work hours. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Results from Wald tests 
examining whether coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the particular YPI 
category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, if Wald tests 
reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-value is 







Appendix Table 6: Trajectories of earned income and policy stringencies (Individual Fixed Effects) 















Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year 0.181*** 0.103*** 0.112*** 0.087*** 0.069*** 0.082*** 
 (0.029) (0.022) (0.030) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) 
2-3 Year 0.282*** 0.225*** 0.199*** 0.113*** 0.124*** 0.115*** 
 (0.038) (0.029) (0.042) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) 
4-5 Year 0.386*** 0.269*** 0.287*** 0.138*** 0.146*** 0.187*** 
 (0.051) (0.039) (0.058) (0.026) (0.023) (0.032) 
6-7 Year 0.445*** 0.348*** 0.347*** 0.132*** 0.172*** 0.273*** 
 (0.060) (0.046) (0.068) (0.031) (0.027) (0.038) 
8-10 Year 0.415*** 0.371*** 0.379*** 0.108** 0.158*** 0.268*** 
 (0.069) (0.052) (0.077) (0.035) (0.031) (0.043) 
YPI X Lenient       
0-1 Year X Lenient -0.018 -0.040 -0.055 -0.040 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.086) (0.071) (0.095) (0.044) (0.042) (0.054) 
2-3 Year X Lenient -0.076 0.090 -0.078 -0.021 0.039 0.072 
 (0.099) (0.079) (0.109) (0.050) (0.046) (0.061) 
4-5 Year X Lenient -0.315 0.138 0.116 0.124 -0.049 0.015 
 (0.208) (0.226) (0.216) (0.106) (0.133) (0.120) 
6-7 Year X Lenient -0.360+ 0.138 0.148 0.136 0.027 -0.107 
 (0.216) (0.234) (0.227) (0.110) (0.138) (0.127) 
8-10 Year X Lenient -0.272 0.242 0.031 0.179 0.041 -0.094 
 (0.230) (0.241) (0.239) (0.117) (0.142) (0.134) 
YPI X Stringent       
0-1 Year X Stringent -0.050 0.014 -0.001 -0.013 -0.013 -0.024 
 (0.038) (0.028) (0.042) (0.019) (0.017) (0.024) 
2-3 Year X Stringent -0.047 -0.009 0.000 0.019 0.001 -0.026 
 (0.045) (0.033) (0.051) (0.023) (0.020) (0.028) 
4-5 Year X Stringent -0.159+^ 0.069 0.043 0.040 0.059 -0.041 
 (0.082) (0.063) (0.099) (0.041) (0.037) (0.055) 
6-7 Year X Stringent -0.150+^ 0.054 0.103 0.095* 0.038 -0.062 
 (0.089) (0.068) (0.107) (0.045) (0.040) (0.060) 
8-10 Year X Stringent -0.094 0.081 0.069 0.131**^^ 0.065 -0.065 
 (0.097) (0.075) (0.116) (0.049) (0.044) (0.065) 
Constant 6.711*** 6.769*** 6.761*** 1.911*** 1.993*** 2.003*** 
 (0.090) (0.085) (0.106) (0.046) (0.050) (0.059) 
Rho 0.740 0.770 0.771 0.749 0.737 0.736 
N 10729 17241 8065 10741 17238 8044 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
For each of the two earned income outcomes, observations that did not work were excluded from the sample, and I set all income 
values below 1 to 1 before taking a logarithm of the outcome. Wage and earning values are expressed in January 1996 US dollars 
using Consumer Price Index. See Appendix Table 3 for sample and model specifications. Results from earned income or hourly 
wage models are restricted to those who have earnings or wage information. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Results from 
Wald tests examining whether coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the 
particular YPI category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, 
if Wald tests reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-





Appendix Table 7: Trajectories of financial independence and disconnect and policy stringencies (Individual 
Fixed Effects) 
 Financial Independence 
















Years since Policy Influence (YPI) (Reference: -2 to -1 year) 
0-1 Year 0.055*** 0.017* -0.011 0.002 -0.009 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
2-3 Year 0.158*** 0.032** -0.006 0.031** -0.005 0.028+ 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
4-5 Year 0.156*** 0.022 -0.051* 0.012 -0.015 0.020 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) 
6-7 Year 0.183*** 0.026 -0.022 0.029+ -0.000 0.048* 
 (0.027) (0.016) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) 
8-10 Year 0.159*** 0.011 -0.050+ 0.042* 0.012 0.046+ 
 (0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) 
YPI X Lenient       
0-1 Year X Lenient 0.065+ -0.055* -0.012 -0.002 -0.012 0.002 
 (0.040) (0.025) (0.040) (0.026) (0.028) (0.035) 
2-3 Year X Lenient 0.018 -0.009 0.087+ -0.003 -0.043 0.072+ 
 (0.045) (0.027) (0.045) (0.029) (0.031) (0.040) 
4-5 Year X Lenient 0.035 -0.027 0.136 -0.058 -0.080 0.016 
 (0.096) (0.077) (0.092) (0.063) (0.086) (0.082) 
6-7 Year X Lenient 0.012 0.012 0.155 -0.106 -0.076 0.054 
 (0.100) (0.080) (0.096) (0.066) (0.089) (0.085) 
8-10 Year X Lenient -0.024 0.028 0.126 -0.152* -0.057 0.006 
 (0.106) (0.082) (0.100) (0.070) (0.093) (0.089) 
YPI X Stringent       
0-1 Year X Stringent 0.012 -0.001^ 0.004 0.006 -0.002 -0.016 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
2-3 Year X Stringent 0.000 0.005 0.027 0.004 0.019^ -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) 
4-5 Year X Stringent -0.055 -0.027 0.011 -0.073**^^ -0.037 -0.047 
 (0.036) (0.022) (0.037) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) 
6-7 Year X Stringent -0.060 -0.025 0.009 -0.078**^^ -0.053* -0.036 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.040) (0.026) (0.026) (0.036) 
8-10 Year X Stringent -0.060 -0.018 0.021 -0.090**^^ -0.070*^ -0.012 
 (0.043) (0.026) (0.044) (0.028) (0.029) (0.039) 
Constant 0.429*** 0.714*** 0.697*** -0.043 0.070* 0.118** 
 (0.040) (0.029) (0.042) (0.026) (0.033) (0.037) 
Rho 0.724 0.687 0.756 0.578 0.686 0.645 
N 14592 23730 11261 14592 23730 11261 
Note: +0.1>p≥0.05, *0.05>p≥0.01, **0.01>p≥0.001, ***p<0.001. Each column is a separate linear multilevel regression model. 
See Appendix Table 3 for sample and model specifications. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Results from Wald tests 
examining whether coefficients from interactions between stringent X YPI and lenient X YPI are the same at the particular YPI 
category are presented in the stringent X YPI rows (^ indicates 0.1>p≥0.05 and ^^ indicates p<0.05). For example, if Wald tests 
reveal that the “0-1 Year X Stringent” coefficient is different from the “0-1 Year X Lenient” coefficient, and the p-value is 









This dissertation investigated impacts of regulatory policies on well-being of immigrant 
families and low-income families. In the first paper, I used nationally representative National 
Health Interview Survey (2000-2012) to study the health and mental health impacts of local 
immigration enforcement policies, under Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Secure Communities Program. I found some evidence of 
local immigration enforcement policies negatively impacting mental health and self-rated health 
of Latino immigrants. This study extended prior literature and showed that adverse health effects 
of local immigration enforcement went beyond certain geographical regions (e.g., Arizona or 
North Carolina) and were not limited to anecdotal evidence on personal experience. Also, the 
adverse effects of enforcement manifested in not only mental health but also self-rated health. 
In the second paper, I explored relationships between participation in the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program and parental investments in children, and how 
stringencies in state TANF policy requirements impacted the relationships. I used the 2004 and 
2008 panels of Survey on Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data and found that TANF 
participation was associated with increased family meal times and decreased incidence of family 
outings and reading time. TANF participation was not associated with many other areas of 
parenting (e.g., extracurricular activity participation, family rules on watching TV, positive 
parenting in forms of praising the child or having fun time with them, parenting stress, and 
parental expectation). Also, stringent state TANF policy characteristics were not associated with 
negative parenting behaviors.   
In the last paper, I investigated how state TANF policy stringencies were associated with 




1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of SIPP data (1996-2007), covering the decade following TANF 
implementation. Findings indicated that stringent state TANF policies were strongly related to 
single mothers’ lower likelihood to participate in TANF; however, single mothers used other 
welfare programs (e.g., SNAP and SSI) to the same extent as single mothers living in states with 
less stringent TANF policies. Also, stringent policies did not lead to higher levels of labor supply 
or earned income. The finding on stringent TANF policies’ lack of behavioral effects beyond 
reducing TANF use may enrich evidence that informs policy discussions on restructuring welfare 
rules. 
Taken together, harsh policies in forms of local immigration enforcement policies 
showed to deteriorate health and mental health of Latino immigrant families, and stringent 
welfare rules in forms of short time limits and strict sanctions on noncompliance to work 
requirements in TANF program did not prompt single mothers to work more or use welfare 
programs other than TANF less. Meanwhile, stringent welfare rules did not contribute to lower 
levels of parental investments in children, nor did these rules lower earned income among single 
mothers or increase their likelihood to be disconnected from the labor market or welfare support. 
These findings uncovered how disadvantaged population groups such as low-income and 
immigrant families fared under strict policy environment as well as evaluated whether harsh 
requirements were harmful to their well-being. Studies on impacts of regulatory policies offer 
evidence for policymakers to constantly evaluate the necessity of employing harsh measures. 
Safeguarding interests of “undeserving” and vulnerable populations through public policy 
research is an important mission for social work researchers, and more researchers and studies 
are needed in manifold areas of policies for this effort. 
